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Laying the Framework  
 
Chapter One 
Introduction to the Turkish Olympics 
 
The Turkish Olympics Final is an annual two-week long cultural festival bringing 
together non-Turkish international students from Gulenist schools in other nations to compete in 
a variety of performances throughout Turkey. The performances tend to have international 
school children singing in Turkish, dancing villager dances from Anatolia, reciting Turkish 
poetry and acting in Turkish plays. International school children can also perform in English or 
their own native languages but much of the Turkish media attention is given to the school 
children/performers that learn Turkish.1 Also important at the Turkish Olympics – while the 
majority of performers are international non-Turkish children – there is a space given for Turkish 
children who go to Gulenist schools outside of Turkey. 
The Turkish Islamist “Gulen Movement” sponsors and organizes the Turkish Olympics 
Final and also organizes smaller semi-final contests in which students from their international 
school network compete in home countries to represent each nation at the final. In Egypt, 
Gulenists have organized a semi-final Turkish Olympics festival at the largest Gulenist school in 
the country, Salahaldin International School in Cairo. 
The focus of my thesis is on the Gulenist educational/dormitory/business network in 
Egypt. The Egyptian Gulenist network is the focus of this study for two reasons. The first reason 
is utilitarian in nature. As a master’s student at the American University in Cairo, I spent several 
years in Egypt after I lived and worked with Gulenists in Istanbul. The second reason is 
geopolitical. Turkey and Egypt are seminal nations in the Middle East. The only other country 
with a similar population size as well as cultural and economic import would be Iran. As such 
research on the Gulenists’ actions and business/education network in Egypt – especially after the 
ouster of President Morsi and the rise of President El Sisi – is an important study which touches 
on issues of politics, economics, Islamism and education between Turkey and Egypt. 
 
Naming the Gulenists an Islamist Weberian Status Group 
Imam Muhammed Fethullah Gulen began his Sunni Islamist organization in the late 
1960s and early 1970s in the city of Izmir, Turkey.2 Over forty years later the Gulen Islamist 
group has schools and members in nearly 200 nations across the globe.3 Gulen himself lives as 
an exile from Turkey in an Appalachian Mountain mansion in the United States. He is certainly 
the most famous Turk living abroad, if not the most famous Turk living.  
Students of Imam Fethullah Gulen say they are part of a movement of “likeminded 
thinkers” who are loosely organized around the creation of schools, businesses, hospitals and 
media corporations. True believers of Fethullah Gulen explain that Gulen’s teachings call on 
them to do “service to humanity.” 4 Gulenists believe they are a part of something bigger than an 
Islamist sect.5 They state that Gulen’s teachings will mediate conflict and give peace to the 
world.6 Many Gulenists feel they are part of an international protective and mediating process.7 
In the English speaking world, Gulenists call themselves “The Gulen Movement.” In the Turkish 
speaking world, Gulenists say they are a part of Hizmet Hareketi or “Service Movement.”  
Gulenists make a point to never call themselves a cemaat or Islamist 
congregation/society. Yet, in the formation of a worldwide educational, medical, business and 
media network Gulenists in Turkey and abroad worship together, work together, go to their own 
schools and universities, and attend the same hospitals and the same mosques. They vacation 
together. They marry one another. They bear Gulenist babies together. As such, for the purposes 
of academic study and in accordance with the ethnographic work, I will refer to the Gulenists as 
a Weberian status group/congregation/society. More of this will be explained below. 
In Turkey detractors of the Gulenists call Gulenists a cemaat. Non-Gulenist Turks use the 
word cemaat to stress that the Gulenist organizational structure is purposefully opaque and 
convert. Turkish critics of the Gulenists describe Gulenists as striving to create a parallel state in 
Turkey by controlling the Turkish police, judges and national public prosecutor’s ministry as 
well as a host of other government bureaucracies.8 Disparagers in Turkey state that the Gulenists 
exist only for money and the growth of Gulenist private Islamist corporations and schools in 
Turkey and around the world. These attackers say the actions of the Gulen congregation 
ultimately serve only to enrich the leaders of the congregation. Doubters say the Gulenists are 
secretive. Detractors say the Gulenists are surreptitious. Detractors fling a lot of mud. 
Yet some of the mud sticks. In the four years working for and studying the Gulenists and 
Gulenism, I have seen that – while not all of the mud detractors fling is true – much of what 
detractors in Turkey say about the Gulenists has merit. The “Gulen Movement” is not a fluid 
poetic “happenstance” that naturally floated out of the collective brain sphere of Anatolian Turks 
intent on “world peace.” Gulenism is a planned, organized, controlled and disciplined Islamist 
network that is spreading all over the world. As such I will sometimes use the word “Islamist”, 
“congregation” or “society” to describe the Gulenists. However, in naming and understanding 
what Gulenism is, it is necessary to find an academic framework that will advance conceptual 
understanding of this group that goes beyond the binary clouded hatred Turkish (and foreign) 
detractors feel toward Gulenism and the “movement for world service” idealism Gulenists 
believe about themselves. 
Sociologist Karl Emil Maximillian “Max” Weber’s (1864 – 1920) ideas on modernity 
and capitalism are useful in understanding and naming Gulenism. In this study on Gulenism, I 
will use Weber’s critique of Marxist notions of class as well as Weber’s concept of status group 
as part of the larger social structure. Later in the thesis I will also discuss Gulenism through 
Weber’s ideas on politics and bureaucracy.  
Regarding Weber’s (and Marx’s) critique of class in capitalism, Gulenism functions 
along classist and capitalist lines. Within the Gulenist media organization where I worked for 
nearly two years I saw the division between management and lower level workers. The notion of 
villager Anatolian classism as expressed in Gulenist Islamist Turkish corporations certainly has a 
place in the critique of Gulenism. In some ways scholars cannot help but understand Gulenism 
through the prism of “class.” And yet, while class exists in Gulenism, something else is at play in 
the organization of the Islamist congregation/society. 
Weber’s ideas on status groups, based around the concepts of honor and prestige9, 
provides insight into Gulenism. The Gulen congregation/society is formulated around being a 
status group both in Turkey and abroad. As per Weber10, the Gulen status group is, at times, 
segregated and at other times active and connected with the greater world. Gulenists believe that 
honor and status is gained in the spreading of Fethullah Gulen’s vision via Gulenist schools, 
businesses, hospitals and media institutions.11 Also, Weberian status groups justify their group’s 
actions. The Gulenists I interviewed in my fieldwork were convinced that they were “serving 
humanity.”12 As such I argue that Gulenists’ belief in this “service to humanity” is an important 
component of their honor/prestige system. The Gulen society while at times being divided by 
class can transcend classism. The role of Sohbet groups (religious discussion groups) supersedes 
the class dynamic in Gulenism. Gulen congregational leaders – some of whom are not wealthy – 
have a voice within the Gulen congregation/society especially when discussing how the business 
institutions and bureaucracies of Gulenism connect to the ultimate “world service” altruism of 
Gulenism.13 In terms of social organization, Weber rightly saw that the need for self-preservation 
creates “protective” and/or “covert” behaviors in honor based status groups separate from class.14 
I will use the term Islamist status group interchangeably with the terms “Islamist 
congregation/society” in discussing and naming the Gulenists. Yet, I will give more weight in 
this thesis to the term “status group” as it better reflects the Gulenist organization and network. 
By including the term “Islamist” I do not seek to replicate Weber’s antiquated notions around 
religion and capitalism. I use the term Islamist because Gulenists have a Sunni Imam as a 
spiritual leader – Fethullah Gulen – who is an entrenched Sunni Islamist and influenced by the 
political and religious discourses of earlier Anatolian Sunni Islamist leaders such as Mevlana 
Rumi and Said Nursi.* 
 
The Turkish Olympics 
For nearly two years (2011 – 2013), I worked as a part-time TV reporter and Istanbul 
correspondent for a Gulenist TV channel named Ebru TV, which was owned by the largest 
Gulenist TV channel, Samanyolu. I went to Gulenist meetings, conferences and covered the 
news. Of all that I saw in my two years with the TV channel, by far the most compelling was the 
production of a two-week long event in early June called “The Turkish Olympics.”  
Gulenist educators began the first Turkish Olympic gatherings in 2001.15 From 2005 
                                                 
*It is important to note that Gulenism is not a Sufi movement as is mistakenly thought by many academics in 
Islamic studies. Though influenced by leading Sufi, Jalal ad-Din “Mevlana” Rumi (1207 – 1273) Fethullah Gulen’s 
ideas come more from his mentor Said Nursi (1872? – 1960). Nursi and Nursi’s Nur status group/congregation were 
concerned with an Islamist/deist re-imagining of modernity in which spiritualism (as opposed to materialism) would 
be the featured epistemology. Nurism and later Gulenism are fundamentally practical political expressions of Sunni 
Islam. In terms of of worldview and general perspective I have observed that Nurists and Gulenists have more in 
common with Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood than they do with Sufi orders in Turkey or in Egypt. 
onward, with support from then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government, the 
Gulenists began to expand the event until it became the largest festival in Turkey. Up until 2014 
the Turkish Olympics as a cultural event was popular in Turkey. The closing ceremony at the 
end of the two weeks was broadcast live on multiple Turkish channels and attended by hundreds 
of thousands. Leading up to the closing ceremony touring Turkish Olympics international 
student participants performed in cities across the Anatolian hinterland. The audience of the 
Turkish Olympics was Turkish speaking and, as such, the spectacle of international school 
children learning Turkish and then traveling to Turkey became a focal point of national pride and 
played on Anatolian traditions of hospitality. At the same time, the Turkish Olympics became a 
space for each child to represent his or her own nationalism; embodying multiple nationalisms in 
the global south. Also at play at the Turkish Olympics in Turkey was the concept of 
internationalism and its transformative power in recreating Turkish national identity. 
 
 
Indoctrination of Performing Children into the Islamist/Capitalist Gulen Congregation and 
Deployment of “Turkish” Audience Members at the Turkish Olympics 
The Fethullah Gulen status group’s use of Islamism, Turkish nationalism and 
internationalism at the Turkish Olympics is meant to indoctrinate performing children into the 
groups’ Islamist congregational structure. Also the spectacle of international school children 
performing in Turkish works to excite and eventually recruit Turkish Olympics “Turkish” 
audience members into the multinational Gulenist educational, business, health care and media 
network. 
As such the primary focus of this research will be on international non-Turkish 
performing school children and Turkish audience members at the Turkish Olympics. 
However, a secondary focus of study emerged from the field work and needs to be 
included in this thesis as it informs the creation of the Turkish Olympics. The secondary focus of 
this study is the Turkish school children who participated in the Turkish Olympics as performers 
and the Egyptian audience members (many are family members of performing Egyptian 
children) who attended the finals of the Turkish Olympics in Egypt in 2014. 
 
Argument 1: Child Indoctrination 
Use of School/Dormitory Networks to Further the Gulen Congregation and Create the 
Turkish Olympics: Albania, Bosnia, Northern Iraq, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Egypt 
Gulenists respondents stated that the largest numbers of the Gulen status group 
educational school/dormitory networks are in Albania, Bosnia, northern Iraq, Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan.16 These dormitories are important points of child indoctrination into Gulenism and 
as such are spaces where reportedly many dormitory residents are active as performers at the 
Turkish Olympics. 
When discussing the role of Albanians (and Bosnians) in Gulenist society, it is important 
to see the special relationship eastern European Muslim majority regions had with Turkish 
nationalism and Turkish Islamism going back to the Ottoman Empire, which is significant in 
understanding how the Gulen congregation made membership and institutional inroads into 
eastern European Muslim majority milieus (especially the elites within those milieus).17 When 
discussing the Gulenist influence in northern Iraq it is fundamental to examine Erdogan’s foreign 
policy and desire for good relations with northern Kurdish Iraqi leaders. The Gulen status group 
was a power broker within Erdogan’s AK Party from 2001 until falling out with Erdogan in late 
2013.18 The details of the Gulenist/AKP fallout will be covered in later chapters.  
From 2001 to 2013 Gulenists supported Erdogan in many initiatives.19 Gulen 
congregational leaders state that much of the diplomatic success Erdogan experienced in 
northern Iraq had to do with the Gulen congregation’s building of an extensive educational 
network there.20 Erdogan was then able to parley Gulenist built educational capital into good will 
for Turkey and Turkish business.21  
When discussing the role of Turkic speaking central Asians in the Gulen society, it is 
important to note that after the fall of the Soviet Union, Gulenists built their first international 
schools in central Asian Turkic republics.22 However, the idea of Turkish political, economic and 
cultural expansion into central Asia did not start with the Gulen congregation. 
The Gulen status group’s expansion into Central Asia was facilitated by an earlier 
discourse in Turkish nationalism. Turkish cultural (and if possible political) expansion into 
central Asia had been a goal of rightest nationalists in Turkey and the Ottoman State since the 
nineteenth century.23 
Turanist Thought in Gulenism and Nationalism(s) 
According to nationalist discourse in Turkey, “Turks” in Anatolia lost direct land contact 
with their supposed central Asian brethren in 1501 with the rise of modern Safavid Iran. 
However, proto-nationalist Turks in the late Ottoman Empire looking for a primordial creation 
story linked modern day Turkish nationalism to central Asian Turkic folktale/folk art study and 
etymology.24 This form of far-right wing Turkish nationalism is called in Turkey “Turancilik” or 
Turanism.25 “Turan” is an old Persian term referenced in the Persian Shahnameh or “Book of the 
Kings” and means the lands north of Iran; i.e. the Turkic lands of central Asia.26 That the Gulen 
congregation built its first international schools in Turkic nations precisely as the Soviet Union 
pulled out of oil rich central Asia was not an accident. In the early 1990s, Gulenists built their 
first international schools in a region most palatable to Turkish nationalists. As such the 
Gulenists’ act of building schools across central Asian nations was an employment of rightest 
Turkish nationalism and a way to galvanize private Turkish capital for new private educational 
opportunities in central Asia. 
Certainly, not all Gulenists are Turanists. There are fundamental differences between 
Gulenism and Turanism. Gulenism is more open-minded to other cultures and belief systems 
than Turanism. For example, Gulenists discuss the importance of what I have posited as 
“comradery internationalism” (that is the concept at the Turkish Olympics where participants 
have mutual respect for each other’s nationalisms). “Comradery internationalism” at the Turkish 
Olympics is a concept purist Turanists do not hold in high regard because Turanists are Turkic 
internationalists intent on creating a new Turkic nation from western China to Istanbul.27 
However, the Gulen congregation’s use of Turanist ideology to further its 
educational/Islamist mission in central Asia and the appropriation of Turanist greeting norms to 
curry male sentiment shows that the Gulenists employ right wing nationalist discourse in Turkey 
and abroad. 
 
Argument 2: “Turkish” Audience Excitement and Deployment 
Turkish Civilization and Turkish Culture in the Gulenist Appropriation of Turkishness 
The Turkish Olympics is a space where audience members are able to position 
themselves as Turkish citizen/hosts and parley this host status into employment opportunities in 
Turkey and possible deployment to work at Gulenist institutions abroad. In order to attract Turks 
in Turkey to work abroad, the Turkish Olympics in Turkey reinvents traditional Kemalist 
understandings of Turkish national identity (Turkishness). As such the Turkish Olympics in 
Turkey provides a venue for citizens of Turkey to reimagine their place in the state sanctioned 
assimilation process known as Turkishness. 
The Turkish Olympics attracted an audience in Turkey which initially came to the 
Turkish Olympics out of curiosity at the existence of Turkish and non-Turkish children involved 
in an international festival which featured Turkishness (being Turkish) as a unifying 
component.28 Famed historian of Turkey, Eric Zucker, explains that Turkish national identity 
production starting in the Kemalist era was tied to an inclusive/exclusive discourse around the 
concepts of “Turkish civilization” (inclusive in that all citizens of Turkey are part of “Turkish 
Civilization”) and “Turkish culture” (exclusive in that only members of the citizenry who follow 
certain social norms of “ethnic Turkishness” can possess Turkish culture).29 As readers will see 
in chapter three, the role of civilization and culture’s reimagination at the Turkish Olympics is 
tied to Islamist and multiethnic (non-Turkish) audience members’ national identity reinvention. 
The Turkish Olympics then is a space where audience members are able to position 
themselves as “civilized” Turkish citizen/hosts and parley this host status into employment 
opportunities in Turkey and possible deployment for work at Gulen status group institutions 
abroad. 
Said Nursi’s Influence on Gulenist Islamism 
The spread of Said Nursi’s Islamist movement in the 1930s and 1940s presents scholars 
with the development of a new Islamist discourse running counter to the Kemalist state. Nurism 
was both anti-nationalistic and anti-materialistic but it was far from being reactionary against the 
project of modernity.30 Nurism discussed how Muslims could connect with the modern world in 
spite of Kemalist laicism.31 Gulenism, as an offshoot of the Nursi Islamist status 
group/congregation, accepted Turkishness and Turkish nationalism but Gulenism’s acceptance of 
Turkishness comes with multiple caveats.32 Gulenists loathe materialism and Kemalists’ use of 
statism and modernism.33 Yet it is Gulenism’s critique of statist and modernist projects in 
Turkey that gives the most insight into Gulenists’ appropriation of Turkishness. The Gulen status 
group’s international education and health care networks and the congregation’s belief in its 
“service to humanity” show that Gulenism does not oppose “civilizing” modernist projects. On 
the contrary, Gulenism embraces such projects. Also, Gulenism is not opposed to the Turkish 
state as many members of the Gulen status group are police officers, state prosecutors and judges 
in Turkey.34 The fact that many of these same police officers, state prosecutors and judges (and 
members of the Turkish military) are arrested and/or out of work following the failed July 15, 
2016 coup against Erdogan and the AKP led state show how connected Gulenists are with power 
politics in Turkey. 
Gulenists support Turkish nationalism and a reinvented spiritualist modernity.35 This 
reinvented modernity comes from Said Nursi’s belief in an internationalized modernity in which 
all deists – regardless of being Islamic, Jewish or Christian – battle against materialism.36 
Following the example of Fethullah Gulen’s 1998 visit to Pope John Paul II at the Vatican, 
international Gulenist schools often organize “dialogue centers” in new cities and countries. The 
purpose of these centers is to reach out to locals regardless of their faith.37 In the US, Gulenist 
dialogue centers tend to reach out to Christians, Jews and other Sunni Islamic groups.38  
In Egypt, the overall anti-Islamist and anti-Turkish rhetoric in the country since the fall of 
President Morsi in July 2013 has created an environment where Gulenists must be careful how 
Egyptian authorities perceive Gulenist educational and/or dialogue activities.39 Before July 2013 
the Gulen congregation had a relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.40 In fact a 
week before President Morsi was ousted, leading Gulenist Mustafa Ozcan planned to go to Egypt 
to meet with Muslim Brotherhood leadership and counsel a more moderate approach to relations 
with the Egyptian military and left-wing Egyptian politicians.41 Following the July 3, 2013 
ouster of President Morsi, the Gulen status group in Egypt have allied themselves with the 
administration of President El Sisi and stressed their anti-Erdogan credentials.42 
Islamism and Performance at the Turkish Olympics in Turkey 
The Turkish Olympics is a performance where Turkish Islamism lies bare and naked. To 
understand how a cultural festival can hold political meaning for Islamists in Turkey, scholars 
need only view how organizers of the Turkish Olympics portray Imam Fethullah Gulen to the 
Turkish audience. 
The beginnings of Turkish Olympics performances in Turkey present audiences with a 
twenty-year old video of Imam Fethullah Gulen giving a “divinely inspired” sermon in which 
Gulen predicts that Turkey will one day have “an Olympics.”43 Turkish audience members 
watching the Turkish Olympics on TV or seeing the Olympics live next see Gulen’s digitalized 
image discussing dialogue centers, schools, progress in Turkey and “Olympic ceremonies” 
which display the activities of “Hizmet friends” (code words Gulenists use to describe 
themselves). While Gulenist Islamism is not overt at the Turkish Olympics in Turkey, it is 
certainly not covert either. The digital presence of Imam Fethullah Gulen (the leader of the 
Islamist Gulenist congregation) at the Turkish Olympics in itself infuses the discourse of the 
Turkish Olympics with an Islamist undertone.44 
 
  
Thesis Argument 3: Economic Growth of the Gulen Status Group 
Much of the rational for continued growth of the Gulen status group comes from a fusion 
of Islamism and capitalism. As such the Turkish Olympics as a festival spurs economic growth 
and wealth production conducted within the rules of an Islamist congregational structure.45  
In interviews, Gulen status group leaders stated that the Gulenist business organization 
TUSKON (Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists) has generated nearly 400 
billion new dollars for the Turkish economy in new international trade since 2004/2005.46  
Turkish corporations have spread across the globe, so too has Gulen status group’s schools.47 In 
fact, this spread of economic and educational capital is linked as the international Gulen 
congregation schools become meeting points where local elites meet visiting Turkish business 
leaders.48 
As stated before many Gulenists believe they are a part of something bigger than an 
Islamist and capitalist sect.49 Interviewees generally believed they were part of a worldwide 
“service to humanity movement” which somehow dwarfed the importance of the status group’s 
separate business/private educational enterprises.50 Gulenists, regardless of being wealthy or 
poor, tended to deny that the Gulen congregation is a hierarchical international educational 
network connected to private, for-profit elite status production. In interviews, Gulenists believed 
that the Gulen status group as an institution would protect51 them from the dangers of the non-
congregational world.52 
While the Gulen status group is profit based and capitalistic in nature53, Gulenists use the 
Islamist congregation as a protective barrier from the uncertainties of unfettered neo-liberalism 
(called vahsi kapitalizm or “wild capitalism” in Turkish).54 Poor Gulenist interviewees seem to 
accept class disparity within the status group because at least poor and wealthy Gulenist children 
alike can go to schools and get health care at little or no expense. The popular Turkish adage 
Suruden ayrilan koyunu kurt kapar is apropos for understanding the protection the Gulen status 
group provides for members. The translation of the adage is: “The sheep which strays from the 
herd is snatched by the wolf.” 
I have seen while working for a Gulenist media organizations (Samanyolu and Cihan 
News Agency) that Gulenists do not fire under-performing employees as long the employees in 
question work hard and are believers.55 While salaries at congregational institutions are below 
industry standards, there always appeared to be a position somewhere in the organization’s 
business enterprises, educational and health services for believers of Fethullah Gulen and 
Gulen’s vision of Hizmet or worldwide “service to humanity.”56 As such firing or the termination 
of employment was unheard of within the status group. As long as members were believers in 
Fethullah Gulen’s spiritual (and economic and political) message, then there was always a place 
of employment for believers. And again, even if salaries are low in Gulen status group 
institutions, the congregation has extensive business, education, media, and health care services 
that members use at little or no cost.57 
This protective-ness inherent in the Gulen status group should not surprise academics. In 
a laissez-faire world where the state is in retreat it is rational that people would unify in religious 
status groups. In fact, given the intense privatization in Turkey since 1980 it is quite logical that 




My research primarily followed Egyptian and Turkish students and teachers who 
attended or worked at Salahaldin International School in Cairo, Egypt. Salahaldin is the leading 
Gulenist school in Egypt and one of the more expensive international schools in Cairo. 
The research for my thesis consisted of ethnography, visual analysis, and observational 
studies. I questioned how the Turkish Olympics deals with nationalism, Islamism, capitalism and 
congregationalism. I conducted interviews with students, parents, Turkish faculty, sponsors, 
judges and audience members of the Turkish Olympics. 
 My fluency in Turkish allowed me great access into the Gulen status group and my 
history as a TV reporter/journalist working with an American/Turkish Gulenist TV channel 
added to the openness of Gulenists to express themselves and their worldview to me. With my 
contacts in the Gulen congregation, I interviewed over seventy active Gulenists in Cairo, Egypt, 
Istanbul, Turkey and in Germany. Besides low-level Gulenists, I was able to interview leading 
heads of the congregation and the President of the Turkish Olympics. 
 I was never beholden to the Gulenists during the production of this thesis. From October 
2011 until August 2013, I worked as a part-time TV correspondent/reporter and assistant news 
editor at Ebru TV the American/Turkish branch of the largest Gulen TV channel in Turkey, 
Samanyolu. I began my formal research into the Turkish Olympics and the Gulen status group in 
January 2014. Consequently, I was not connected to the Gulen congregation in any capacity 
while producing this thesis. 
 Gathering general background information on the Gulen congregation occurred in 
informal conversations between myself and my TV producer, “Abdullah Erdogan”, from 
October 2011 until August 2013. As a leading Gulenist media producer, Erdogan was an 
individual who provided invaluable information on the scope, size and functioning of the Gulen 
status group. 
I began initial investigations for this thesis on the Turkish Olympics in the summer of 
2013 and completed the final interviews on the Turkish Olympics in September 2015. However, 
the vast bulk of the interviews and ethnographic work took place from January 2014 until June 
2014, or a 5-month time period. In this time, I interviewed performing school children (twenty 
respondents), Turkish teachers (thirty respondents) and Egyptian parents (fifteen respondents) of 
the students to learn why they encourage students to perform at the Turkish Olympics. Besides 
the performers and those around them, I interviewed judges (twenty respondents) and sponsors 
(three respondents) of the Turkish Olympics in Egypt, Turkey and Germany. Finally, I conducted 
extensive interviews with “Turkish” audience members (twenty respondents) who attended the 
Turkish Olympics Final both in Turkey (from 2005 – 2013) and in Germany (in 2014) in order to 
understand the excitement/incitement and then later deployment process that audience members 
at the Turkish Olympics experienced.  
While some of the categories of respondents I interviewed were separate, oftentimes the 
categories of respondents meshed. For example, a Gulenist Turkish judge of the Turkish 
Olympics who worked as a teacher at Salahaldin International School in Egypt might have been 
an audience member of the Turkish Olympics in Turkey seven years earlier. This interviewee 
could possess multiple roles in the ethnography in that he could speak to being a Gulenist judge 
at the Turkish Olympics, a Gulen status group educator at a Gulenist international school and a 
Turkish audience member at the Turkish Olympics. 
The Gulen congregation has discouraged would be Turkish scholars from studying this 
important event for fear of an academic or journalistic attack on their congregation. Ironically, as 
a foreigner, it was in many ways easier for me to do this academic study than a Turkish scholar. 
As stated before my knowledge of Turkish was a great asset to this work both in Egypt and, 
especially, in Turkey. I intend for this study to inform a deeper understanding of the Gülen 
society in the academy and multimedia journalism. 
My field work is fundamental to this study. I was able to chart the Gulenist international 
network based on direct interviews with Gulenists themselves. In many ways having direct 
interviews and contacts with the subject of study had many advantageous. However, there was 
one disadvantage to this kind of research. Readers need to be aware of this short coming in order 
to read the thesis properly.  
Gulenists were telling me about themselves and their congregation. As such there is a 
component of subjectivity inherent in the research. Were respondents always telling me the truth 
or were they lying sometimes? Or were there some lies mixed in with the truths? Did the truths 
that respondents held dear always correlate with reality or were their “truths” a fiction sold to 
them by leaders of the Gulen status group? As the researcher I have tried in the text to highlight 
many of these inconsistences. Yet the fact remains that readers of this thesis need to realize 




The Turkish Olympics affords a view of multiple nationalisms. It is within this 
framework that Islamist Turkey reproduces itself nationally and internationally. The Turkish 
Olympics is a showcase for what Gulenists have done globally; a way to excite their base and a 
means to produce cultural capital and public consent. As such, I conducted a series of 
investigations around the following questions: 
1. How much can the Turkish Olympics inform studies on the newly developing “Black” 
Turk hegemon vis-à-vis Prime Minister Erdogan’s and the AKP’s decade long 
dominance of politics and the economy in Turkey?  
2. How do “Turkish” audience members view performing international students (“the 
other”/symbols of internationalism displaying Turkish nationalism)?  
3. What is the depth of involvement in the Gulen society that performing children 
experience? Are there different levels of involvement these children experience and if so 
what are these levels and how does involvement work at each separate level? 
4. How does this show of multi-cultural exchange under the banner of a seemingly inclusive 
internationalism help scholars better understand Islamist congregations such as the 
Gulenists’ version of Islamist capitalism? 
 
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 This thesis has three parts and seven total chapters. They are as follows: 
Part I: Laying the Framework 
1. Introduction 
2. Literature Review 
Part II: Child Indoctrination at the Turkish Olympics 
3. Theoretical and Historical Background and Literature Review of Child Indoctrination at 
the Turkish Olympics 
4. Ethnography of Child Indoctrination at the Turkish Olympics 
  
Part III: Audience Production and Turkish National Identity Reinvention at the Turkish 
Olympics 
5. Theoretical and Historical Background and Literature Review of Audience Production 
and Turkish National Identity Reinvention at the Turkish Olympics 
6. Ethnography of Audience Production and Turkish National Identity Reinvention at the 
Turkish Olympics 
Part IV: Summary 






A study on a cultural festival funded and articulated by an Islamist status group’s international 
educational network has never been done before. Research on the Turkish Olympics must 
discuss Turkish nationalism as the superior (or at least dominant) nationalism on display at a 
festival of multiple global southern nationalisms. As such this research will add to academic 
understanding of global south on global south cultural imperialism. Readers will recognize 
Edward Said’s and Timothy Mitchell’s influence in this study. However, unlike Said and 
Mitchell, I do not focus my study on eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth century academic and 
artistic justifications for European imperialism and the resulting cultural festivals (i.e. World’s 
Fairs). My research instead interrogates how a hereto subjugated “oriental” other (“Turks”) 
reinvent themselves at the Turkish Olympics by mapping the world according to their own 
nationalism. I also study how the “other” of the festival – that is performing school children – are 
indoctrinated into the Gulen status group via the Turkish Olympics. 
A collection then of thinkers – many of whom are connected to post-colonial critical 
theory – is necessary to unpack the phenomena of the Turkish Olympics within the Gulen 
congregation/status group. I will utilize studies on spectacle/festivals, cosmopolitanism, 
ethnicism and nationalism in this review of literature.  
I begin with Timothy Mitchell’s work on world fairs in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Mitchell’s critique will inform this thesis’ discussion of the Turkish Olympics as a 
traveling “fair” for nationalist reinvention of the “international Turk” in Turkey. Also this thesis 
will interrogate how the Turkish Olympics works as a Turkish neo-imperialist mapping festival 
in which Turks objectify children and nations of the global south. 
Pierre Bourdieu’s ideas around cultural and educational capital will be used in critiquing 
the Gulenist schools and dormitories as spaces for the development of Gulenist educational 
capital. By using Bourdieu’s concepts of educational capital production, scholars can understand 
the Turkish Olympics as an event, which reifies and displays the Gulen status group’s 
educational capital product. The Turkish Olympics then is involved in the selling and 
consumption of Gulenist education to the wider world. 
The literature review discusses the theory of cosmopolitanism as outlined in the seminal 
book Cairo Cosmopolitan. I will use ideas in Cairo Cosmopolitan to critique how Gulenists 
employ the notions of internationalism/multiethnicism/cosmopolitanism in the formation of their 
status group, the group’s international education network and the Turkish Olympics.  
Ethnicism will be featured in this study on Turkishness, Egyptianness and multiple 
nationalisms under the umbrella of Turkish nationalism. I will compare Max Weber’s ideas on 
the presumptive nature of ethnicities with Anthony D. Smith’s cultural approach or ethno-
symbolism to the study of ethnicism.  
Any study on nationalism would not be complete without Benedict Anderson. 
Anderson’s ideas on print capital utilizing dialects and creating “national languages” will be 
fundamental for this thesis’ study on Turkish nationalism. Also I will discuss Anderson’s more 
esoteric studies such as his critique of death, timelessness and how these two existentialisms 
connect with modern nationalism.  
Ernest Gellner states that nationalism in the industrial age is tied to state-sponsored 
education, which in turn codifies and imposes on the populace of the state a nationalized 
communication/language. Gellner’s ideas will helpful in the unpacking of the Gulen status 
group’s employment of multiple nationalisms in their worldwide school and dormitory network. 
Gellner’s work connects with Anderson’s interrogation of nationalism and Bourdieu’s studies on 
educational capital production. Using these connections, I will highlight nationalism, education 
and performance at the Turkish Olympics. 
 
Mapping the Spectacle 
Timothy Mitchell’s groundbreaking work Colonising Egypt positions his study of the 
colonial object in international “orientalist” spectacles (world fairs and conferences) of 
nineteenth century Europe. Mitchell is writing as part of a larger group of intellectuals influenced 
by Edward Said’s book Orientalism. In Orientalism Said critiques what he sees as western 
artistic and academic justification for eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth century European 
imperialism in the creation of dehumanized eastern “Orientals.” 
Mitchell furthers Said’s work by critiquing the process by which non-Europeans became 
objectified spectacles/performers for European audiences. Scholars have justified European 
spectacles as “Western curiosity” from which European intellectual growth bloomed in the early 
modern age.58 Yet, in Colonising Egypt Mitchell critiques “the festival/spectacle.” Using a series 
of examples from the nineteenth century, Mitchell shows European spectacles as spaces where 
Europeans could reveal and objectify the “exotic” other. This objectification of “orientals” had 
an ancillary influence on imperialism and global capitalism of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. 59  Mitchell discusses how western Europeans – having made “easterners” exotic 
objects at world fairs and other cultural festivals – could then justify brutal economic domination 
of and direct imperial rule over them60 
 My study will engage the performers and the audience of the Turkish Olympics. As such 
my research will be informative into how Kemalist state oppressed Islamist Turks empowered by 
global capital, map and plan their power over Turkish citizens and foreigners. Also I will 
interrogate how the international students view their roles in the production of the Turkish 
Olympics and their relationships with Turkey, the Gulenists and Turkish nationalism. 
 This study will use frameworks developed by Mitchell and Said with a twist in that I will 
focus my research on a global southern milieu’s (Turks’) employment of cultural imperialism on 
other global south nations (in this study’s case Egypt). Turkish nationalism is the moving force 
behind the production of the Turkish Olympics. As such this study will contribute to research on 
post-colonial power structures and economic relations between formally oppressed global 
southerners. 
 
Pierre Bourdieu, Capital Production and the Gulen Congregation 
Going to an unknown nation, learning that country’s languages and building schools far 
from Turkey is all part of how Gulenists believe they serve humanity. Pierre Bourdieu’s studies 
on the production of different forms of capital help us understand the process in which the 
Gulenists build their worldwide network and then return home for the Turkish Olympics.  
Bourdieu views society as one field of metaphoric “play.” For Bourdieu capital 
production is, “the experience of being passionately involved… engaged in a struggle with others 
and with our own limits, over stakes to which we are (at least for the moment) deeply 
committed.”61 When accomplishment of any sort occurs, social actors seek to develop their own 
personal capital for the increase in their standards of living and that of their children.62 
According to Bourdieu, actors can reproduce capital in two general ways. One way of capital 
reproduction is through inter-generational support of educational institutions. In this version of 
capital production, wealthy people work to ensure that their children succeed in elite universities. 
The progeny then has access to high levels of cultural capital (such as educational credentials). 
From the collegial contacts made within educational institutions students can then develop ties, 
which might result in future economic capital production.63 A tangible example of this would be 
elite educational institutions in the United States such as Harvard University. Attending students 
at Ivy League schools irrespective of their family’s backgrounds gain access to elite capital 
production and networks simply from the four years students attend the university. 
The second version of capital production according to Bourdieu occurs when an athlete 
or a famous person converts his or her name or appearance into endorsements. These 
endorsements increase the popularity and name recognition of the product and enrich the 
spokesperson both in terms of economic and prestige capital.64 
The Gulenist school of my case study, Salahaldin International School in Cairo, is 
connected to the type of cultural capital production Bourdieu envisions. Salahaldin International 
School is not just a site for elite cultural capital production but also is a school for the 
advancement of talented students from poor families and a site for the maintenance of 
educational and ideological standards for students from Gulenist families. This ternary nature of 
Salahaldin is by no means simply an anomaly; it represents three wide-spread sociological 
constructs of the Gulen status group. Those constructs are neo-liberalism, reproduction, 
indoctrination. 
Gulenists build schools in Turkey and in Egypt that intentionally seek children from 
wealthy parents by promising top-notch private/neoliberal education. Meanwhile the 
congregation presents students from families that are a part of the Gulen status group free 
education as a way to strengthen and continue the status group. And finally Gulenist leaders give 
scholarships and free room and board to students from non-Gulenist families as a meritocracy-
based way to indoctrinate talented students into the Gulen status group.65 In Turkey, these 
scholarship children from poor families can and often do become the new generation of teachers, 
businessmen, media experts and bankers in the Gulen status group/congregation. In Salahaldin’s 
case, the Egyptian children on scholarship come from the poor city of Beni Sweif outside of 
Cairo and from middle class families in Alexandria. 
The Turkish children at Salahaldin (twenty-five percent of the school populace at 
Salahaldin International school in Cairo as of 2014 were from Turkey) tended to come from 
Gulenist families with parents either working in Turkey or Egypt for Gulenist institutions. That 
some Gulenist parents would send their children to far away Egypt for high quality English 
language based education speaks to Bourdieu’s ideas on education capital reproduction. First and 
foremost, the Gulen status group reproduces high levels of education capital for children of 
Gulenist families. Also it is easier for Gulenist authorities and parents to indoctrinate their 
children by sending their children abroad to a Gulenist school and Gulenist dormitory where 
their children adopt many of the Gulen status group’s ideas on internationalism, nationalism and 
Islamism. 
The Turkish Olympics in Egypt were tied to scholarship students in that many Egyptian 
and Turkish students on scholarship participated in the Turkish Olympics in Egypt 2014. 
Incidentally 2014 was the first year when children from Beni Sweif performed, trying to go to 
the Turkish Olympics Final in June of 2014. 
 
Cosmopolitanism in Cairo at the Turkish Olympics and in the Global South 
 Cairo Cosmopolitan is a collection of writings by a group of thinkers called the Cairo 
School of Urban Studies. In developing their theory of cosmopolitanism, thinkers connected with 
the Cairo School of Urban Studies work to go beyond two ideologies. The first ideology to 
which contributors of Cairo Cosmopolitan were opposed was the neo-liberal belief that modern 
societies naturally divide between dictatorial regimes and middle class “western” states.66 The 
Cairo School of Urban Studies was also against the neo-imperialism inherent in the “Clash of 
Civilizations” theory. Recently some scholars of the MENA region have revised Huntington’s 
theory and stated that within “Islamic Civilization” the same conflicts Huntington outlines in 
terms of geo-political divides were replicated in MENA societies themselves. These scholars of 
the MENA region who supported this revised version of Clash of Civilization theory organized 
groups within MENA societies into “western” modernizers and “backward” Islamists. The Cairo 
School of Urban Studies, on the other hand, oppose such normative dualities, instead embracing 
the idea that theory must be linked to direct experience of the world and concrete relations of 
power within society.67 
 Contributors to Cairo Cosmopolitan accept that some scholars have appropriated the 
word “cosmopolitan” to idealize certain metropolises (i.e. Alexandria, Istanbul, Izmir/Smyrna, 
Thessaloniki, Istanbul, Cairo) in the nineteenth century where multiethnicism/internationalism 
was thought to be of central import in social change.68 The writers of Cairo Cosmopolitan 
dismiss this understanding of cosmopolitanism as a nostalgia project of scholars in the twenty-
first century. In the nineteenth century western European imperialism and capitalist emulation by 
non-European elites in so-called “cosmopolitan” cities like Istanbul and Cairo was the norm. 
That these nineteenth century cities/examples of “cosmopolitanism” may appear to some 
historians in the twenty-first century to be “internationalist” in flavor, misses the oftentimes 
contentious relationship between newly arrived peasant labor and elite owners of capital in the 
nineteenth century. Also historians who look with a loving eye to nineteenth century 
cosmopolitanism oftentimes fail to discuss the developing discourse around nationalist mono-
ethnic identity politics that sprung from these “multiethnic” cities. For example, a 
multiethnic/international Istanbul in the nineteenth century was the birthplace of Pan-Turkic 
Turanism, a far-right version of Turkish nationalism/Turkish mono-ethnicism. Certainly there 
were ethnicities living side by side in some MENA urban centers in the nineteenth century. Yet 
the political discourse and direction of the world in the nineteenth century was toward 
nationalism and mono-ethnicism. The question can be posed and is posed in Cairo 
Cosmopolitan: how much was nineteenth century “cosmopolitanism” anything but an urban 
concentration of a new capitalist elite in the MENA region with ties to foreign imperial states, 
corporations and homogenizing nationalism? 
The term “cosmopolitanism” has also been used by some academics to describe a new 
“Petroleum Cosmopolitanism” originating from the Persian Gulf, which seeks in the twenty-first 
century to employ Islamist symbols in the production of architecture and consumerism. 
Superficially “Islamist,” petroleum cosmopolitanism works “…with the US to ruthlessly repress 
Islamist radicalism.”69 Academics connected with the Cairo School of Urban Studies state that 
petroleum financed “cosmopolitanism” is international only if there is an acceptance from local 
actors regarding the pre-eminence of a neo-liberal globalized world. As such while global capital 
production may change aspects of its surface appearance (blue cheese Le Big Macs at 
McDonalds in Paris or Islamist architecture at hyper malls in Dubai), ultimately the exploitive 
and unequal aspects of neo-liberalism remain the same.70  
 The academics writing in Cairo Cosmopolitan see cosmopolitanism as a concept, which 
can be re-branded in the twenty-first century. This rebranding becomes part of an emancipatory 
counter-mono-ethnic theory, which gives local actors a space to define themselves outside of 
state sponsored nationalist projects.71 The term cosmopolitan in Cairo Cosmopolitan is 
connected to a process by which the marginalized bring their ideas back to the public sphere, “in 
the shape of subversive, grounded, fierce, world-weary articulations.”72 As such the writers of 
Cairo Cosmopolitan agree with critical theorists like Bent Flyvberg who view social science as 
being dependent on interpretation and the interrogation of power relations in social change and 
transformation.73 For these writers Cairo offers them a laboratory to explore citizenship in the 
global south.74 
 This thesis is aided by the work done in Cairo Cosmopolitan in that the Turkish 
Olympics, like Cairo itself, is a laboratory or mirror of how Gulenists employ 
cosmopolitanism/internationalism/multi-ethnicism in their worldwide congregational schools and 
business network. Cairo Cosmopolitan includes writings on gated communities in Cairo and how 
connected these communities are part of the neo-liberal urban planning process. The Gulen status 
group in Cairo organizes their schools on a nearly identical business model that is a model of 
neo-liberal “gated education” or education for the elite of Cairo. However, the Gulen status 
group at times undermines what is called in Turkish “Vahsi Kapitalizm” or “Wild 
Capitalism”/neo-liberalism. In terms of inter-congregational support services, the Gulen status 
group gives many members education, health care and other services for little or no money.75 
This process of gathering around an Islamist status group is not undermining the neo-liberal 
privatized paradigm but instead an understandable response by locals who seek protection where 
there is no protective state or provision of public services. 
 Scholars writing in Cairo Cosmopolitan discuss the Muslim Brotherhood as possessing a 
space in cosmopolitanism. Sections of Cairo Cosmopolitan show that members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood believe in political pluralism, anti-police brutality efforts, secular parties and full 
rights for Coptic Christians and women.76 Following the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to 
political power in 2012 many students of Egypt would now question how much members of the 
Brotherhood really believed in political pluralism at the time Cairo Cosmopolitan was written in 
2006. Nonetheless that the Muslim Brotherhood was included as a possible partner in 
cosmopolitanism will be helpful when looking at Gulenists.  
It seems apparent from the ethnographic work that some of the time Gulenists are 
marginalized, especially following their clash with Turkish President Erdogan in late 2013 and 
early 2014 and presently following the unsuccessful July 15 coup attempt. Since their clash with 
Erdogan, Gulenists have allied themselves with other minority voices in Turkey and support 
political pluralism and campaigns for press freedom and human rights in Turkey. However, like 
the Muslim Brotherhood, when the Gulenists were allied with Erdogan and were a part of 
Erdogan’s ruling elite, Gulen status group members were active in the Turkish police force, 
public prosecutor’s office and other state bureaucracies. Up until the unsuccessful July 15, 2016 
coup attempt, Gulenists held some sway in the Turkish state (though they had been under attack 
by the AKP leadership since 2013). After the July 15 coup, massive arrests and firings have been 
reported in public and private sectors of Turkey.77 President Erdogan and Turkish authorities 
have taken aim against the Gulen status group focusing the arrests on Gulenists. Leadership 
within the AKP has accused the Gulen congregation of being accomplices with the CIA in the 
planning of the July 15 coup.78 
Investigating how much the Gulenists accept neo-liberal “petroleum cosmopolitanism” 
and how much Gulenists connect with a subaltern cosmopolitanism as outlined will be useful in 
studying the Turkish Olympics, the ethnicities/nationalities of participating school children and 
the ethnicities of the “Turkish” audience. 
As a final note, I will use the term “petroleum cosmopolitanism” in this study as an 
analogy of the neo-liberalized version of cosmopolitanism as outlined by the Cairo School of 
Urban Studies. Readers ought to see my use of this term as reference to the entire global process 
by which hyper-capitalism/neo-liberalism applies itself in multiple societies and works to make 
itself felt superficially and aesthetically relevant to people’s lives all the while being the same 
process of elitism from China to Brazil; from the Middle East to the Midwest of the United 
States. 
 
Ethnicity as the Origin of Nations 
 Max Weber’s and Anthony D. Smith’s (1939 - ) ideas are useful comparisons in 
understanding the concept of ethnicity and its importance in studies on the Gulen status group 
and the Turkish Olympics. Both thinkers position the role of ethnic identity as the genesis of 
nationalism and nations.79 For Weber, ethnicity is subjective and “presumed,” far from being 
certain or normative.80 Weber states that any “irrational” political community – regardless of 
how objectively artificial or real that community is – ultimately relies on an acceptance of a 
shared ethnic brotherhood.81 While Smith accepts the subjectivity inherent in ethnic formation, 
he stresses cultural differences between ethnicities as the focus of his study. Smith contends that, 
“the role of myths, memories, values, traditions and symbols … (are) reminders of the unique 
culture and fate of the ethnic community.”82 
 Smith’s acceptance of some normative elements of ethnicity and Weber’s contention that 
ethnicity is presumed and subjective will be useful in studying fieldwork connected to student 
performers’ Egyptian-ness and Turkish-ness at the Turkish Olympics. It may appear from first 
glance that Weber’s critique of ethnicity as an illogical happenstance and Smith’s study of the 
variants and truths that go into ethnic production may be opposed theories. However, I prefer to 
use both Weber and Smith’s ideas inter-changeably as two sides of the same ethnic studies coin. 
I see no conflict between Weber and Smith but instead useful theories which support each other. 
The ethno-symbolism of ethnicity a la Smith is – some of the time – helpful in academic 
production linked to history, myth and tradition. Yet it is also fascinating (and helpful) to the see 
the assumed/inventive nature of ethnic production a la Weber. In some ways then ethnicity exists 
as both invented and unreal and at the same moment one of the driving forces a person  has in 
her identity production. 
 
Benedict Anderson’s Roots of Nationalism 
A leading scholar in studies of nationalism, Benedict Anderson contends that nationalism 
is more akin to kinship or religion in that these concepts create immediate associations with 
communities as opposed to ideologies such as liberalism or Marxism.83 Anderson stresses that 
while nationalism has different forms it nonetheless is the primary unifier around the world, 
surpassing even Marxism and/or neo-liberalism in its importance.84 According to Anderson, 
nationalism arose two centuries ago in a “spontaneous distillation” of “differing historical 
forces.”85 Nationalism then became a “modular” force of modernity, planting itself across 
cultures and venues.86 
Anderson states that nationalism is based on how a community imagines itself.87 
Anderson gives the example of an aristocrat in France during the Ancien Régime explaining that 
the said aristocrat would likely not think of herself as being a part of a “class of aristocrats.”88 
Anderson here is not stating that class or proto-nationalism only existed after July 14, 1789. 
Certainly when pressed the aristocrat would have known that she was a part of a community 
which was above and apart from the rest of the King’s subjects in the Kingdom of France. 
However, Anderson explains that an aristocrat of the Ancien Régime would likely first imagine 
herself to be part of a familial/honor/service community in which her father the Comte of X 
would be sworn in service to the Duc of Y and so on.89  
Yet in modern nationalism, Anderson explains, mobilization of the populace is based 
around the nation being an imagined horizontal community.90 The social system in the nation 
itself may be (and often is) unequal. As per Anderson it is important to recognize that the idea of 
a “nation,” industrialism and modern military mobilization all coalesced onward from the late 
1700s. Given nationalism’s overt success – and murderous war brutality – over the past two 
hundred years, Anderson seeks to understand the cultural roots of nationalism.91 
He finds these roots in the rise of print capitalism in the fifteenth and especially sixteenth 
centuries, starting in Europe and then spreading across the world.92 According to Anderson the 
rise of print capital empowered the merchant class in Europe to begin reading in vernacular 
dialects.93 Initially print capital’s spread was a Protestant movement against the use of Latin by 
the “universal” Catholic Church.94 However publication quickly became associated with one 
particular dialect as the new “national language” of a political area.95 Castilian became codified 
as Spanish. Modern English came from the dialects of English around London. The French of 
northern France around Paris became the new national language; so too with the northern 
German dialect in the Holy Roman Empire.96 Between roughly 1450 and 1900, nationalism 
became the result of print capitalism and the existent linguistic differences (ethnic or otherwise) 
first in western Europe and then across the planet.97 
This development of national languages had two discernable results according to 
Anderson. On the one hand national languages created a disparity of power within nations in that 
those who spoke the national language as native speakers gained easier access to capital 
production and political power.98 Second, print production gave new national languages a feeling 
of antique authenticity. This faux antique-ness would be used by nationalists to justify 
“objective” primordial origin myths of their separate nations and nationalisms.99 
Understanding the roots of nationalism will be fundamental in this thesis’ theoretical 
framework around the rise of Turkish nationalism in the nineteenth century and Turkish 
nationalism’s subsequent transformations in the twenty-first century. Famed Turkish historian 
Kemal Karpat uses many of Anderson’s ideas (or perhaps Anderson uses many of Karpat’s 
ideas) in developing theories as to why Turkish language becomes the moving force behind 
twentieth century Turkish nationalism in the republican period of Turkish history. 
Importantly Ataturk’s belief in the rightness of pan-nationalism; that is an 
internationalization of nationalisms for all peoples is oftentimes used by Gulenists to justify the 
Turkish Olympics to Turkish and foreign audiences. Anderson dismisses such claims as being 
nearly impossible. It certainly was impossible in Ataturk’s case. Just as Ataturk was holding up 
his hallowed “Turks” as examples to the world of how anti-imperialism and nationalism mixed 
could result in a “free” Turkish state, he was in 1925 and again from 1937 to 1938 brutalizing 
different Kurdish groups. These were the same Kurds who were at least twenty-five if not thirty-
five percent of the population of Ataturk’s free “Turkish” state. 
From roughly from 1923 until Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s electoral victory in 2002 the 
Kemalist dominated Turkish state actively supported a one state nationalism. Kemalist 
nationalism followed modernist structures of nationalism in that it was nominally “secular” and 
materialist in outlook. Actually the Kemalist state was far from secular, but instead Kemalism 
was laicist; the distinction between secularism and laicism will be made later on in this thesis 
when discussing the Kemalist state’s actions against religion staring in the 1920s. Kemalist 
Turkish nationalism could be maintained only by a self-imposed (or Kemalist junta imposed) 
cultural isolation from the MENA region and Eastern Europe, the two areas of the former 
Ottoman state. In some ways this self-imposed/military imposed isolationism from neighbors 
made Turkey the ideal NATO member and ally of far-away America. 
Erdogan’s rise to power in 2002 and 2003, coupled with Gulenist growth both in Turkey 
and outside of Turkey and the production of a show/festival like the Turkish Olympics presents a 
challenge to isolationist Kemalism as the ruling ideology of Turkey. Since 2002 a new spirit of 
neo-liberal Islamism (a.k.a. “Petroleum Cosmopolitanism”) has become the norm in Turkey. 
This internationalist neo-liberal Islamism seeks to claim and rebrand Turkish nationalism (called 
in this thesis “Black” Turkish nationalism). The Turkish Olympics becomes a mirror then by 
which scholars can view how neo-liberal Turkish Islamist leaders are seeking to reinvent and re-
employ Turkish nationalism. 
 
Death, Timelessness, Religion and Nationalism 
Anderson posits that the nation came into being at a time when religion was ebbing as a 
unifying factor across the globe.100 Modern nationalism thus grew from the lacuna left by 
religion. Understanding death and timelessness – two concepts explained by orthodox and 
heterodox sects within each religion – became a space nationalism needed to fill. 101 In the 
nineteenth century, the nation became worthy of the ultimate sacrifice. The nation at the same 
time became timeless, stretching back to antiquity and forward to a future utopia.  
National sacrifice became a justification and explanation for mass death in nineteenth, 
twentieth and twenty-first century wars. Nationalized death monuments, museums to war and 
mass gravesites in Cairo, Paris, northern Virginia, Canakkale and countless others are places 
where nationalized populations can feel as if they knew/know/will know and had/have/will have 
a connection with everyone else in their nation state’s past, present and future.102 According to 
Anderson, the appeal then of nationalism was/is/will be fundamentally connected with the 
communal need to process death and timelessness.103 
Anderson’s ideas on death and timelessness will be useful in this thesis interrogation of 
Turkish nationalized media performed at the Turkish Olympics. 
 
Ernest Gellner: Nationalism and Education 
While Anderson  sees imagination and creativity in a society developing its nationalism, 
Ernest Gellner (1925 – 1995) sees fabrication and falsification in a people’s production of their 
collective national narrative. According to Gellner the way in which nationalism is reified in any 
nation is through state-sponsored education. 
Gellner focuses much of his study on nationalism around the artificiality of life in the 
industrial age.104 According to Gellner, the process of modernity is the process of state-
sponsored homogenization of national populaces.105 In the modern age an artificialized humanity 
can “no longer breathe” without the homogenizing panacea of state sponsored national education 
and nationalized communication.106 Gellner writes that modern day people need to be mobile 
and able to communicate immediately with the same shared and standardized linguistic 
medium.107 As such one’s educational background becomes paramount to the modern 
man/woman, “The employability, dignity, security and self-respect of individuals, typically, and 
for the majority of people now hinges on their education.”108 Humanity, in Gellner’s eyes, has 
become separated from everything (monarchy, land, faith) and gelded only to nationalized 
education systems.109 
The Gulen status group employs nationalism as a part of their educational network in 
Turkey, Egypt and many other countries. As such the Gulenist educational system must adhere to 
certain nationalized rules and laws in every state they build their schools and/or dormitories. For 
example, starting in 2014 the Gulenist educational curriculum at Salahaldin International School 
in Cairo came under scrutiny by the Egyptian state.110 The Egyptian Ministry of Education 
imposed a nationalized education system at Salahaldin International School following the rise of 
President El Sisi’s government in 2014.111 In 2015 and 2016 (the years after this thesis’ 2014 
field work on the Turkish Olympics) the Turkish Olympics in Egypt was cancelled or “limited.” 
Instead Gulenist leaders at or connected to Salahaldin International School began to push for a 
new “Arabic Olympics.”112 Performed for the first time in 2015, the Arabic Olympics was a 
cultural festival akin to the Turkish Olympics. It featured Pan-Arabism and sought to bring 
students together from Gulenist schools across the Arab world.113 
Scholars see that Gulenists are able to maintain their educational system in Egypt and 
morph their most important cultural festival to adhere to new political realities and an upsurge in 
Egyptian nationalism following June 30, 2013. I will use both Gellner’s and Bourdieu’s ideas on 
education, capital production and nationalism in the study on the Turkish Olympics and the 
Gulen status group. 
 
Conclusions 
The upcoming thesis will discuss the ways in which the Gulenists are and are not a part 
of neo-liberal worldview. Also this thesis will interrogate how much a festival like the Turkish 
Olympics reproduces nationalism, ethnicism, and cosmopolitanism/internationalism and in what 











Study of Child/Performer Indoctrination into the Gulen Status Group at the Turkish 
Olympics   
Chapter Three 
History and Theory of the Process of Child Indoctrination at the Turkish Olympics 
 
The Gulen Status Group owns and operates an extensive school network throughout 
Egypt and as a result holds sway over children and parents in their schools. The Turkish 
Olympics performance festival in Egypt is a space for shaping and subjugating performing 
children. Child performers of the Turkish Olympics are inculcated into the Gulen status 
group/congregation using two seemingly opposed ideologies: internationalism and Turkish 
nationalism.  
In the ethnography I was able to discern three categories of international child 
indoctrination into the Gulen status group via the Turkish Olympics. I stress that these categories 
came from my fieldwork and are not based on previous literature on the Gulen status group nor 
are they from another established theoretical framework. The three categories of international 
child indoctrination into the Gulen congregation via the Turkish Olympics that I was able to 
observe were international comradery, outsider internationalism and Gulenist internationalism. I 
will explain these three variants of international child indoctrination in further detail later in the 
thesis. 
While the focus of this research is on international children and their process of 
indoctrination via the Turkish Olympics into the Gulen congregation, a secondary focus of this 
study is the indoctrination process for Turkish children into the Gulen status group. Turkish 
children at Salahaldin international school had an intimate relationship with Turkish national 
identity and many of the Turkish children interviewed came from Gulenist families. As such, 
indoctrination of Turkish students into Gulenism at the Turkish Olympics was more about 
strengthening and reinforcing existent national and familial beliefs.  
Twenty-five percent of the student population at Salahaldin International School were 
from Turkey.114 Turkish students then may have been examples of Turkishness (and Gulenism) 
for Egyptian and other international students at Salahaldin. 
 
Use of Turkish Nationalism at the Turkish Olympics in Egypt 
Turkish nationalism was the featured narrative at the Turkish Olympics in Egypt in 2014. 
Performers reciting Turkish poetry, music, plays and folk dances constituted the majority of 
performances.115 However, the Guleninsts were careful to temper the Turkish Olympics in 
Egypt’s use of Turkish nationalism. The Turkish Olympics in Egypt also employed Egyptian 
national symbols such as an occasional Egyptian folk song.116 The ideology of internationalism 
was fundamental to balance for the Egyptian audience the Turkish nationalism espoused by 
Turkish Gulenists with Egyptian national songs and performances.117 The concept that the 
Turkish Olympics is a festival that “connects all peoples of the world”118 helped the Gulen status 
group legitimize itself as an impartial and inclusive organization to Egyptian parents and 
audience members. 
 
Nationalism and the Sun-Language Theory 
 Simply being able to sing in Turkish does not guarantee that a non-Turkish child 
performer will have success at the Turkish Olympics.119 Whether competing in Egypt on the 
national level or at the international final in Turkey, medal winning non-Turkish students are the 
ones who learn Turkish.120 Organizers of the Turkish Olympics highlight the learning of Turkish 
as one of the de jure requirements of success at the Turkish Olympics.121 Certain talented 
Egyptian performers in training before the Turkish Olympics performance in Egypt attended 
after school Turkish Language sessions to get their Turkish level to a place where they could 
compete.122 The Turkish Olympics has a requirement which states that non-Turkish participants 
must be proficient in speaking Turkish when participants compete for singing or poetry recitation 
competitions.123 Turkish language learning at the Gulen’s Turkish Olympics has a pronounced 
connection to the nationalist project in Turkey. In order to understand why Gulenist Turks have 
such an identity investment in the language of Turkish, one must understand the history of 
Turkish nationalism and the development of the Sun-Language Theory in the 1930s.  
From the Izmir Economic Conference in 1923 onward, Ataturk and other Kemalist 
leaders of Turkey tied the development of the modern Turkish language to the Turkish 
nationalist project.124 Ataturk and his contemporaries were the successors of Turkish proto-
nationalists such as Munif Pasha, a leading Ottoman statesman in the middle of the nineteenth 
century.125 In 1862 Munif Pasha discussed the need to transform written Ottoman Turkish to 
correspond with the widely spoken vernacular Turkish.126 In 1928 nationalists in Turkey 
accomplished Munif Pasha’s goal of aligning written and spoken Turkish with the adoption of 
the Latinized Turkish alphabet. The next step was to “clean” Turkish and make it “pure.” In 
1934, Ataturk created the Turk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti, The Society for the Study of the Turkish 
Language (later called the Turk Dil Kurumu or Turkish Language Association). Republican 
leaders in The Society for the Study of the Turkish Language used The Society as a national 
platform to “cleanse” Turkish of its sizable Arabic and Persian vocabulary.127 By 1936, Ataturk 
and Turkish academics hatched the Gunes-Dil Teorisi, “Sun-Language Theory.”128 The Sun-
Language Theory posited that all languages originated from one primordial language in Central 
Asia and that Turkish was the closest language to the original “Sun-Language.”129 After 
developing the Sun-Language Theory, Ataturk’s administration hoped to give a western veneer 
of authenticity to their “theory.” Consequently, the Turkish State hired Viennese academic hack 
Hermann Feodor Kvergić to push the Sun-Language Theory in academic circles and claim the 
ideology as Kvergić’s own.130 In the mid-1930s – with help of Turkish government largess to 
pay hospital bills and travel expenses – Kvergić wrote in support of the Sun-Language 
Theory.131  
Ataturk’s primordial Sun-Language Theory legitimizes the Turkish language as the 
scalpel of modernity in Turkey. Turkish is the one language, not just of the nation, but of a 
primordial Turkish nationalist world-view. As Kurds, Armenians, Arabs, Laz, Greeks, Dönme 
and Ladino Jews living in the Republic of Turkey can attest,132 nationalism and the 
consciousness of “being Turkish” are fundamentally tied to the language of Turkish. As such, the 
Turkish Olympics’ prioritization on Turkish language learning is a part of this larger historical 
picture. The emphasis given to Turkish language acquisition at the Turkish Olympics 
exemplifies one of the ways in which the Gulen status group employs Turkish nationalism in the 
subjugation of non-Turkish student performers. That the Gulen congregation’s Turkish Olympics 
festival would recreate the same sort of nationalist discourse prioritizing Turkish language 
acquisition is not surprising. Many members of the Gulen status group and their families have 
been indoctrinated into Turkish nationalist rhetoric and the Sun-Language Theory.133 
 
  
Use of Internationalism at the Turkish Olympics in Egypt 
If a non-Turkish child participant were to question the importance of Turkish 
nationalism, Gulenist organizers explained that in fact the Turkish Olympics in Egypt is not a 
vehicle for the expression of Turkish nationalism. Instead, it is a venue that supports all the 
world’s nationalisms. This Gulenist version of internationalism accepts the idea that nationalism 
is a norm in the modern world; akin to the air humans breathe, the water humans drink and the 
food humans eat. The Turkish Olympics’ display of linguistic, sartorial and dance based Turkish 
nationalism first awes subject children. Gulenists organizers then employ an internationalism 
supportive of Egyptian, Turkish or other nationalisms to convince subject children of the 
importance and auspiciousness of the Turkish Olympics. Consequently, the Turkish Olympics in 
Egypt presents two ideologies (nationalism and internationalism) but ultimately uses Turkish 
nationalism as the persuasive ideology to socialize student participants into the Gulen status 
group. 
 
Comradery Internationalism, Outsider Internationalism and Gulenist Internationalism 
By using Turkish language, Turkish media production, myths of Turkish good 
governance and hygienic standards and national pride movements for expatriate Turks, the 
Turkish Olympics in Egypt employ nationalism to indoctrinate and subjugate Egyptian and 
Turkish school children into the Gulen status group. However, Turkish nationalism cannot be 
overt in Egypt, lest it would create an equally powerful Egyptian nationalistic backlash. As such 
the Turkish Olympics in Egypt also stresses internationalism in the subject formation of 
performing school children. 
The degree to which the Gulen congregation can subjugate a child often depends on a 
variety of familial, monetary and belief factors in each child’s life. Since the Gulen status group 
links its many educational activities and institutions, Egypt based Gulenist schools and 
dormitories are spaces of student/participant subject development at the Turkish Olympics in 
Egypt. Gulenist organizers of the Turkish Olympics employ Turkish nationalism at the Turkish 
Olympics by prioritizing Turkish language, “civilized” Turkish artistic performance and 
Turkishness for expatriate Turkish children. I have observed and posit that internationalism at the 
Turkish Olympics in Egypt is a three-step process: comradery internationalism, outsider 
internationalism and Gulenist internationalism. 
 
The Three Steps of Indoctrination of non-Turkish Students 
 Comradery internationalism is the version of internationalism that most of the Egyptian 
and other international student participants experience at the Turkish Olympics in Egypt. Since 
the participants of the Turkish Olympics in Egypt are almost always from Gulenist schools 
and/or Gulenist Turkish language courses in Egypt,134 participants and participant families are 
often paying clients of the Gulen status group schools. Given the fact that many Egyptian 
participants of the Turkish Olympics in Egypt come from families who are paying for them to 
attend Gulenist schools, Egyptian students experience internationalism based on equality and 
comradery between Turkish and Egyptian nationalism. In comradery internationalism an 
Egyptian/international student experiences the Turkish Olympics (and the Gulenist educational 
system) as a festival that recognizes and appreciates the international student’s national identity. 
The international student experiences equality with Gulenist Turks at the Turkish Olympics 
because he or she is equal based on the fact that the student’s parents pay full tuition for their 
child to be in the Gulenist educational network. 
When payment to the Gulen status group school stops, so too does the equality an 
international student experiences at the Turkish Olympics. When a non-Turkish 
participant/student is taken by scholarship into the Gulen congregation, the international student 
becomes an “outsider international.” In outsider internationalism a non-Turkish student is 
expected to acquiesce to Gulen status group standards based on the fact that he or she is 
receiving free or subsidized education at a Gulenist school. This will likely include performance 
at the Turkish Olympics, learning Turkish at Gulenist summer camps in Turkey and perhaps 
living in Cairo at Gulenist dormitories. In these Gulenist dormitories Gulen congregation leaders 
reportedly create an environment of strict Sunni Islamism.  
From the ethnographic evidence I have qualified a third step of indoctrination non-
Turkish students experience into the Gulen status group as displayed at the Turkish Olympics. 
This final step of full indoctrination is called Gulenist internationalism. A Gulenist international 
is a non-Turkish student who has accepted the role of membership in the Gulen status group. The 
Gulenist internationalist is fluent in Turkish and a staunch Islamist in support of Fethullah Gulen, 
the Gulen status group and Turkish nationalism. Yet, the Gulenist internationalist speaks other 
native languages besides Turkish and is an example at the Turkish Olympics of how an 
international participant can possess multiple nationalisms. 
 
International Comradery: The Friendly Face of the Turkish Olympics 
 Comradery in the expression of multiple nationalisms is the pretty face of the Turkish 
Olympics in Egypt. Comradery internationalism is one way that Gulenist staff members 
inculcate student participants into participation in the Turkish Olympics. Comradery 
internationalism also is an effective tool to sell Gulen Congregation schools to Egyptian families 
(and non-Gulenist Turkish families living in Egypt).135 At the Turkish Olympics in Egypt, many 
children explained that they were active in the Turkish Olympics because they wanted to see a 
comradery of nationalisms in union together. As one student explained, “I wanted to see that 
atmosphere because from what people explained we would feel our culture by seeing the 
international students’ performances.” 
Winners at the Turkish Olympics in Egypt move on to the Turkish Finals in Turkey. 
Participants at the finals experience a wider world where they meet and befriend other people 
possessing other nationalisms. Yet, the Turkish Olympics prioritizes Turkish nationalism; as 
such, Turkish nationalism overrides all other versions of nationalism. Gulenists further their 
status group’s use and support of Turkish nationalism at the Turkish Olympics in Egypt by 
giving scholarships to certain Egyptian performers and inviting the selected performers into the 
Gulen congregation as “outsider internationals.” 
 
Outsider Internationalism 
The Gulen status group influences the version of Turkish nationalism expressed at the 
Turkish Olympics in Egypt. When Gulenists open educational institutions free of charge to 
Egyptian performers/students, Gulenists expect the Egyptian youngsters to acquiesce to 
Turkishness and Islamism.136 As such, the performers brought into the Gulen status group 
possess a middle space called outsider internationalism in the Gulen congregation and the 
Turkish Olympics. These performers are still the “other”, the outsider, the Egyptian. While some 
of their performances are rooted in Egyptian sartorial or musical traditions, these 
students/performers are expected to learn Turkish, accept Turkishness and Turkish nationalism, 
live as Gulenists live at a Gulen status group dormitory in Cairo and attend Salahaldin 
International School on scholarship. It is possible then that the Egyptian performers at the 
Turkish Olympics in Egypt who are on scholarship are active as comradery based 
internationalists and outsider internationalists depending on the situation. 
 
The Black Sheep in the Herd of Turks: Gulenist Internationalism 
 In Gulenist internationalism, a non-Turkish child subject has fully embraced the Gulen 
status group or the so-called “Hizmet (Service) Movement.” As such the child subject has 
become a member of the Gulen congregation and has accepted the teachings of Imam Fethullah 
Gulen as the true Islamic path. A Gulenist internationalist child believes that the Gulen status 
group is not an Islamist congregation but is instead a “movement to serve humanity.” The child 
also accepts the primacy of Turkish nationalism yet has a space in the Gulen congregation and 
the Turkish Olympics as a non-Turk. Though most non-Turkish performers are active in only 
comradery internationalism or outsider internationalism, a Gulenist internationalist is active in all 
three forms of internationalism. In this a Gulenist international student can experience the 
excitement and comradery of sharing their multiple nationalisms with other Turkish and non-
Turkish students. Also the Gulenist international student adheres to Gulenist morality codes and 
finally positions him or herself as an international among the Turkish Gulenists. 
 
Turanism and Turkish Rightist “Head Clunking” in the Gulen Congregation at the 
Turkish Olympics 
Gulenists’ use of nationalism is connected to a long tradition among rightist nationalists 
in Turkey. One of founding intellectuals of the Turkish Republic and a leading Turanist, Ziya 
Gokalp (1876 – 1924) believed that if Turks looked to their central Asian roots they would find a 
“true” form of the modern that was not polluted by the West.137 According to Gokalp the original 
Turks of central Asia were both feminists and democrats. The first Turks had a society which 
was a meritocracy and sexually equal. It was only with an importation of “degenerated Islam” 
that Turks lost their modernity.138 In Gokalp’s thinking, modern Islam was not the culprit so 
much as a misinterpretation of an older, truer Islam. As such, according to Gokalp, Islam needed 
to be re-imagined and, “purged of the cultural pollutants it had acquired as it spread across the 
globe.”139 This purging process then was directly connected to introducing Islam to a “re-
invigorated” Turkishness. When purified Islam and Turkish nationalism appeared, a Turk could 
be modern and democratic all at once.140 
That a political movement such as Turanism with its connections to right wing, 
authoritarian, patriarchal xenophobia could call itself “feminist” or “democratic” is a massive 
contraction. Yet, right-wing politicians and thinkers around the world have oftentimes claimed to 
be “democrats and feminists” all the while curtailing the rights of women and limiting the 
freedom for minorities. Perhaps given the inherent popularity of feminism and democracy 
rightists like the Turanists feel the need to “steal thunder.”  
A component of Gulenist appropriation of masculine Turanist behavioral norms is the 
kafa tokuşturmak greeting. The kafa tokuşturmak (literally “head clunking”) is a sign of rightist 
masculinity in Turkey; women and leftist males in Turkey would never do the kafa tokuşturmak 
greeting.141 “It is our thing,” explained Turanist Professor “Murat,” “We believe from out studies 
that the ‘true’ Turks (Turks of central Asia) greet and greeted each other in this manner.”142  
I studied at the Turanist Turkic World Studies Institute in Izmir from 1997 – 1998 and 
worked as a translator there in 2005 directly with Professor “Murat.” While at the Turkic World 
Studies Institute I learned how to do the kafa tokuşturmak. In order to do the kafa tokuşturmak 
two male friends shake hands and at the same moment touch the sides of their foreheads 
together, once on the right side of the forehead, once on the left side of the forehead (akin to 
kissing on the cheek but no cheek kisses are exchanged). During the greeting males do not strike 
each other’s foreheads in an aggressive manner yet there is an implied “manliness” to the process 
of soft head-butting. Because Gulenists also greet each other in the same manner as Turanists, 
this displays a cross pollination of rightest nationalist behavioral norms among likeminded 
groups in Turkey. This sharing of behavioral norms indicates that the Gulen status group, while 
an Islamist organization, is also connected to and holds within its congregation Turkish 
nationalist/Turanist fascist believing members. 
Certainly there appears to be much intellectual sharing between the most formulaic 
version of fascism, Nazism, and Turanism. Both Nazism and Turanism take their ethnic origin 
myths from an idealized central Asia milieu. Both are highly militaristic and anti-democratic. 
Domestically both Nazis and Turanists employ street thugs and intimidation tactics to exclude 
and destroy any group not adhering to national ethnicity myths.143 Yet Nazism was born from a 
modernity invented by German scholars who gave social priority to whiteness and Caucasian 
Aryans.144 Meanwhile, Turanism/Turkish nationalism and modern Turkish Islamism were at 
times responses to imposed modernity as well as local movements which at times was processing 
events and occurrences separate within the Ottoman state of the 19th and early 20th century. 
 
Gulen and Said Nursi’s Joint Islamist Critique of Modernity in Turkey 
The imposition of modernity over a populace has often times been a brutal and violent 
process. The ruling Muslim elite of the Ottoman State (i.e. the proto-Turks) began to respond to 
the ideas of democracy, human rights and the place of religion in a secular world with the 
Tanzimat in 1839 and Abdul Hamid II’s later reforms. 
Famed Turkish sociologist Serif Mardin and other Turkish sociologists have discussed 
Gulen and his status group as offshoots of the older “Nur Islamist congregation” of the mid 
twentieth century. Gulen stated that he learned much from Kurdish Islamist leader Bediüzzaman 
Said Nursi (1872? – 1960).145 As a young man Nursi began his education at the palace of Abdul 
Hamid II in Istanbul and later members of Nursi’s own Islamist congregation worked to 
reinterpret Islam and Muslim identity in the light of science and modernity.146 As a young man 
Gulen was a member of the Nur status group and seems to have taken Nursi’s approach a step 
further incorporating Turkish nationalism and neo-liberalism into his Islamist critique of 
modernity.147 
 
The following chapter will feature the ethnography of child indoctrination into the Gulen 
status group. The theoretical concepts discussed above – Islamism, Turanism, internationalism – 
connect with Turkish language use and the three processes of indoctrination students experience 




Ethnography of Student/Performer Indoctrination at the Turkish Olympics in 
Egypt 
 
The first part of the research focused on the indoctrination of children into the world-
wide Gulen status group vis-à-vis the Turkish Olympics in Egypt. As such this chapter is based 
on interviews with Turkish Olympics performing students in the Cairo based Salahaldin 
International School (SIS) network, Gulenist teachers at SIS and parents of the performing 
students. 
Fundamental to this ethnography will be to examine the depth of involvement in the 
Gulen congregation that performing international non-Turkish children experience. I posit that 
there are three levels of indoctrination which performing international children experience. The 
first level is called “international comradery” in which children from non-Turkish backgrounds 
are accepted in an embrace of all internationalisms at the Turkish Olympics. The second tier is 
called “outsider internationalism” because non-Turkish students – usually through living in 
Gulenist dormitories and getting scholarships to attend Gulenist schools – are compelled to 
acquiesce to some aspects of Turkish nationalism and Gulenist Islamism. The last and deepest 
layer of non-Turkish child indoctrination into the Gulen status group is called Gulenist 
internationalism. At this stage the non-Turkish child (usually with the support of their parents 
who have also accepted the teachings of Fethullah Gulen) embraces Gulenism. Yet the 
divisiveness of nationalism within the Gulen movement becomes apparent in that, though a 
spiritual brother or sister of Turkish Gulenists, the non-Turkish performer/student at the Turkish 
Olympics is still separate and possesses a space of internationalism within the Gulen status 
group. 
The three categories of indoctrination listed in the above paragraph are not fixed 
divisions. It is possible (and oftentimes occurred in the fieldwork) that a student/performer at the 
Turkish Olympics was active in at least two categories. And, as in the case of “Sema,” some 
students were active all three categories of child indoctrination into the Gulen status group via 
the Turkish Olympics. Perhaps, it is better  to call the three categories “stage sets” in that just as 
in any theatre production, the three “stage sets” of child indoctrination (international comradery, 
outsider internationalism, and Gulenist internationalism) shifted based on the needs of the 
performance.  
Also at play in the field work was a final “related aspect” to the overall indoctrination 
process. Scholars need to consider the “related aspect” of privatized verses subsidized education 
in how non-Turkish children are indoctrinated. If a student came into the Gulenist educational 
structure as a full tuition paying student, she was less likely to be deeply indoctrinated and in her 
performance at the Turkish Olympics she was usually a part of international comradery. This 
would be the case for the three Egyptian girl dancers whose case study will be seen later on in 
this chapter. However, if a student came into the Gulen congregational school via a scholarship 
then Gulenist leaders expected her to adhere to Gulenist dormitory standards and become 
indoctrinated into the Gulen status group and participate at the Turkish Olympics as at least an 
outsider internationalist or even a Gulenist international. 
Of secondary import to this ethnography is the indoctrination process experienced by 
Turkish students at the Turkish Olympics. The field work points to the Turkish Olympics being a 
space where Turkish children reinforce their Turkishness. Performance then for these Turkish 
students becomes a process by which the Turkish child pledges him or herself to being both 
Turkish and a Gulenist. Yet, Turkish students are involved with the process of indoctrination as 
experienced by non-Turkish students at the Turkish Olympics. Turkish students may only be 
onlookers to this process of non-Turkish student indoctrination. Yet, nonetheless Turkish 
students inform this study since by their very presence, Turkish students become examples of 
“Turkishness” for non-Turkish students.  
 
“Sevinc”, Teacher of Egyptian and Turkish Girls at the Turkish Olympics 
“Sevinc” was a twenty-six-year-old member of the Gulen congregation from Kirsehir 
province in Turkey. In early 2014 she was working as a teacher’s aide at the largest Gulen school 
in Egypt, SIS in Cairo. After classes on weekday evenings, Sevinc coached a dancing troupe of 
Egyptian and Turkish girls in Salahaldin’s school auditorium. The girls in Sevinc’s charge were 
bolts of energy, running and playing in the aisles of the auditorium or whirling to Turkish folk 
dances on the stage. Many of the dancing Turkish and Egyptian girls said they dreamed of going 
to Turkey for the finals of the Turkish Olympics that upcoming summer.  
Privately Sevinc confided that given the girls’ youth and inexperience it was unlikely the 
judges of the Turkish Olympics in Egypt would select their dance group to represent Egypt at the 
final Turkish Olympics celebration in June 2014.148 However, Sevinc explained, it was not 
important that her girls advance to the finals of the Turkish Olympics. Gulenists active in the 
creation of the Turkish Olympics think five or six years in advance as they decide on which 
children they will spend resources on developing.149 Many Gulenist staff members like Sevinc 
encourage and coach young students from SIS to participate in the Turkish Olympics. The fact 
that these coaches/teachers in 2014 viewed future participants’/students’ development in not just 
one year increments but instead in five to six year increments (2019 or 2020) speaks to the Gulen 
congregation’s investment in and development of youth capital. 
Bourdieu’s idea of education as capitalized production is useful when scholars interrogate 
how Gulenist leaders view students/performers in the long-term. A talented student like “Salma” 
(who will be discussed later in this chapter) was a full paying student but she received extra free 
education in Turkish language and was thus incentivized with free education at SIS and at the 
Gulenist women’s dormitory to participate in the Turkish Olympics. However, decisions as to 
who would win at the Turkish Olympics in Egypt and move on to Turkey for the finals appeared 
to be at times connected to a child’s tuition status and the importance of the child’s parents in 
supporting the Gulen congregational education network. 
In Salma’s case she was considerably better at singing than her leading competition, 
“Nabila”, a girl from a wealthy family in Alexandria whose father “Wael” held a position of 
importance in the Egyptian government. When it came time for Gulenist judges to choose a 
winner between Salma and Nabila to go from the Turkish Olympics in Egypt and perform at the 
Turkish Olympics final in Turkey, judges picked Nabila even though she was a substandard 
singer at best.  
That an inferior singer like Nabila, would beat out a natural talent like Salma appears 
unfair. Yet this example follows Bourdieu’s theories in that the reproduction of wealth is always 
part and parcel to educational capital production. Nabila’s father as a leading bureaucrat in the 
Egyptian government was worth more to the Gulen status group than the talent of Salma. Clearly 
the Gulenists have made inroads in becoming part of the educational elite in Egypt and Cairo. 
Friendly government and business leaders like Nabila’s father would likely be useful to 
Gulenists in continued elite status production for their school network in Egypt. Therefore, as per 
Bourdieu, it was more important to give Nabila high status and an aspect of educational capital 
(i.e. winning the female singing competition at the Turkish Olympics in Egypt) than it was to 
give Salma’s more successful performance at the Turkish Olympics in Egypt top prize. 
However, besides the Turkish Olympics, Salma was scheduled to perform in Turkey at 
other Gulenist conferences in 2014. As such the Turkish Olympics – while the main cultural 
festival of the congregation – is by no means the only venue where talent like Salma can shine. 
As such a meritocracy within the Gulen status group appears to exist alongside Bourdieu’s 
theory of elite educational capital production. In this meritocracy of educational capital 
production, talented children can go far in the Gulen status group but they are more financially 
dependent upon the congregation itself since they are poorer and receive less from their families. 
 
“Ibrahim”, Gulenist Activist and Leader in Cairo 
Leading member of the Gulen status group, “Ibrahim Gokhan”, thirty-eight, ran Gulenist 
businesses and dormitories in Cairo, Egypt. He was watchful of any outsider/“guest” interested 
in the Gulen status group and the congregation’s main event, the Turkish Olympics. During my 
interview at SIS with performers at the Turkish Olympics in Egypt, Ibrahim attended the 
interview, observing my questions and the performers’ answers. Ibrahim said nothing during the 
interview. He sat in a chair in a corner of the room, his legs crossed and his brow furrowed, 
listening intently.  
I asked two Turkish boys (both aged sixteen named “Yunis” and “Cengis”) about 
participating in the Turkish Olympics in Egypt, living in Egypt in the Gulenist Dormitory and the 
Turkish Olympics Final in Turkey. The boys’ answers reflect that the Turkish Olympics was for 
them a space where they could be proud of their Turkishness, be good Muslims (Gulenists) and 
appreciate other peoples’ nationalisms. Yunis and Cengis’ answers fall into an oft-seen pattern 
among Turkish student participants at the Turkish Olympics. The Turkish Olympics was a 
national proclamation space for Turkish children. 
After the interview was over Ibrahim – sufficiently pleased with the boy’s answers – 
shook the boys’ hands, gave them a soft nationalist head butt (kafa tokusturmak) and put his 
arms around the boys’ shoulders proudly announcing: “These are our boys! We love them very 
much! And they are important to us today and they will of course be quite important to us 
tomorrow. You know these boys… these boys are the boys of the future!”150 
 Coming from Gulenist parents Yunis and Cengis reflect Bourdieu’s ideas of individuals 
and groups working to capitalize on their wealth and confer upon their progeny academic 
credentials. Gokhan becomes, in this example, a kind of surrogate Islamist status group stand-in-
father; proud of his successful boys. Yunis and Cengis are to Ibrahim “the future” of Gulenism. 
 As per Bourdieu, education capital is used by the Gulen status group institutions in three 
ways. One way is that the Gulen congregational network convers academic success to students 
from wealthy non-Gulenist families. The second way is students from Gulenist families 
reportedly paying little or no tuition for schooling. In the first example education capital is a neo-
liberal product that Gulenist institutions are selling to wealthy non-Gulenist families. In the 
second example Gulenist schools give education capital to Gulen status group members and their 
children based on a reproduction and continuation of the Gulen status group itself. 
 Yet in the third production of educational capital scholars can discern a kind of 
meritocracy which conveys a higher economic status to successful graduates from Gulenist 
institutions. In this third production of educational capital, Gulenists give poor (or middle class) 
children from non-Gulenist families free education as a way to tie the children to the status group 
and indoctrinate the children to be a new generation of Gulenists. 
 
An Egyptian Diva, the Story of “Salma” 
In the afternoon on Wednesday, January 29, 2014, Salahaldin International School held a 
practice in the school auditorium for all children interested in competing at the Turkish 
Olympics. “Salma,” an Egyptian girl aged eleven, was called to the stage. 
Alone on stage Salma appeared nervous and shaken. The opening notes of Sezen Aksu’s 
Masum Degiliz began to play out of the auditorium speakers. This was the song Salma would 
sing in Turkish. 
Masum Degiliz (None of Us Are Innocent, 1993) is a Turkish pop rock song written and 
performed by Sezan Aksu. Sezen Aksu is a prolific performer in the world of Turkish pop music. 
Some in the west have even called Aksu “The Queen of Turkish Pop.”151 Born in 1954, Sezen 
Aksu is an environmentalist152 and Turkish nationalist. Aksu sung in support of “martyred” 
Turkish soldiers in the thirty year-long Kurdish PKK guerrilla insurrection against the Turkish 
state.153 Aksu is also culturally progressive. She supports women’s rights, the campaign for 
universal literacy and the LGBT movement in Turkey.154 Masum Degiliz is an apolitical ballad 
about human guilt and sin which declares, “Hands are sinful, Words are sinful, This is the fire of 
(our) time, The whole world is sinful!” 
The Gulenists employment of a Turkish star whose songs are remembered by the Turkish 
nation speaks to Anderson’s ideas around nationalism, death and timelessness. Anderson posits 
that nationalism fills a social need in modernity in that it justifies death by fellow countrymen in 
service to the nation. Death and sacrifice make the nation itself immortal. 
How then does a religious organization like the Gulenists who are employing nationalism 
validate its celebration of Turkishness to a Turkish audience? Gulenists employ non-Islamists yet 
nationalist artists at the Turkish Olympics as a way to tie music and performance to time and 
national memory of the Turkish audience. From Aksu’s music and public views, it seems nearly 
impossible that Aksu is a Gulenist. However, Aksu’s lack of membership in the Gulen 
congregation or in any other Turkish Islamist movement in no way prohibits the Gulen status 
group’s use of Aksu’s music at the Turkish Olympics. Sezen Aksu’s music at the Turkish 
Olympics appropriates transformative artists whose expression reminds the nation of times past, 
present and future.  
Salma began to sing Masum Degiliz. She struggled. For the first minute Salma’s voice 
cracked and was off-key. She forced her Turkish vowels. It was obvious Salma could not speak 
Turkish. And then she came to the chorus. This was a part of the song Salma knew well. Her 
voice sunk down for a moment, gathering strength and then sprung out, singing, “Hands are 
sinful, Words are sinful, This is the fire of (our) time, The whole world is sinful!” 
Salma hit the notes and then went through them, creating new sounds in the wake of her 
voice’s echo. She was a natural: perfect and untrained. 
The audience sat awed for moments. Time paused… then… the audience roared 
approval. Salma fed off their applause; her voice on target now for the rest of the song. The 
crowd swooned, an enchanted mob, wanting more, cheering her every word. As Salma finished 
Masum Degiliz girls and boys in the auditorium crowded the stage, chanting her name and 
clapping. 
Salma ignored her new fans. She watched the judges. The judges sat at a long table in the 
middle of the auditorium, a line of Gulenist Turkish men in their thirties and forties, appearing 
impartial behind their dress suits and almond moustaches. A badem biyik or “almond moustache” 
is a popular symbol of Islamist masculinity in Turkey. Called an almond moustache because it is 
light and just fits over the lip, the almond moustache is representative of how the Prophet 
Mohammed reportedly wore his moustache. Turkish Islamist leaders such as Necmettin Erbakan, 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Fetullah Gulen all wore or wear the almond moustache.  
The Gulenist judges quietly wrote their marks and feedback for Salma. Since the judges 
did not express happiness at the end of the show, Salma was sure they did not like her 
performance.155 She began to cry and ran from the stage, down into her fans. She ran through the 
group of children and toward the back of the auditorium, still weeping, shaking with tears. Her 
friends chased after her. Salma’s Turkish teacher, “Meltem Hanimeli” (aged twenty-five from 
Izmir, Turkey) came to Salma and took her aside. Hanimeli told Salma that she had done a 
wonderful job.156 
The purpose of this first practice was to gauge how much effort and resources the Gulen 
status group would spend on each student. The judges decided to fast track Salma into the 
Turkish Olympics.157 Salma would take private music lessons after school and Meltem Hanimeli 
would give Salma extra Turkish classes. Hanimeli would even bring Salma to stay a few nights a 
week at Hanimeli’s apartment so that Salma could learn Turkish faster.158 Hanimeli shared a flat 
with other Gulenist women in a Gulenist Women’s Dormitory near Salahaldin International 
School.159 The judges hoped that Salma would learn Turkish faster with the exposure to both 
Hanimeli and the other Turkish women with whom Hanimeli lived.160 All of this extra coaching 
and teaching would be free of charge to Salma’s family.161 Some judges felt that even if Salma 
did not win the singing competition at this year’s Turkish Olympics in Egypt, she needed to 
attend the Turkish Olympics Final that summer as a non-placed Turkish Olympics “touring 
singer.”162 The Gulenist judges knew they had a star on their hands and now it was time to help 
their star shine. 
In terms of Salma’s indoctrination into the Gulen status group, Salma started as a paying 
student but given her talents the Gulenists incentivized her to develop her skills. Part of the 
indoctrination process then for Salma was a deeper involvement within the Gulen status group 
via her Turkish Olympics performance and her actively participating in what amounted to a 
mini-performance scholarship. Gulenist leaders asked Salma to take extra Turkish lessons with 
her Turkish teacher Meltem Hanimeli in an environment (the Gulenist women’s dormitory) 
where Salma would be exposed to Turkishness, Turkish language and Turkish music. It is 
plausible then to state that in the field work the privatized and/or scholarship status of all 
students at Salahaldin was fundamental to how deep a student could go in the indoctrination 
processes. If Gulenists gave a student/performer a scholarship it was expected that she became 
indoctrinated deeper into the Gulen status group. 
Salma came from a self-described conservative Muslim family who liked that SIS gives 
Qur’anic morality courses as part of its regular curriculum.163 Because Salahaldin positioned 
itself as a Turkish Islamist school, Salma’s Egyptian Islamist family felt comfortable placing 
Salma in Salahaldin and having Salma participate in the Turkish Olympics.164 Salma explained: 
They (My parents) say that at the beginning Turkey wasn’t a civilized 
country at all… And then when the new people came it became a good 
country. So they told me it was a pleasure for them to make me learn at a 
Turkish school, because they left me in safe hands.165 
 
In referencing “new people” it seems likely that Salma’s parents meant the rise of an 
Islamist political majority in Turkey following the AK Party’s electoral success in 2002 yet 
Salma, at eleven years old, did not know who the “new, civilized” people were that were running 
Turkey. 
Salma did not seem to grasp or care about the differences between secular Kemalists such 
as Ataturk and Islamist Turks like Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Salma explained that she wanted to 
sing the song Masum Degiliz because she liked the way the song sounded and because her 
“Turkish teachers” had thought Salma’s voice was good for Masum Degiliz.166 On why the 
Turkish Olympics occur in Egypt and in other nations Salma stated that Turkish people “wanted 
to spread their culture more” and “discover hidden talents” of people around the world.167 
Salma’s ideas on why the Gulenists hold the Turkish Olympics, has some validity. 
Gulenists are involved in a version of imperial mapping as described by Mitchell. The goal of 
such mapping is a utilization of colonial economic production by the “mother” country. The 
Gulenists use the Turkish Olympics as a space to highlight and map the hidden and no-so-hidden 
talents of Turkish and non-Turkish students for the eventual utilization in their international 
network. 
 
“Civilized” Turkish Performance 
“Mariam,” “Nada” and “Laila” were members of the girls dance troupe coached by 
Sevinc. Mariam, Nada and Laila were also eleven years old and classmates of Salma. During a 
joint interview Mariam, Nada and Laila explained that each of their families had visited Turkey 
and approved of the girls’ participation in the Turkish Olympics in Egypt.168 The girls stated that 
they saw their participation in the Turkish Olympics in Egypt as the first step to seeing the wider 
world outside of Egypt.169 Mariam, Nada and Laila discussed how the Turkish national project 
could “civilize” Egypt saying, “We are representing Turkey in Egypt… the audience will see that 
Turkey is such a nice country and that Egypt too can be a nice country.”170 As an example of 
how Turkey can be a civilizing example for Egypt, Mariam, Nada and Laila pointed to higher 
hygienic standards in Turkey stating, “Turks don’t enter the house with shoes so they are cleaner 
than we are.”171 
Gulenists socialize Egyptian children like Salma by using Turkish media figures coupled 
with the idea that Turkish society is more “civilized” than Egyptian society. In Salma’s case 
Turkey is more civilized because “good people” govern Turkey. In Mariam’s, Nada’s and Laila’s 
example Turkey is more civilized because it has better hygienic standards. It was not important 
to Salma that by reproducing Sezen Aksu’s song at the Turkish Olympics in Egypt she was, in 
fact, a part of the Turkish nationalist project. 
 Mariam, Nada and Laila’s statement that they represent Turkey in Egypt speaks to a 
version of cosmopolitanism that sounds akin to south-on-south neo-imperialism. The Turkish 
Olympics can create among some non-Turkish students a new cultural imperialism in which 
participant children can idealize Turkishness to the detriment of their own ethnicity/nationalism. 
Though Mariam, Nada and Laila expressed pride in connecting with Turkishness they 
were full tuition paying students. Also, Mariam, Nada and Laila could not speak Turkish and 
they did not have their lives overtly controlled by Gulenists as some other non-Turkish children 
living in the Gulenist dormitories did. As such, Mariam, Nada and Laila were ultimately only a 
part of comradery internationalism at the Turkish Olympics. Yet their case study is important in 
that scholars see by their participation in the Turkish Olympics and as students at SIS the extent 
of their acceptance of Turkishness over being Arab or Egyptian. 
That Gulenist Turks would teach to young students like Mariam, Nada and Laila a 
version of cultural/soft neo-imperialism should not surprise academics. Turkey grew from the 
Ottoman state which itself was imperial in conquest and design from at least the Battle of 
Kosovo in 1389 onward. It is possible then to call the “neo-imperialism” in the ethnography 
nothing “neo” or new. Instead Turks belief in their cultural supremacy and imperial dominance 
over Middle eastern “others” could be called “Ottomanism.” We must careful however in using 
the term Ottomanism because Ottomanism was also used in the 19th century by Ottomans to 
describe the multi-ethnicism of the Ottoman state. I employ both terminologies (one imperial, the 
other multi-ethnic) in this thesis. 
 
Turkish Nationalism for Expatriate Turkish Children 
The extensive Turkish corporate sponsorship of the Turkish Olympics exemplifies how 
Turkishness, capital and education are interconnected in the Gulen status group. The best symbol 
of this interconnection is the existence of a “native Turkish speakers” competitive branch in the 
Turkish Olympics. This branch of the Turkish Olympics gives a space of nationalist expression 
for expatriate Turkish children in the Gülenist school network. 
Poetry Reciter “Su”  
As stated before, SIS’ student population is twenty-five percent Turkish.172 “Su 
Buyukgoz,” fifteen, is a Turkish girl attending Salahaldin and a reciter of Turkish poetry at the 
Turkish Olympics in Egypt. Su’s family hails from the Turkish province of Bolu and her father, 
“Emre Buyukgoz” thirty-nine, is a Gulenist and SIS’ head-chef. A talented chef Emre follows 
the tradition of the best chefs in Turkey coming from Bolu province. 
Su explained that many of the Turkish kids in Salahaldin came from Turkish families 
who either work in Cairo or are in Turkey but want their children to study in a Gulen status 
group school abroad.173 Su did not want to say why the Gulenist parents living in Turkey would 
send their children to Salahaldin. It became apparent to me that learning the deeper reasons why 
parents in Turkey would send their children to Salahaldin or other Gulenist schools around the 
world is a difficult topic to undertake and would need to be its own separate project. 
Regarding the Turkish Olympics, Su said, “There is an advantage for the (Egyptian) 
students at Salahaldin to learn Turkish because then they can understand us.”174 Su stressed that 
she was proud of her Turkishness and her native Turkish language when she participated at the 
Turkish Olympics in Egypt.175 
Turkish Dancer “Hakan” 
Sixteen-year-old “Hakan” was in the boys dance troupe at Salahaldin International 
School. Hakan’s father worked in a Turkish corporation in Cairo. Hakan revealed, “The goal of 
the Turkish Olympics is to spread the Turkish Language and to show the world how Turkish can 
be a unifying language.”176 Hakan felt that by spreading the language of Turkish he was involved 
in a movement of “national pride.”177 
Turkish Singers “Yunis” and “Cengis” 
Sixteen years old “Yunis” and “Cengis” were singers who had performed in the Turkish 
Olympics in Egypt and as students of SIS had represented Egypt in the Turkish native speaker 
competitions of the 2012 and 2013 Turkish Olympics finals in Turkey.178 Yunis and Cengis were 
the same boys who Gulenist leader Ibrahim Gokhan embraced as the “boys of the future” after 
sitting in on their interview. Yunis family lived and worked in Cairo. Cengis’s family lived in 
Istanbul. Cengis’s father was a writer for the leading Gulenist newspaper Zaman.179 The Gulen 
status group gave Cengis a scholarship to attend Salahaldin International School and Cengis 
lived in a male Gulenist dormitory near to Salahaldin.180 Both Yunis and Cengis had heard of the 
Turkish Olympics from when they were young.181 Visitors from other countries would come to 
their communities in Turkey and they would welcome “these new friends.”182 Yunis discussed 
the media spectacle around the Turkish Olympics in Turkey: 
All Turkey – before it wasn’t like this – but now all Turkey when it comes time of 
the Turkish Olympics, I saw the Olympics on all Turkish channels. Children 
come. Poets and artists come and meet the children. So there is real popular 
support for the Turkish Olympics.183 
 
There may have been more to learn from Cengis about the experience of living in the 
Gulenist men’s dormitory but the presence of Gokhan dissuaded further inquiry into the inner 
workings of the Gulenist dormitory system or questions as to why Cengis’s parents would send 
him to a Gulenist school in Egypt. 
More questions remain as to why Turkish children are at SIS and why they participate in 
the Turkish Olympics. However, thinking on Weber’s and Smith’s ideas around an ethno-
symbolic/presumed ethnicity scholars can see the Turkish Olympics as a space for Gulenist 
Turkish children to affirm their ethnicity and accept a Gulenist version of Turkish nationalism. 
Turkish and non-Turkish performers formed bonds which lasted years after their 
performance at the Turkish Olympics finals in Egypt and in Turkey.184 Certainly Turkish 
performers did not experience the indoctrination process into the Gulen Movement via the 
Turkish Olympics the same way non-Turkish students did. Likewise, non-Turkish students did 
not experience the reification process of Turkishness and Gulenism that Turkish students 
experienced at the Turkish Olympics. Yet because of the interconnectedness of the performer 
community at the Turkish Olympics, Turkish performers knew and spoke about the 
indoctrination processes non-Turkish performers experienced. As such, Turkish performers’ 
responses need to be included in the below sections on the three steps of indoctrination for non-
Turkish performers at the Turkish Olympics. 
 
 International Comradery: The Friendly Face of the Turkish Olympics 
In their interview, eleven year old girl dancers Mariam, Nada and Laila described 
participation in the Turkish Olympics in Egypt as their first step to see the wider world.185 
Similarly, Yunis and Cengis – though Turks and more connected with the process of reification – 
described the comradery, which developed at the Turkish Olympics.186 Yunis and Cengis 
expressed their nationalism as mono-nationals that is nationals of only one political nation-state.  
Like Yunis and Cengis, the Turkish Olympics in Egypt (or the finals in Turkey) was a 
space where Abdelrahman, aged seventeen, could also express his Egyptian nationalism at the 
Turkish Olympics. Abdelrahman stated that the Turkish Olympics in Egypt and the finals in 
Turkey opened for him a new door to the world.187 Abdelrahman and one of his parents gave an 
interview to me. Abdelrahman joined Facebook groups for the years he participated in the final 
of the Turkish Olympics in Turkey.188 The Facebook groups Abdelrahman joined had 
membership in the thousands, mostly of Abdelrahman’s fellow Turkish Olympics participants 
from Turkey and around the world.189 
Abdelrahman performed at a section of the Turkish Olympics called “Native Singing” 
and his rendition of the Egyptian nationalist song Beledee, Beledee (My Nation, My Nation) was 
a hit at the 2012 Turkish Olympics Finals in Turkey. Abdelrahman won bronze at the final 
competing in a field of talented performers from around the world.190 While Mariam, Nada and 
Laila were dancing Turkish folk dances, organizers of the Turkish Olympics in Egypt only called 
upon the dancing girls to be Egyptian and proud of the comradery existing between Egypt and 
Turkey at the Turkish Olympics.191 Yet Gulen Congregationalists called on Abdelrahman to be 
something much more. As such Abdelrahman would come to be a part of comradery 
internationalism and outsider internationalism. 
 
The Story of Abdelrahman and Sartorial Mapping 
Abdelrahman hailed from Alexandria, Egypt. In being able to sing an Egyptian song 
“Beladee, Beladee,” Abdelrahman was successful in comradery internationalism. However, 
despite speaking fluent Turkish, Abdelrahman found the Gulen status group stifling and was not 
successful as an outsider internationalist. 
Abdelrahman’s first connection with the Gulen Congregation and the Turkish Olympics 
in Egypt was when “Omer Yildirim” (talent scout for the Turkish Olympics in Egypt and 
principal at SIS) visited the Bibliotheca Alexandrina boys’ choir. Abdelrahman sung in the same 
choir as his friend “Ahmed.”192 In 2010 Yildirim, a Gulenist Turk/Arab from the southeast of 
Turkey, attended a performance of the boys’ choir and then offered both Abdelrahman and 
Ahmed full scholarships to SIS and a place in the Gulenist dormitory in Cairo.  
According to Abdelrahman, he and Ahmed were the only Egyptian boys in the 
dormitory.193 The majority of the young men living in the dormitory with Ahmed and 
Abdelrahman were Turkish, Albanian and Kazakhi.194 Abdelrahman explained, “They told us 
that if we stay in the dorms then khalas (everything has been decided), you are part of Hizmet 
(the Gulen status group).”195 
Abdelrahman took intensive Turkish lessons at a Turkey based Gulenist summer camp 
language program. All of this work in Turkish in addition to living in the Gulenist Dormitory in 
Cairo resulted in Abdelrahman learning fluent Turkish.196 While Abdelrahman was successful in 
learning Turkish, he faced problems accepting Turkish nationalism and Gulenist Islamism at the 
Turkish Olympics.  
When Abdelrahman was about to perform a Turkish song at the Turkish Olympics in 
Egypt or the finals in Turkey – Gulenist organizers urged Abdelrahman to wear the outfit of a 
Turkish villager.197 Turkish Olympics organizers told Abdelrahman that if he wore a Turkish 
villager costume while singing a Turkish song it would be easier for him to win  metals at the 
Olympics in Egypt and Turkey.  
Abdelrahman wore the Turkish costume but wondered, “What it would matter if I wore a 
Turkish costume or not? The costume was not singing the song.”198 Organizers compelling 
Abdelrahman to wear a Turkish villager costume to score higher at the Turkish Olympics is a 
sign of Turkish nationalism in costume and stage presentation. More than this, non-Turkish 
children wearing traditional Turkish outfits is a symbol of the Turkish audience’s need for 
sartorial mapping. Yet unlike what Mitchell observed in nineteenth century world fairs, the 
sartorial mapping at the Turkish Olympics is a post-colonial south-on-south version of neo-
imperialism (or inversely a throwback of old style Ottoman imperialism). In this mapping 
process the southern audience of Turks – while curious of the outside world – can only begin the 
process of mapping “the other” by first coming to terms with their own history of self-imposed 
national modernization. As such first the Turkish audience must view “the other” as they have 
viewed the marginalization of their own villagers/“Black” Turks in republican Turkey. 
 
The Story of Abdelrahman and Problems at the Gulenist Dormitory 
Abdelrahman went on to explain that the behavioral standards for those living at the 
dormitory and attending Salahaldin were harsher than for the paying students at Salahaldin.199 As 
a high end International School in Cairo, Salahaldin was unlikely to be overly strict with students 
from tuition paying families. The dormitory behavior standards Abdelrahman experienced 
include limited or no communication with co-eds at Salahaldin and little or no internet 
connection while at the dormitory. Smart phones, for example were forbidden for dormitory 
residents.200 Abdelrahman explained that it was difficult for him to adjust to the behavioral codes 
of the Gulen Dormitory in Cairo: 
All of the strict rules against talking to girls and no internet based cell phones are 
only for the people staying in the Salahaldin Dormitory. Otherwise the other 
students who live in Cairo and go to the school never experience the same sort of 
rules and discipline as the dormitory member experiences.201 
 
According to Abdelrahman most of the young men at the dormitory – Turkish, Egyptian or other 
nationalities – wanted out of the Gulen status group. Turkish boys at the dormitory said that, 
“Fethullah Gulen did not teach what the dormitory was practicing.”202 The fact that the majority 
of the residents at Abdelrahman’s dormitory were reportedly from Turkey, Albania and 
Kazakhstan helps researchers see where the Gulen Congregation has had the most success in 
Gulenist subject formation. Ultimately the field-work showed that the Gulenist dormitory system 
was the fundamental point of indoctrination into the Gulen status group. 
Abdelrahman related a story where he said hello to a Turkish girl at Salahaldin during 
school hours. Abdelrahman also asked the Turkish girl to borrow a pencil. Later on the Gulenist 
“big-brothers” of the dormitory investigated Abdelrahman’s actions, “They asked me, ‘Why 
didn’t you ask for a pencil from a boy?’ They were always watching me, especially around the 
Turkish girls of our school.”203 Abdelrahman reported that if he spoke to Egyptian girls at 
Salahaldin International School he would not have a problem from the elders of the Gulen 
congregation. However, the Gulenist “big brothers” of the dormitory would question him if he 
spoke to a Turkish girl at Salahaldin.204 
When Abdelrahman asked why it was forbidden to speak to girls at the school, Gulenist 
leaders reportedly would not give him a reason besides to say that in Islam, “it was harem 
(forbidden) to speak to women in public.”205 In 2013 Abdelrahman relates that he left Salahaldin 
and the dormitory. The reason for his leaving was – according to Abdelrahman – thirty percent 
because he wanted to leave the school and seventy percent because he was kicked out of the 
Salahaldin International school and the Gulenist dormitory.206 
  
Gulenist Principal Omer Yildirim’s Response to Abdelrahman’s Story 
In the 2013 – 2014 school year Yildirim became the Salahaldin high school principal yet 
he was still connected to the Turkish Olympics in Egypt. While Yildirim no longer was a talent 
scout, he advised the organizers of the 2014 Turkish Olympics in Egypt. Yildirim discussed 
Abdelrahman’s removal from Salahaldin and the Gulenist dormitory in 2013 of the 2012 – 2013 
school year.  
As related earlier, before becoming the high school principal of Salahaldin, Yildirim was 
one of the main chaperones and organizers of the Turkish Olympics in Egypt. As such he 
brought the qualifying Egyptian students to the Turkish Finals in Turkey. In 2012 and 2013 when 
Abdelrahman went to Turkey, Yildirim reports that Abdelrahman – a handsome and charming 
boy – often got numbers and emails of female participants.207 Regarding Abdelrahman’s abilities 
with girls, Yildirim rolled his eyes and called teenage Abdelrahman a “suave hornball.”208 
Yildirim tried acting as a mentor and role model for Abdelrahman so that Abdelrahman could 
learn to be patient and choose wisely which girl he wanted to date.209 However, Yildirim’s duties 
as organizer and talent scout of the Turkish Olympics in Egypt meant that he could not always be 
with Abdelrahman. Because of Yildirim’s limited time, other Gulenist “big brothers” watched 
over Abdelrahman and – according to Yildirim – these other Gulenists did a poor job mentoring 
young Abdelrahman. Said Yildirim, “The quality of some members of hizmet (the Gulen status 
group) can be lacking.”210 Yildirim related that he wished he had more time for Abdelrahman 
because Abdelrahman was a good boy and needed a good mentor. 
Abdelrahman for his part said that he, Abdelrahman, loved Yildirim calling Yildirim, 
“My big brother… (Yildirim) isn’t like the rest of Hizmet (the Gulen status group).”211 
 According to Yildirim, the reason Abdelrahman was kicked out of Salahaldin and the 
dormitory had to do with a Gulenist Turkish girl Abdelrahman began to date secretly from 
Salahaldin. At night (according to Yildirim) Abdelrahman began slipping out of the dormitory 
and visiting the girl who lived nearby. Doormen in the area saw Abdelrahman and his girlfriend 
together on the streets late at night. One night, kidnappers abducted Abdelrahman and 
Abdelrahman’s Turkish girlfriend and held them for ransom. Gulenist administration at 
Salahaldin responded to the ransom threats by calling on their contacts within the Egyptian 
Mafia and paying to get Abdelrahman released.212  
After Abdelrahman’s release, leaders of the Gulen status group at SIS and the Gulenist 
dormitory cut all ties with Abdelrahman. Yildirim disliked his fellow Gulenists decision to end 
the congregation’s relationship with Abdelrahman.213 Yildirim argued with other Gulenists on 
behalf of Abdelrahman to no avail. Yildirim told his fellow Gulenists that the Gulen status group 
should give Abdelrahman another chance to continue with his scholarship and work directly with 
Yildirim. Yildirim told his brother Gulenists that he, Yildirim, would be responsible for 
Abdelrahman’s future behavior. Despite these pleas the heads of the Gulenist administration at 
Salahaldin and the dormitory stood firm and ended Abdelrahman’s scholarship.214 
Ultimately, the exact reason why Gulenist leadership removed Abdelrahman from the 
Turkish Olympics, SIS and the Gulenist dormitory is not as important as what researchers can 
learn from Abdelrahman’s case study in outsider internationalism and child indoctrination into 
the Gulen Congregation. 
Abdelrahman’s claim that the “big brother” Gulenists did not like Abdelrahman speaking 
with Turkish girls gives a glimpse into gender relations and nationalism in the Gulen 
congregation. Equally important was Yildirim’s story about Abdelrahman’s post-date abduction, 
the Gulen congregation’s payment of ransom for Abdelrahman and the Turkish girl at the school. 
In Abdelrahman’s statement and Yildirim’s story, the role of youth flirtation, nationalized 
sexuality and status group discipline underpin Gulenist understandings of femininity, masculinity 
and Turkishness. 
 
From the Library of Alexandria to the Dormitory of Gulen: Outsider Internationalism – 
“Ahmed” Case Study 
Ahmed, Abdelrahman’s friend, also aged seventeen was originally from Alexandria. As a 
young teen he performed in the Bibliotheca Alexandrina choir. It was at a Bibliotheca 
Alexandrina choir performance that principal Yildirim and the Gulenist administration at 
Salahaldin offered Ahmed a scholarship to attend Salahaldin and stay in the Gulenist dormitory 
in Cairo.215  
Ahmed lived up to Yildirim’s expectations and in 2012 and 2013 Ahmed won one gold, 
one silver and four bronze medals at the Turkish Olympics finals in Turkey.216 While Ahmed 
was not completely fluent in Turkish (he was not nearly as good at Turkish as Abdelrahman) he 
had learned Turkish well enough to participate in the finals of the Turkish Olympics and be 
active in the Gulen status group’s dormitory system. Like Abdelrahman, Ahmed and many of the 
people Ahmed met at the Turkish Olympics kept in touch and planned to go to university 
together.217 As an outsider, Ahmed’s use of internationalism served him well. He reportedly 
accepted the rules of the Gulen status group dormitory system so that he could parley “pseudo 
membership” in the Gulen congregation into subsidized university education in Turkey.218 
Ahmed’s experience at the Turkish Olympics and in the Gulen status group mirrors some 
aspects of how Salma was treated. However, the difference between Ahmed and Salma is age 
and level of indoctrination. While Gulenist administrators wanted Salma to learn Turkish, she 
did not live in the women’s Gulenist dormitory (though during the production of the Turkish 
Olympics in Egypt in early 2014 she did stay some nights per week at the Gulenist woman’s 
dormitory to improve her Turkish). Ahmed however while at SIS lived all of the time in the 
men’s dormitory and as such had learned passable Turkish and becoming more indoctrinated into 
the Gulenist system than Salma. 
In Ahmed’s case study, we see that the cosmopolitan nature of Gulenist dormitories is 
linked with the Gulenist project of educational capital production. As non-Turkish internationals, 
Ahmed and Salma represent a version of outsider internationalism. Both Ahmed and Salma 
received free education and both might – in the future – continue to gain more educational 
capital at subsidized Gulenist universities in Turkey or in Africa.  
Outsider internationalism is part of a greater indoctrination-based meritocracy system of 
educational capital production existent within the Gulen status group. It appears from the 
ethnography that Gulenism needs to bring in talent from poor families (or middle class families) 
which makes the talent loyal to the Gulen status group. In fact, the meritocracy of education 
capital production within the Gulen congregation may be one of the biggest strengths of a group 
like the Gulenists. 
Both Ahmed and Abdelrahman are important case studies at the Turkish Olympics and in 
the greater Gulen status group because both boys were a part of comradery internationalism and 
outsider internationalism. Both Ahmed and Abdelrahman received full scholarships to SIS based 
on their performance abilities. And yet in performance they were able to embrace their Egyptian-
ness at the Turkish Olympics; for example when Abdelrahman performed the Egyptian 
nationalist song Beladee, Beladee. Ahmed was also able to perform some songs which were 
“Arabic” or “Egyptian.”  
Both boys were examples that students being indoctrinated have their own agency into 
how deeply they become part of the Gulen congregation and accept Turkishness. In 
Abdelrahman’s case he rebelled and was removed. In Ahmed’s case he accepted Turkishness and 
Gulenism and hoped to get free (or partially subsidized) education from a Gulen status group 
university. While Gulenists in the field work clearly tried to bring non-Turkish students into their 
status group, the process of indoctrination of non-Turkish students was complex indeed. While 
the carrot of free education as opposed to expensive private education might have been appealing 
to students like Ahmed and Abdelrahman (and their parents), the indoctrination process is far 
from certain and linked to personal agency of the students as well. 
 
Gulenist Internationalism: Kazakh, Turkish and Egyptian 
Of all the performers at the Turkish Olympics in Egypt “Sema”, a girl whose family was 
from Kazakhstan, was the best example of Gulenist internationalism. 
 Seventeen year old Sema was one of the three masters of ceremonies at the 2014 Turkish 
Olympics in Egypt final ceremony.219 Sema’s history with the Gulen status group dates back to 
before she was born. In the early 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union, Sema’s mother met the 
first Turkish Gulenists in Kazakhstan.220 In fact Sema’s mother was one of the first of seven 
Islamic Kazahki women who decided to cover themselves after the fall of the Soviet Union.221 It 
was partially with connections to the Gulen status group that Sema’s mother and father were able 
to come to Turkey in 2000 when Sema was 3 years old.222 After a year in Turkey, her family 
moved to Cairo to study at Al-Azhar University. Sema’s family has been in Egypt at Al-Azhar 
since 2001.223 As of March 2014, her father was doing his master’s degree at Al-Azhar and 
working in the Kazakhi Embassy in Cairo.224 Sema’s mother was still studying at Al-Azhar’s 
undergraduate program. Sema had an older sister who was also studying in Al-Ahzar.225  
Sema said that her mother and father and whole family were members of the Gulen status 
group (which she called Hizmet).226 Like many in the Gulen congregation in Cairo, Sema and her 
family lived near other Gulenists. The entire Gulenist community, stated Sema, lived close to 
SIS in Cairo’s Fifth Settlement District.227  
That Gulenists live close to one another follows typical Weberian status group behavior. 
Sema attended Salahaldin and said, “At school here I feel half Egyptian and half Kazaki.”228 She 
spoke in Turkish to Turks, in Arabic to Egyptians and at home in Kazakhi to her family. In her 
years at Salahaldin International School, Sema had specialized in learning new languages.229 
Her work in language acquisition at Salahaldin facilitated her MC work with the Turkish 
Olympics in Egypt. Sema reported that she and her family spoke fluent Turkish, Arabic and 
Kazakhi.230 Besides speaking Turkish, Arabic and Kazakhi, Sema spoke near native speaker 
level English from her time at SIS (as stated earlier, at Salahaldin the language of instruction is 
English).231 Reportedly, she could also communicate in French and Russian.232 During the 
Turkish Olympics in Egypt final performance, Sema translated Turkish into fluent colloquial 
Egyptian Arabic for the majority Egyptian audience.233 While on stage, Sema wore a traditional 
Kazakhi woman’s dress. To the audience Sema was Egyptian and Kazakhi while translating and 
speaking Turkish.234 Her sartorial appearance, fluency in Arabic, Turkish and Kazakhi presented 
a newly mapped third milieu at the Turkish Olympics, which exemplified the existence in the 
Gulen congregation of a “Gulenist internationalist.” 
Sema was covered and said she was a believer in Islam and the teachings of Fethullah 
Gulen.235 Sema said the ideal behind the Turkish Olympics is to: 
Introduce Islam to the world… Like, when the Christian people who attend the 
Turkish Olympics see the people praying they become introduced to the Turkish 
Olympics… And I know of people who became Muslim by meeting (Gulenists). 
So the Turkish Olympics is a way to introduce Islam behind the show of speaking 
Turkish.236 
 
From watching satellite TV, Gulenist channels such as Samanyolu Sema heard about Americans 
and Russians who, after attending the Turkish Olympics Finals in Turkey, had become 
Muslim.237 Sema stated: 
When we look at the generation of Fethullah Gulen and the other big brothers of 
Hizmet, they have always worked for one goal, the Turkish language and Islam 
together… God be praised let them continue to do their work…In future 
generations this will continue… Gulen and the other Gulenist big brothers have 
had the biggest influence on the development of the Turkish Olympics.238 
 
According to Gulenist Turanists, as a Kazakhi girl Sema is a pure Turk, purer than Turks 
themselves. And yet Sema too must acquiesce to the Turkey-based nationalism of the Turkish 
Olympics and the Gulen congregation. Gulenists seem to believe that it is only with Turkish 
nationalism and a re-imagined Islam moderated by the teachings of Fethullah Gulen that Sema 
can regain the modernity that is her birth right as a Turk from the Turkic homeland of central 
Asia. 
Besides Salahaldin, the Gulenist community in Egypt had connections and schools in the 
city of Beni Sweif south of Cairo, in Alexandria and in Port Said. Gulenists in Egypt are 
primarily Turkish but there are a sizable number of non-Turkish Egyptian and central Asian 
Gulenists in Egypt. Though organized around a neo-liberal economic paradigm which champions 
the “gating” of education to elite students and families, Gulenist internationalists like Sema 
represent a new version of cosmopolitanism within the Gulen status group. Gulenists are 
inclusive of non-Turkish Anatolian elements (Kurds, Laz, etc) within their status group. This 
openness to Anatolian “others” indicates an openness to foreign internationals within the status 
group in so far as Gulenist internationalists accept the teachings of Fethullah Gulen and the 
primacy of Gulenist Turkishness in congregational identity production. 
Gulenist internationals are inside the congregation and as such are separate and protected 
from the external neo-liberal policies of the Gulen congregation. The employment of Islamist 
capitalism within the Gulen congregation appears to be different and community based but is 
also a neoliberal response to unfettered capitalism. Certainly wages are low in the Gulen status 
group but the walls of protection (free or semi-free education, health care, vacation sites, food 
provisions, etc.) are high. Meanwhile Gulenists actions outside of the status group in Egypt and 
other nations appear to be neo-liberal in design and implementation. The ethnography shows that 
Gulenists push a version of rugged individualism/neo-liberal capitalism on the elite class its 
educational network primarily services but act in quite an opposite manner to members within 
their community—providing subsidized private services in response to the withdrawal of state 
social service provisions. 
 Gulenist Structure in The Child Indoctrination Ethnography 
One Turkish Islamist described the role of the Islamism in Turkey akin to being in a 
factory.239 Gulenists work together in their part of the Turkish Islamist factory.240 Are Gulenists 
actions any different than the anti-reformation Jesuit schools across Asia in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries? Yes, in that Gulenists are connected with 21st century fiscal 
austerity/privatization and exist in a status group says it supports concepts such as democracy 
and religious tolerance. Is the Gulen congregation any different than Jerry Jones’ People’s 
Temple? Yes. The Gulen status group/Gulen Congregation/Hizmet is not a cult limited to a small 
group but instead a global network possessing internationalism and inclusivity. 
Some have likened the Gulen status group to being an “Islamist Mafia.” Yet the mafia 
trope does not fit the Gulen congregation because the mafia (at least the version of the mafia 
active in the United States, Cosa Nostra) focuses most of its resources on protecting and 
controlling illegal and semi-legal activities.241 While some in the Gulen congregation may have 
Turkish or Egyptian mafia connections, Gulenists as a whole seek power and influence in many 
different fields in many different countries242 by using a combination of religiosity, education 
and financial wealth.  
It seems likely that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s damnation of the Gulen 
status group as a parallel group within the nation, seeking to subvert and control the government 
has a great deal of validity within the Turkish context. Yet, the Gulen congregation in Egypt is 
quite different than the Gulen congregation in Turkey. Also, non-Turkish Gulenists of Egyptian, 
Kazakhi or Albanian decent have different goals in mind for the Gulen status group in Turkey, 
Egypt, Kazakhstan or Albania than their fellow Turkish Gulenists.243 
Ultimately, the Gulen Congregation is a complex and large organization with a ruling 
cadre of “big brothers” headed by Fethullah Gulen the hoca efendi (“auspicious teacher”). And 
yet, given its size, the Gulen status group possesses a diversity of voices and perspectives. 
 
Conclusions of Child Indoctrination Ethnography 
The Turkish Olympics is an effective magnifying glass with which scholars can study the 
greater Gulen status group. As such, the best way to understand the wealth production machine 
that is the Gulen Congregation is to think of the congregation as a multinational caramel apple. 
The caramel on the outside is the institutionalized public relations part of the status group. 
“Sweet Caramel” is how non-congregationalists first encounter the Gulenists, usually through a 
Gulenist school or an activity such as the Turkish Olympics. In this first layer Gulenists practice 
a form of international acceptance of all people, i.e. comradery internationalism.  
The second layer, the apple itself, is how the Gulen congregation organizes through 
networks of dormitories, schools, universities, hospitals, businesses and media organizations. It 
is possible for Turks and foreigners to work and/or attend these institutions and still not be a 
member of the Gulen status group. Ahmed and Abdelrahman are examples of non-Turkish 
outsiders who were not a part of the Gulen congregation but were deeply connected to the status 
group and undergoing proselytism and inculcation into the Gulen status group vis-à-vis their 
Gulenist dormitory in Cairo as outsider internationalists. An important “stage set” here to 
remember is that entrance into this layer of the Gulen status group for non-Turkish students is 
connected to subsidized/incentivized education. 
Finally, to go to the seeds of the apple, the center third layer, is to cut into actual Gulenist 
Islamism. It is from this center point that Gulenist true-believer proselytism emanates. It is 
possible for non-Gulenist student/performers at the Turkish Olympics in Egypt to feel nothing of 
their indoctrination and subjugation into the Gulen status group. However, as the same 
performers get deeper into the congregation, Gulenist proselytism increases and the process of 
child subjugation and indoctrination intensifies. Also a feeling of communal connectivity in 
which the status group “takes care of its own” increases. It becomes a forgone conclusion that 
upon being a member of the Gulen congregation one has help or full support for one’s health 
care, education and employment. 
While the Gulen status group is usually Turkish in ethnicity, the congregation has 
developed a space for non-Turks. These non-Turks like Sema and her family must whole-
heartedly accept Imam Fethullah Gulen as their mentor and spiritual guide. They must also 
accept the preeminence of Turkish nationalism and Turkishness. And yet, fully indoctrinated 
non-Turkish Congregationalists like Sema and her family possess a third Gulenist 
internationalism which incorporates the notions of international comradery and outsider-







Study of Audience Production and Nationalist Reinvention at the Turkish Olympics
Chapter Five 
The History and Theory of the Development and Transformation of “Turkishness” among 
Audience Members at the Turkish Olympics 
 
For much of Turkey’s republican history Kemalism – or the ideas associated with 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk – has been the ruling ideology. In Kemalism, Turkishness is the 
fundamental part of national identity most dominant in the fields of education, family, business, 
militarized duty, masculinity and femininity.244 As such, the ideal of being Turkish was the 
unifying glue of the Republican Turkish state.245 Any study then of present day Turkish audience 
production and reinvention at the Turkish Olympics must first discuss and define the earlier 
notion of Turkishness as conceived by republican Turks and pre-republican Ottomans. Leading 
historians of Turkey, Kemal Karpat and Erik Jan Zurcher, will inform much of this theoretical 
study into the ideology of Turkishness and the feelings of inferiority Turkishness creates among 
many citizens in Turkey. 
 
Primordialism and the Language of the United Ottoman State 
Kemal Karpat differentiates the terms “Turkishness” and “Turkism,” stating that 
Turkishness was a nationalist project of unification based on a “synthesis of new socio-cultural 
forces”246 growing out of the Ottoman crises years in the middle nineteenth to early twentieth 
centuries.247 Karpat explains that “Turkishness” became the leading political discourse in the late 
Ottoman State and early Republican period with the rise of the Young Turks’ Committee of 
Union and Progress in 1908/1909.248 However, Karpat explains that by the late 1920s and early 
1930s, populist “Turkishness” gave way to the state sponsored “Turkism” of the Kemalist 
Republican state.249 Karpat’s critique of the term Turkculuk is important in that it divides the 
nascent nationalist/populist project of 1856 – 1923 (Turkishness) with the modern Kemalist 
nationalist project (Turkism). However, the fact remains that political discourse in Turkey today 
uses the term Turkishness – not Turkism – to describe nationalist identity politics around “being 
Turkish.” Perhaps the use of Turkculuk in modern day Turkey shows the popularity of pre-
Kemalist (or Turanist) versions of Turkish nationalism as opposed to the state sponsored and 
imposed Kemalist Turkishness. 
From 1856 (the end of the Crimean War) to 1914 seven million Muslim refugees 
relocated in Anatolia from the Caucuses, Macedonia, Greece, Bulgaria, Bosnia/Yugoslavia, 
Romania, Crete, Cyprus and Albania.250 By 1882 forty-two percent of the Anatolian populations 
of the Ottoman Empire were from refugee Muslim families or decedents of Muslim refugees, 
turning Anatolia, “into a de facto United Ottoman state.”251 Commonalities in religion (Sunni 
Islam) created links between the newly arrived refugees and the villager Muslims of Anatolia.252 
While Tanzimat† leaders such as Ahmet Cevdet Pasa (1822 – 1895) were not ready to Turkify 
the Ottoman Muslim milieu in Anatolia, he accepted that the Ottoman state “stood on four 
foundations” that is the Caliphate, the family of Osman, the capital being in Istanbul and that the 
sultan was always Turkish.253 In Ahmet Cevdet Pasa’s writings, scholars see that the concept of 
“primordial Turkishness” was an active discourse among Ottoman elite in the mid-nineteenth 
century.254 Clearly the Ottomans discussed and thought on their own “primordialism” in 
response to the cultural nationalism of French Revolution and the racialized history of the 
Brothers Grimm and the “Aryans.”  
                                                 
† Tanzimat = reorganization of the Ottoman State based on western European examples. This process began in 1839 
and ended in the First Constitutional Era in 1876. 
Ottoman elites would eventually come to employ both a racial (German) and a cultural 
(French) approach to national identity production in the early twentieth century.255 Initially 
Turkishness would be Turanist and connected to ideas of a racial “Turkic blood” and epic myths 
of Central Asia. Then Turkishness would morph under the Kemalist regime and the national 
identity of Turkey would be constructed more along cultural/civilizational lines. As such, in 
modern day Turkey both cultural (French in origin) and racial (German in origin) Turkishness 
exist as active discourses. These discourses at times compliment and reinforce  each other and at 
other times conflict.256 
Karpat explains that though the Ottoman state from 1839 to 1908 did not officially 
support the Turkish ethnicization of Sunni Muslims in Anatolia, a natural populist process of 
language reinvention took place among the “Turkish milieu” and the greater Ottoman 
community of Anatolia and the Middle East.257 A new populist language – the precursor to 
modern Turkish – grew out of late nineteenth century newspapers and reviews in Anatolia.258 
This new language blended the classical Ottoman Turkish (heavily influenced by Arabic and 
Persian languages) with the villager Turkish of Anatolia. This “new Turkish” gained widespread 
use in Ottoman elementary schools, middle schools and professional schools as well as many 
government offices.259 The creation of a “people’s Anatolian language” happened in the 
polyglotism of the Ottoman state and, as such, Arabs, Circassians, Greeks, Kurds, Laz and 
Armenians all used the new Turkish language.260 Karpat states that Turkish language use was a 
tool to unify different Muslim ethnicities in Anatolia. Clearly Karpat’s analysis closely follows 
Anderson’s theory of print capital being the main root of modern nationalism. 
However, Karpat argues this was not a nationalist project in so much as it was a “natural 
evolution” among “Turks” and “non-Turks spreading unopposed … as a means of 
communication, rather than a mark of the dominant ethnic group.”261 Karpat states that the new 
Turkish identity in Anatolia played off of earlier, rustic villager Turks who, while regionalized, 
could trace their lineage in Anatolia back to the eighth, ninth and tenth centuries A.D. Given the 
need to create a nationalist Turkish identity in the nineteenth century, Turkishness “…coalesced 
around the existing ancient Turkish ethno-tribal identity to which it grafted the Ottoman and 
Islamic political ingredients.”262 
Did the modern day Turkish language develop in a “natural” manner among the “Muslim 
milieu” of late nineteenth/early twentieth century Anatolia? Or did forces within the Ottoman 
state actively conceive of modern Turkish for the masses of newly arrived Muslim refugees in 
late nineteenth/early twentieth century Anatolia so as to instill a new nationalist identity, thus 
effectively nationalizing a sectarian refugee milieu? The answers to these questions are not clear 
and outside the scope of this study. Yet if scholars of Turkey wish to understand the 
development of modern day Turkish and how language production is associated with 
Turkishness, these questions need more investigation. A deeper reading of Anderson will be 
necessary in this process. One can suppose (as Karpat does) that the rise of modern Turkish in 
the late nineteenth century occurred devoid of nationalist machination and was a “natural 
process.” However, given the import Young Turk leaders of the Ottoman Empire and the early 
Turkish Republic gave to Turkish language production and reform, it is possible that elements 
within the Ottoman State before 1908, covertly (if not overtly) supported the development of a 
new language to further the nascent Turkish Nationalist project. 
 
  
Turkishness of the Young Turks: First Turanist and then Kemalist 
The Young Turks were a group of elite Ottomans active in the state’s military and 
political power structures. First the Young Turks worked as agitators against Sultan Abdul-
Hamid II’s government (1880s – 1908) and then they became the rulers of the late Ottoman and 
early Republican state (1909 – 1950). Erik Jan Zurcher’s work on Turkishness gives academics 
one of the best accounts of the ideological development of the Young Turks. 
Initially the Young Turks wanted to oust autocratic Sultan Abdul-Hamid II (r. 1876 – 
1909) and to create a constitutional, parliamentary state. By enacting democratic reforms in the 
Ottoman Empire, the Young Turks hoped to remove the external threat of European imperialists 
dominating the internal workings of the Ottomans.263 However, the Young Turks had a 
fundamental clash of ideals. While they gave lip service to democracy and popular 
representation, they were also elitists who adhered to the anti-democratic concepts of 
technocracy.264 As such their political discourse was at loggerheads with their elitist foundations. 
Whenever given the choice between real democracy or technocratic modernization, the Young 
Turks always choose the latter.265 
Zurcher explains that Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his supporters belonged to a radical 
wing of the Young Turks.266 As time went on the Young Turk movement as a whole and the 
radicals in particular moved closer toward an employment of Turkishness/Turkish nationalism as 
the guiding ideology of their political enterprise. By the time Young Turks were running the 
Ottoman State in 1909 they embraced a version of populist Turkishness theorized by Ziya 
Gokalp and other Turanists.267 This version of Turkishness (Turanist in approach) persisted as 
the main national identity through the 1920s.  
From the mid to late 1920s onward, the ideology of “being Turkish” became more tied 
to the Kemalist state and as such focused on one state Turkish nationalism within the Republic 
of Turkey. Fearing that the rise of Pan-Turkic nationalism in Turkey might upset delicate 
relations with Stalin’s USSR, Ataturk closed all Turanist institutions in 1931.268 After closing 
Turanist institutions, the Kemalist state embraced a new Turkishness. Kemalists actively 
supported the Sun Language Theory in the 1930s and revisionist histories of ancient Anatolia 
featured early Anatolian civilizations (such as the Hittites and Sumerians) as proto-Turks.269 
Ataturk himself opened Sümerbank (Sumer Bank) with backing from the Soviet Union in 1933 
and Etibank (Hittite Bank) in 1935. Borrowing from communist central planning policies, these 
financial institutions were part of the Kemalists’ statist plan to transform Turkey’s industrial 
output.270 By naming these new institutions after ancient Anatolian civilizations, scholars can 
see the Kemalist state’s “repackaging” of Turkishness rhetoric in 1930s Turkey.271 While 
Ataturk and other Kemalist leaders continued to recognize Turkic roots from central Asia, being 
Turkish in 1930s Turkey became tied to the land and ancient history of Anatolia. As such the 
Kemalist state checked and rebranded the earlier Turanist version of a Turkic nationalism 
stretching from western China to Istanbul.272 It is important to note the synthesis which has 
occurred among the Islamist Gulen status group in that the Gulenists have adopted some 
Turanists behavioral norms and beliefs. Since both Turanists and Turkish Islamists were for 
much of the history of the republic not a part of the ruling elite, it is understandable that these 
two rightist marginalized groups would find ways to mutually support and work together. This 
closeness between Islamism and Turanism has resulted in Gulenists being able to move 
seamlessly between both Islamism and Turkic Turanism. 
Zurcher explains that the Kemalist employment of Turkishness was tied to the idea of 
“Turkish civilization” and “Turkish culture.” The dichotomy within Kemalist Turkishness 
between the concept of “Turkish civilization” and “Turkish culture” would become the leading 
inclusive/exclusive process by which the new Turkish national identity would emerge in 1930s 
Turkey.273 
However before discussing the concepts of “Turkish culture” and “Turkish civilization”, 
it is necessary to discuss earlier discourses around “Ottomanism” and “Islamism” in the late 
Ottoman state and how Ottomanism and Islamism relate to Turkishness. Besides identification 
with Turkishness, Ottomanism (the multiethnic character of the Ottoman State) and Islamism 
were important rallying points for the Muslim milieu of Anatolia during the War of Turkish 
Independence (1919 – 1923).274 Ataturk’s capture and entry into Izmir on September 9th, 1922 
ended the existential threat to the Muslim/Ottoman “nation” and signaled the complete victory 
over the Christian “Greeks” and Armenians in Anatolia. Much of the Kemalist victory over 
native Anatolian Christians, the country of Greece and Greece’s western allies (Italy, France and 
Britain) grew from a decade of anti-Christian rhetoric which relied on Islamism and multiethnic 
Ottomanism as unifying tools for the Anatolian Muslims.275 For example, during the Turkish 
War of Independence, Ataturk’s National Assembly worked to position the nationalist resistance 
as a rightly guided Islamic movement276 and Ataturk allied with Muslim Kurdish and Muslim 
Circassian guerrilla leaders.277 
Sectarianism then appears to be a unifying and founding component of Turkish and 
Greek national identities in Anatolia and the southern Balkans. Opposed to the national 
narratives of modern day Greece and Turkey, it seems difficult to say with any kind of certainty 
that the early communities of “Hellenic” or “Turkic” villagers existed opposed to one another in 
the Ottoman and pre-Ottoman Seljukid/Beylik periods of Anatolian/Balkan history. What seems 
more plausible is that starting in 1071 until the eighteenth century life in Anatolia and the 
southern Balkans was a polyglot blend of Muslim, Jewish and Christian families living next to 
one another, marrying one another, and speaking a mix of languages. As such Armenian 
converts to Islam called Hemshin worshiped in Armenian while Orthodox Christians in western 
Anatolia would speak in villager Turkish. However, nationalism in the modern period resulted 
in the formation of new states. The death knell of Ottomanism then was the forced population 
exchanges between Turkey and Greece (1923/1924) in which the Christians left Anatolia and 
most Muslims left Greece. 
After the Christian “ethnicities” left Turkey, the Kemalist state embraced the 
monoculturalism of Turkishness to the detriment of Kurds, Laz, Circassians and other Muslim 
non-Turkish ethnicities in Turkey. As early as 1923 the nationalists’ party Halk Partisi or 
People’s Party had as one of its statues, “Every Turk and every outsider who accepts Turkish 
nationality and culture can join the People’s Party.”278 By 1925 the Turkish Ministry of 
Education stated that political ideologies opposed to “Turkish unity” had resulted in the ministry 
banning the use of the terms Kurd, Laz, Circassian, Kurdistan and Lazistan.279 In 1927 the 
People’s Party’s platform declared the spread of Turkish language and culture to be a guiding 
principle of the party.280  
After declaring the Republic of Turkey, the new Kemalist leadership also moved against 
Islamism in the state’s drive toward modernization.281 Ataturk’s government worked to control 
all religious activity in Turkey in a militarized version of laicism reminiscent of Jacobin 
aggressions during the French Revolution.282 Kemalist laicism was repressive toward Sunni 
Muslims who – while being the vast majority of the Republican population – had views, which 
were opposed to the Kemalist state.283 It is important to note that the Kemalists adopted a 
laicism, which means state control of the religious structures and religious leaders. Secularism is 
different in that the state does not try to control the form which religious structures organize or 
religious authorities preach. 
As a means to enforce laicist/statist control of Islam over the populace, Kemalist leaders 
created Istiklal Mahkemeleri (Independence Tribunals) throughout the 1920s. Initially these 
tribunals prosecuted and executed Independence War deserting soldiers, bandits and members 
of the former ruling party, the Committee for Union and Progress.284 However by the mid-1920s 
the Tribunals began arresting and executing Islamist reactionaries and anyone who did not go 
along with the “westernized” dress code and hat law (1925).285 The actions of the Independence 
Tribunals paved the way for a national discourse amendable to Kemalist legal transformations 
such as the Latin Alphabet (1928), women’s suffrage (1930 partial, 1934 full), the spread of 
communal education centers Halkevleri or People’s Homes (1931), Turkish last name adoption 
(1934) and the “purification” of Turkish (mid-1930s). As such the laicism of the Kemalist state 
was reminiscent of Jacobin conflicts with Catholicism during the French Revolution. Like the 
Jacobins, Kemalists recreated a nationalist narrative, which removed the authority of religious 
leaders in politics. Ataturk’s use of religious leaders as enemies of the state – such as the Sheikh 
Said Rebellion of 1925 – legitimized the state’s use of secularism in the modernization of 
Turkey.286 
 
The Excluded and Included: Minority Communities and “White/Black” Turk Divide 
Turkish scholar Seda Demiralp and other Turkish scholars such as Serif Mardin and 
Mucahit Bilici have written about Islamism and modernity in modern Turkey. For these thinkers 
and like-minded Turkish journalists, the concept of a “white” Turkey and a “black” Turkey are 
powerful sociological concepts relating to real divisions across Anatolia. My use of such words 
such as “white” Turkey and “black” Turkey are not meant to reify such divisions. To the 
contrary a binary which divides into literal black and white camps is a flawed concept. Yet 
because many Turks see a “black”/“white” division in their society (however fictitious that 
division may be) means that we must discuss how this division is employed in the social 
construction of Turkish nationalism at “black” Turkish events like the Gulen status group’s 
Turkish Olympics. If there is a new “black” Islamist Turkish hegemon ruling Turkey, then we 
scholars are compelled to use the language of Turks themselves in studying and understanding 
this new hegemonic transformation. Yet we must be careful least we academics ourselves 
become complacent and use divisive words like “white” Turkey and “black” Turkey in a way 
which accepts naturalness to such divisive concepts. 
Throughout the late Ottoman and early Republican periods, Muslim refugees from 
Bosnia, the Caucasus, Bulgaria, Crimea, Romania, Crete, Thessaloniki and other regions of 
Eastern Europe came to Turkey in different waves. Many of these “white Turks” – urbanized 
denizens of western Turkish cities with Eastern European heritage287 – adopted Turkishness as 
their new national identity. One of the fundamental components then of a Kemalist employment 
of Turkishness was a nationalist embrace of all new comer Muslims who (1) were open to 
modernist ideology around “progressive” nation building and (2) embraced Turkishness. While 
the use of Turkish identity was an effective tool for national inclusivity and loyalty among newly 
arrived eastern European Muslims, Turkishness was exclusive and far harder for Muslims and 
non-Muslim inhabitants of Anatolia to adopt. Newly arrived eastern European Muslims tended to 
be better educated, wealthier and more used to European modernity from their home countries. 
Meanwhile Anatolians had less education, were more rural and oftentimes had less experience 
with materialism and secular/statist ideologies.288 As such Anatolian villager Turks, Kermanji 
speaking Kurds, Zazaji speaking Kurds, Arabs living in Turkey, Trabzon-based Laz, Circassians, 
Georgians, Arameans, Hemsin and Armenians were excluded from the national Turkish identity 
to varying degrees.289 All of these communities left over from the Ottoman state found “being 
Turkish” in Republican Turkey to be an identity imposed by the state.290 Even ethnic Anatolian 
Turks unfamiliar with statist modernity underwent a forced assimilation into the Kemalist 
Turkish national identity.291 As such the struggle of Ottomanism or multi-ethnicism in creating a 
mono-ethnic Turkey has been the existential crises point for the peoples of Turkey in their 
relationship with the national state. Certainly this struggle of the marginalized cosmopolitan 
gaining voice and power is not unique to Turkey. Anderson stated as much when he discussed 
exclusion and inclusion to the power structure in the new nation state based on national language 
production. 
As per Anderson, groups in nation states close to state-sponsored print capital production 
inherently have easier access to nationalized power structures. This was the case with “white” 
Turks who at the start of the Turkish Republic were denizens of western Anatolian cities and 
decedents of Eastern European Ottoman Muslims. As the Kemalist state pushed its own 
modernized version of Turkishness, “white” Turks were the quickest to learn the official 
nationalized language and fill new positions in the Kemalist government and state controlled 
economy. 
Meanwhile “black” Turks lived in villages across Anatolia and in the early republican 
period of Turkish history had less access to the new nationalized language and the resulting 
national power structure. Scholars can see then that the Erdogan prime ministry/presidency and 
long leadership of Turkey is a “black” Turkish correction in the power divide between urbanized 
and rural Turks coming from the inception of the Turkish Republic and Ataturk’s presidency. 
With the arrival of “black” Turks into major Turkish cities after 1950 the pendulum of power 
began to shift from an urban elite to a rural-turned-urban majority. 
However, scholars’ understanding of national identity production cannot rest alone on a 
study of Ottomanism/multi-ethnicism in modern day Turkey. A deeper critique of how 
Turkishness, modernity and Islamism interact is fundamental in understanding the state’s and the 
citizenry’s production of national identity and how that identity is transformed by audience 
participation at the Turkish Olympics.  
Following the oppressive laicism of the Kemalist state, the idea of two Turkeys has 
developed. One Turkey – that of the “white Turk” – is western in outlook, urban, supportive of 
the Kemalist military and religious in so far as being religious means being culturally Turkish 
and being religious in private life but supportive of secularism publically.292 The other Turkey – 
that of the “black Turk” – is politically Islamist, rural/“villager”, anti-military and pro-capitalist 
in so far as the “civilizing” influence of capitalism in Turkey represents a wealth and power 
accumulating structure separate from that of Kemalism.293 While “white” Turks generally accept 
a one-state Kemalist version of Turkishness and “black” Turks tend to adhere to an international 
Turanist version of Turkishness, both groups are vocally nationalistic.294  
Some in Turkey feel there is an actual racial divide between both groups with Anatolian 
“black” Turks looking “darker skinned” and eastern Europe immigrant “white” Turks looking 
“whiter.”295 While there may be some racial differences between ethnicities in Turkey, the divide 
between “white” and “black” Turks appears to be based more on ideological differences in 
relation to religiosity, state power and capital production. Generally speaking, Islamist “black” 
Turks often use spiritualism to express their existential intent while laicist “white” Turks 
organize their political and social lives around the tenants of materialism. As such belief in either 
materialism or spiritualism is the starting point of conflict between these groups.  
Given the economic, infrastructural and educational advances of modern Turkey both 
groups adhere to a version of political modernity based on earlier Kemalist state structures.296 
However both groups employ modernity differently. As the successors of Ataturk, the “white” 
Turk employs a nineteenth century materialist modernity while the “black” Turk, through the 
teachings of Said Nursi, has transformed modernity into a new hybrid: spiritualist modernity. 
Elite “white” Turks in the Kemalist political party the People’s Republican Party (or 
CHP) exclude and segregate “black” Turks saying Anatolian villagers living in Turkey’s large 
cities are ignorant, unwashed and uneducated.297 Meanwhile “black” Turk leaders such as 
Necmettin Erbakan, Fethullah Gulen and Recep Tayyip Erdogan embrace their roles as voices of 
the oppressed majority and feature their employment of Islamism and capitalism as victories of 
democracy in modern Turkey.298 It is fundamental then for scholars to conceptualize how 
discourses around multi-ethnicism/mono-ethnicism and the “black”/“white” Turk divide inform 
the Kemalist creation of a Turkishness which is culturally exclusive and yet inclusive in its 
approach to civilization and civilized behavior. 
Clearly Weber’s ideas on ethnicism being a presumed irrational community give insight 
into the “black”/“white” Turkish divide. “Black” and “white” Turks are both an imagined 
community as per Weber. Yet, these “ethnicities” (or divisions within the Turkish ethnicity 
based on economic inequalities) did in fact emerge from shared and at times separate historical 
experiences. Smith’s study then of memories, traditions and symbols allows scholars to look at 
the “black”/“white” Turkish divide less connected with skin color and much more connected to 
the varied histories, traditions and memories of different Anatolian groups/ethnicities. These 
histories, traditions and memories created a “white” Turkish community in Anatolia starting in 
the 1850s and a marginalized “black” Turkish one from 1923 onward. 
 
Turkish Culture and the Turkish Civilization Umbrella 
Jewish Kemalist thinker Munis Tekinalp (also known as Moiz Kohen, 1883 - 1961) wrote 
on the assimilation concepts of “Turkish civilization” and “Turkish culture” in Republican 
Turkey.299 Tekinalp explains that culture consists of: “the sentiments and attitudes adopted from 
earliest childhood onwards, from one's parents and immediate surroundings.”300 However 
civilization is, “the high culture consciously learned at a later age, which is international and 
possibly changed at will.”301 In this Tekinalp appears as an archetypical Kemalist. While a 
shared Islamism and Ottomanism unified the Muslim communities of Anatolia during the 
Turkish War of Independence, modernist Kemalists decided that neither multi-ethnicism nor 
religious Islamism would be the bond to create a new Turkey. Leaders of the Turkish Republic 
supported a mono-cultural and mono-civilizing Turkish nationalism for identity production. 
Turkishness would both inclusively civilize all different cultures in Anatolia and be the exclusive 
culture of Turkey.302 
Consequently, a resident of Diyarbakir – a leading Kurdish city – who can accept her 
Turkishness to the detriment of her Kurdishness may be able to become “culturally Turkish.” 
Her children have an even a better chance to be culturally Turkish. Meanwhile, another 
Diyarbakir woman who holds onto her Kurdishness is compelled at the very least to accept the 
“civilizing hand” of Turkishness in her life. This imposition of Turkish civilization is reflected in 
the primacy of Turkish language, Turkish business, Turkish state controlled education systems, 
the Turkish military and the Turkish state legitimizing marriage. Even if she does not accept her 
Turkishness in terms of culture, a Kurdish woman in Turkey accepts Turkish civilization as the 
umbrella under which she understands her Kurdishness. Turkish civilization becomes equivalent 
to Turkish nationalism meanwhile Turkish culture is connected with Turkish ethnicity. 
Perhaps the best example of the Turkish umbrella civilization among Kurds would be the 
Kurdish nationalist leader Abdullah Öcalan. Öcalan reportedly only speaks and thinks in 
Turkish.303 As a product of the Turkish education system Öcalan likely found his Kurdish 
nationalism and communism from a Turkish educational system and state structure. Here 
scholars can see Gellner’s ideas on nationalized education systems writ large. 
In this Ocalan appears to be the norm, not the exception. The Kurdish language in Turkey 
is taught with a Turkified Latin Alphabet (while Kurdish in Syria, Iraq and Iran is taught with an 
Arabic alphabet). As Kurds move to western Turkey and settle in large Turkish cities their 
children often speak little Kurdish. Kurds call this new generation who has grown up in the west 
of Turkey and speak little Kurdish, “white” Kurds.304 While more research needs to be done on 
this topic, it seems likely that this “black”/“white” divide among Kurds plays off of the civilizing 
“black”/“white” divide among Turks. The fact that a civilizing rhetoric of exclusivity and 
inclusivity in Turkishness can come to define exclusivity and inclusivity in Kurdishness is an 
example of the overarching civilizing/nationalizing power of Turkishness on all other ethnic 
groups in Turkey. 
In the production of a nationalized language and education system and the inclusive and 
exclusive nature inherent in such a system, many of Anderson’s and Gellner’s theoretical ideas 
apply. For example, the national Turkish Language Association (Turk Dil Kurumu) was the state 
apparatus by which the new Turkish language of the Turkish republic was invented in the 1930s. 
New language rules were then given to the Ministry of Education and spread through the entire 
Kemalist state. Interestingly, many non-Turkish respondents in the ethnography stated that their 
fathers’ and grandfathers’ first contact with state sponsored Turkish was in the Turkish military 
during forced tours of duty. As such nationalism, state sponsored education, the new Turkish 
language and military mobilization became the tools by which “black” Turks and non-Turkish 
minorities became “Turkified” in Turkey. 
 
Response to Kemalist Turkishness Example A: Multi-ethnicism 
The Zazaji Kurdish Dersim Uprisings of 1937 – 1938 show that Kurds and other 
ethnicities in Turkey contested state sponsored Turkishness as a unifying ideal even during the 
period of high Kemalism (1930 – 1950). While Turkishness transformed within the Kemalist 
discourse in the latter half of the twentieth century, Kemalists continued to exercise influence on 
the national discourse and development of the Turkish state.305 From Adnan Menderes’ election 
in 1950 until Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s victory in 2002, Kemalist ideology was the primary 
narrative of the ruling elite in Turkey even if – from time to time – a Kemalist leader was not the 
Prime Minister or President of the Republic.306 
The rise of the Abdullah Öcalan’s Communist/Nationalist Kurdish Worker’s Party or 
PKK in 1978 marked a turning point in ethnic relations in Turkey and how citizens of Turkey 
would conceive of Turkishness. In 1984 Öcalan and the PKK began a thirty-year insurrection 
against the Turkish state. As of 2013, forty-five thousand deaths have resulted from the 
PKK/Turkish state conflict.307 While a Turkish nationalist backlash against the PKK was the 
response of many Turks, the on-again off-again PKK insurrection has had inevitable realpolitik 
results across Turkey. The “Kurdish question” is now openly discussed in the Turkish media, 
Kurdish speaking radio and television channels broadcast in Turkey and the leftist PKK 
affiliated, People’s Democratic Party or HDP regularly wins the majority Kurdish vote in the 
east of Turkey. HDP also polls well in western Turkish cities showing an ethnic transformation 
in how Turkish citizens view the ideal of Turkishness and Turkish nationalism. While some of 
the HDP support in Turkish cities comes from the migrant Kurdish community living in western 
Turkey, many Turkish leftists, feminists and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered groups  
also support the HDP.308 As result, a citizen of Turkey can now openly pronounce her 
Kurdishness, Lazishness, Circassian-ness, Jewishness, Armenianian-ness and so on. HDP acts as 
a unifying political party where the same citizen can discuss her feminism and embrace whatever 
sexual orientation she desires. Certainly Turkey continues to be a conservative country and 
HDP’s embrace of the “other” should not be misunderstood as a general openness of Turkey’s 
citizenry or perhaps as anything but an alliance of othered groups intent on political power. 
Nonetheless, HDP’s victory in the June 7, 2015 parliamentary election shows a continued 
transformation in Turkey’s ethnic awareness and awareness of the “other.” 
In the PKK and HDP’s marginalization and active political involvement, scholars detect 
similarities with the marginalized actors highlighted in Cairo Cosmopolitan who work to reclaim 
power in Cairo from statist institutions and neo-liberal wealth. Incidentally after the June 7, 2015 
successful HDP electoral victory, President Erdogan led a state sponsored attack of the HDP 
across Turkish media. The result of Erdogan’s and AKP’s media blitz (all made possible from 
Turkish corporate support of Erdogan) was a massive AKP/Erdogan electoral victory in the fall 
of 2016. As such, when allowed, Kurdish and other marginalized cosmopolitan voices of Turkey 
possess a meaningful space in the political opposition. When outlawed – as is more or less 
HDP’s condition in 2016 – marginalized cosmopolitan groups have the choice of silence and 
observance of the law or outright revolt as has been the practice of the PKK since 1984. 
 
Responses to Kemalist Turkishness Example B: Spiritualism and Deism 
While Kemalism has no place for what some in Turkey have termed “domestic 
foreigners”309 – indigenous Jewish and Christian groups in Turkey after 1924 – Gulenism seeks 
to reach out to potential political and business allies among Turkey’s Jews and Christians.310  In 
Turkey Jewish and Christian numbers are small yet Gulenist connections with indigenous 
Christians and Jews are informative in the transformational politics around spiritualism and 
multi-ethnicism in Turkey. Similar to controls on Islam, the eighty-year laicism of the Kemalist 
state resulted in Turkish state control of indigenous Christian and Jewish religious activities.311 
As Islamism gains more visibility and political power in Turkey, these non-Islamic and 
yet deist groups may also benefit and gain increased political recognition by the Turkish state 
through connections to “black” Turkish political and religious organizations such as the Gulen 
status group.312 The process by which all religions’ boats rise together in modern Turkey is 
outside the scope of this study on Islamists and audience production at the Turkish Olympics. 
However, scholars’ work on the role of Christian and Jewish groups in Turkey will likely inform 
studies on the way in which materialism and spiritualism can support openness and democracy 
and at other times morph into oppressive forms of laicism and/or religiosity. Also a study on 
inter-sectarian dialogue and support will be informative on ethnic/religious relations in Turkey. 
There is one exception to Gulenist interfaith dialogue. This exception comes from the 
historic divide between Shia and Sunni Islam. While Gulenists reach out to deist religious 
groups, and even Buddhists and Hindus at Gulenist interfaith dialogue centers and schools in 
India and Southeast Asia313, Sunni Muslim Gulenists consider Shia Muslims to be a heretical 
sect and a perversion of the truth faith. 314 As such Gulenists tend to vilify Alevi Shia in Turkey 
and other Shia groups abroad making alliances between the Gulen status group and Shia groups 
in Turkey and outside of Turkey reportedly non-existent.315 This topic of Sunni/Shia relations in 
Turkey is a point of conflict and transformation in today’s Turkey and any study of Sunni/Shia 
relations would likely start in the contested alleyways and backstreets of Alevi neighborhoods in 
Istanbul and Ankara. In these neighborhoods running street battles between leftist Alevis and 
state security forces is the norm. To their credit Turkish scholars have done work in Alevi 
communities in Turkey, discussing the role of an excluded Weberian ethnicity which has been 
historically oppressed by both the Kemalist and Erdogan-led state. 
In conversations some leading Gulenists have privately expressed the practical need to 
reach a settlement between the two main Alevi Shia sects (ten to fifteen percent of the Turkish 
population is Shia Alevi) and Sunni Islamists in Turkey. If the next generation of Gulenists can 
find a way to reconcile their religiosity with political needs in Turkey and the rest of the Middle 
East, there may be a chance for the forging of relations between Shiaism and the Gulen status 
group. 
 
The Islamist Dance Partners: Gulenists and the AKP at the Turkish Olympics 
The Turkish Olympics in Turkey – though initially conceptualized by the Gulen 
congregation – is not a wholly Gulenist affair. In the midst of the 2012 Turkish Olympics 
Closing Ceremonies at Turk Telekom Arena in Istanbul, then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan gave the keynote address to the audience and called on Imam Fethullah Gulen to come 
back to Turkey from Gulen’s self-imposed exile in the US.316 The crowd roared at Erdogan’s call 
for Gulen’s return.  
Erdogan’s speech and presence at the Closing Ceremonies of the 2012 (and later 2013) 
Turkish Olympics in Turkey, exemplified the complexity of the Gulen status group and AKP 
relationship in Turkey from 2002 to 2013.317 In this eleven-year period Gulenists and the AKP 
appeared to be the closest of friends. Events in late 2013 and in early 2014 would end the Gulen 
congregation/AKP political alliance and the failed coup attempt in 2016 was the final nail in the 
coffin of the former alliance. Yet, the fact that a mere four years before the July 15 coup, 
Erdogan in 2012 would publically – at the Turkish Olympics – call for Gulen’s return to Turkey 
shows that the Turkish Olympics in Turkey was not just a Gulenist enterprise but an 
amalgamation of different groups within “black” Turkish Islamism. These groups at times 
conflict and at other times are in harmony with each other.318 
From 2003 onward, the Uluslararasi Turkce Dernegi (TURKCEDER) or the 
International Turkish Association – a Gulenist organization – worked closely with Erdogan’s 
government to produce the annual two-week long Turkish Olympics tour of Turkey.319 As a 
joint venture between the Erdogan state and the Gulen status group, the Turkish Olympics in 
Turkey supported an appropriated “black” Turk version of Turkishness that reached out to 
citizens in most parts of the country.320 This new version of Turkishness removed laicist 
Kemalists as the ruling elite and changed Turkishness from being laicist, modernist and statist 
into being Islamist, modernist and statist. Both Fethullah Gulen’s status group and Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan’s AKP political party donated large sums of money and backed the Turkish 




Multiethnic Turkiyeli as Hosts and Audience Members of the Touring Turkish Olympics 
Besides being a featured media event, the Turkish Olympics was also a two-week long 
nationwide touring festival. As such the Turkish Olympics Tour brought “the world” to the 
doorstep of small town and villager Anatolians. In 2012 the Turkish Olympics toured forty-one 
of the total eighty-one Turkish provinces.321 Also, every major metropolitan city in Turkey 
hosted the Turkish Olympics tour in 2012.322  Most Turkish respondents in the fieldwork stated 
that they saw their first Turkish Olympics performance during a Turkish Olympics tour of their 
home province in Turkey between 2005 and 2009. Many of these same respondents cited the 
Turkish Olympics in Turkey as being an important influence in getting them active in the Gulen 
status group and bringing them over to teach in Egypt from Turkey.  
Here Gellner’s and Michell’s ideas around a spectacle/festival reinforced by state-
sponsorship and a friendly nationalized media apply. For the Turkish Olympics festival to be a 
success it was necessary for “black” Turks and the multiple ethnicities of Turkey to view and 
experience a reinvented national identity. While television and radio use is widespread in 
Turkey, nothing beats seeing a show live. The point then of the touring Turkish Olympics in 
Turkey was to connect with the masses. As shown in the ethnography, for the Gulen status group 
the tour of the Turkish Olympics was a great recruiting tool. The festival allowed “Turks” in the 
audience to map a familiar world dressed and appearing to them in traditional Turkish outfits: 
singing Turkish songs, dancing Turkish dances and role playing Turkish nationalism on an 
“international” stage.  
Until 2014 the Turkish state under Erdogan’s leadership was the main sponsor of the 
Turkish Olympics. Erdogan and his AK Party benefited from the reinvented Turkish national 
identity at the Turkish Olympics which leaned more on Islamism than Kemalist laicism. As such 
all of the state’s affiliated media groups were in attendance at the Turkish Olympics festival and 
the Turkish Olympics opening and closing ceremonies in Istanbul were broadcast live on all 
major private and public Turkish radio and television channels. 
The Turkish Olympics’ use of Turkishness rebrands earlier Kemalist understandings of 
national identity production in Turkey. In Kemalism Turkishness is both exclusively cultural 
and inclusively civilizational. Identity production at the Turkish Olympics however embraces 
formally excluded non-Turks of Anatolia (primarily Sunni Laz, Sunni Kurds, Sunni Circassians, 
Sunni Arabs and Sunni Hemshin). As long as these marginalized groups accept “being Turkish,” 
they can host and be cultural emissaries to international school children.323  
The Turkish Olympics admission of host status to the audience creates a space of 
national empowerment for non-ethnic Turks of Anatolia. This empowerment of formally 
marginalized Sunni non-Turks of Anatolia comes at a cost in that Gulenism compels multi-
ethnic audience members to feature their “Turkishness” and adhere to Islamic modernity when 
acting as hosts, teachers and emissaries at the Turkish Olympics. Yet, if non-Turkish Anatolians 
can embrace the ideal of a recreated Turkish national identity at the Turkish Olympics they can 
become the teachers and emissaries of a new Turkishness to the world. As such these 
marginalized groups gain more power than in the earlier Kemalist paradigm in which they are 
recognized as both Turkish and multiethnic Turkiyeli (citizens of Turkey).324  
The difference then between Kemalism and Gulenism is that the former oftentimes 
denies the existence of or oppresses non-Turkish ethnicities in Turkey. Meanwhile, Gulenism 
accepts the cosmopolitan existence of different ethnicities insofar as Sunni ethnicities of 
Anatolia embrace a Gulen status group approved version of Turkishness.325 
 
The Turkish and Egyptian Audience Community 
On March 15, 2014 at Salahaldin International School’s Turkish Olympics Final in 
Egypt, Salma sang. While she sang both Egyptian and Turkish audience members gasped at the 
young girl’s talent. Later, during a play both Egyptians and Turks laughed. And still later during 
a poetry recitation on lost love both Egyptians and Turks in the audience got distant, tears in 
eyes, some in the audience reliving lost loves from five, ten or even fifty years earlier. As such 
audience members experience the Turkish Olympics performance communally, even if Turks 
and Egyptians have different national understandings of the Turkish Olympics. 
Chapter Six  
Ethnography of The Creation of an Audience’s Turkishness 
 
Many Turkish Gulenist respondents at the Turkish Olympics in Egypt stated that had it 
not been for the their attending the Turkish Olympics performed in Turkey, they would have 
never come abroad to work at Gulenist institutions in Egypt or any other country. A study then of 
Turkish audience members – many of whom came to Egypt, produced the Turkish Olympics in 
Egypt and sometimes returned to Turkey for the Turkish Olympics finals – is a story of Turkish 
national identity reinvention. Once an audience member in Turkey has accepted a new 
Gulenist/black Turkish national identity, then Gulen institutions can employ and possibly deploy 
the new Congregationalist abroad. 
 There are three discourses Gulenist organizers use in the transformation of Turkishness 
among Turkish audience members at the Turkish Olympics. Gulenists show the audience 
members a new internationalism in which Turkey is the center of the world. This discourse is 
connected with Mitchell’s ideas of mapping the world through a festival/spectacle. The Turkish 
Olympics also employs subtle and – at times – overt political Islamism. This brand of Islamism 
connects to both Fethullah Gulen (as the leader of the Gulen status group) and the Erdogan state 
and Erdogan’s voter base. Third, the political and religious oppression black Turks experienced 
during the period of Kemalist state dominance (1923 – 2002) resulted in the Erdogan state and 
the Gulen status group’s openness to a multi-ethnic Turkey or a concept known as Turkiyeli (one 
who is a member/citizen of Turkey but not necessary “Turkish”).  This openness to multi-
ethnicism/cosmopolitanism, while being prefaced as Turkish multi-ethnicism (and thus still tied 
to the notion of mono-ethnic Turkishness), extends citizenship status and is reflected in the 
Turkish Olympic’s call for audience members to become “Turkish hosts.” 
Hosts at the Turkish Olympics spread a newly internationalized version of Turkishness 
first as active Gulenists in Turkey and then in eventual employment and deployment to the 
Gulenist educational system across the world. 
This ethnography on audience production at the Turkish Olympics takes as its primary 
focus the Turkish audience at the Turkish Olympics. Yet this ethnography will also have as its 
secondary study the Egyptian audience at the Turkish Olympics. Egyptian audience members 
experience the Turkish Olympics in Egypt differently than the Turkish audience members. The 
inclusion of Egyptian audience members is pertinent to this study in that the views of Egyptian 
audience members speak to how Gulenists build consent among a VIP non-Turkish milieu. 
Egyptian audience members tended to be parents of performing students. Oftentimes the 
Egyptian parents/audience members were from wealthy segments of Egyptian society. Turkish 
Gulenist leaders based in Egypt courted these same VIP Egyptians at the Turkish Olympics. As 
such Gulenists used the Turkish Olympics and the Turkishness on display to build bonds with 
VIP Egyptian parents. 
 
Politics of the Fervent, Principal “Omer Yildirim” 
“Omer Yildirim” separated a half open pistachio nut with his teeth and tongue. He was 
sitting in the plush chairs of his principal’s office in SIS, remembering his first appointment to 
Africa, to Tanzania specifically. “Africa is a hard geography,” recalled Yildirim.326 He first went 
to a poor school, much poorer than SIS in Cairo. Yildirim’s Tanzanian students could not speak 
Turkish and at the time he could not speak English or Swahili. The only help Yildirim had was 
that he was from a Hejazi Arab family who had fled Saudi Arabia to Turkey, “a few generations 
ago.”327 Thus Yildirim could recognize some Arabic words in Swahili. 
From 2004 until 2009 Yildirim worked as a Turkish teacher and lead promoter of the 
Turkish Olympics in Tanzania. It was a time when new Gulenist schools were increasing in 
Africa and across the world. Yildirim explained that being assigned in Africa was the hardest 
place to teach in the Gulenist educational network.328 And yet the Gulenists at Yildirim’s first 
school in Tanzania had a fervent belief in their mission. 
Yildirim related a story about an elderly Turkish man who was part of the teaching staff 
at Yildirim’ first school.329 The elderly man became ill while in Tanzania and the man’s 
condition quickly deteriorated. From his deathbed, the old man made fellow Gulenists promise to 
bury him in the garden of the school. The old man told those who sat with him in his last hours 
that he had come abroad to “spread love in the world” and did not expect to see Turkey again.330 
The old man said that after he died he had one wish: in death he wanted to hear the voices of 
children – children from the school he had helped found – playing near his grave.331 When the 
old man died, Yildirim and other Gulenists dutifully buried him in the school courtyard.332 
 
Politics of the Fervent, Director “Nuri Kuloglu” 
From his office in Cairo’s Zamalek district, “Nuri Kuloglu,” thirty-eight, director of the 
Nile Center discussed the Turkish Olympics’ role in the political discourse of Turkey. Nile 
Center is a Gulenist language center catering to young adult Egyptians who want to learn 
Turkish.  
It was May 2014 when I interviewed Kuloglu. Two months earlier in March 2014 some 
of Kuloglu’s Egyptian students had participated in the Turkish Olympics in Egypt at SIS. Now 
all winners at the Turkish Olympics in Egypt were waiting to learn if Gulenist organizers would 
hold the Turkish Olympics finals in Turkey the next month (June). 
Kuloglu discussed Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s declaration of war on the Gulen 
status group. In recent months Erdogan had called Gulenists a secretive “parallel” society 
seeking to take over the Turkish state. As such Erdogan’s government had cancelled all Turkish 
Olympics venue/stadium contracts with the Gulen congregation. If there were no stadiums then 
the Turkish state was effectively boycotting the production of the Turkish Olympics in Turkey in 
2014.333 
Kuloglu felt that the production of the Turkish Olympics was connected to a deeper, 
“Anatolian” popular sentiment displayed by audience members at the Turkish Olympics.334 
Kuloglu, an ethnic Kurd, complained about Erdogan and Erdogan’s actions against the Turkish 
Olympics saying the Turkish Olympics is the: 
Property of the people of Anatolia… The sponsors and the people are the real 
owners of the Turkish Olympics. Even if the (Turkish) state helped the formation 
of the Turkish Olympics before – the real owner and the creator of the Turkish 
Olympics are the people of Anatolia.335  
 
As a protest against Erdogan’s decision to cancel the Turkish Olympics in Turkey in 2014 one of 
the leading hash tags in Turkish on Twitter was “#TurkceOlimpiyatlariMilletinEseri” or 
“#The_Turkish_Olympics_is_a_Treasure_of_the_Nation.”336 This hash tag oftentimes appeared 
alongside Gulenist projects on Twitter. 
 Scholars can see that when the Gulenists lost their political war with Erdogan in early 
2014 their position within the Turkish state’s bureaucratic system was weakened. This 
weakening has reportedly only continued since 2014. Before July 15, 2016 while Gulenists in 
some state bureaucracies continued to work, the Gulen status group’s power vis-à-vis the Turkish 
state had been greatly diminished through arrests, purges and demotions within the Turkish 
government directed by Erdogan and other AK Party leaders. Following the failed July 15 coup, 
Erdogan’s blaming of the coup on Gulenists has increased the power of the Erdogan-led 
government to arrest and blackball Gulenists in public and private institutions across Turkey.337 
As such Gulenists within Turkey (and in some cases abroad338) have moved into a 
“marginalized cosmopolitan status” as envisioned by the Cairo School of Urban Studies’ work 
with the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, the respective roles of the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Gulen status group are more similar in 2016 than when Cairo Cosmopolitan was written in 2006. 
In 2016 the Muslim Brotherhood and the Gulen status group are considered by their respective 
political elite to be pariahs and fifth columns active within domestic politics. What is interesting 
is how a marginalized Islamist organization from Egypt (the Muslim Brotherhood) is 
championed in Erdogan’s Turkey and another marginalized Islamist group from Turkey (the 
Gulen congregation) is supported and allied with El Sisi government in Egypt. These regional 
alliances seem to support the adage, “He who is the enemy of my enemy is my friend” following 
the Rabaa clashes in the summer of 2013. Since that time the Gulen status group in Egypt and 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey have become valuable weapons President El Sisi and 
President Erdogan wield in their ongoing war of words.  
Meanwhile, in Turkey the Gulen status group has ceased to hold political power and as 
such Gulensits look for alliances among other marginalized groups. In 2014 respondents in the 
ethnography told me that Gulenists and Kemalists (one time enemies) had begun a series of 
“talks” intent on healing wounds and finding common ground in their opposition to the Erdogan 
state.  
Did these “talks” result in alliances that led to the July 15, 2016 coup against Erdogan 
and the AKP? Erdogan and his supporters have only blamed the Gulenists. For example, AKP 
Prime Minister Binali Yildirim has accused the Gulenist elements in the Turkish Military for the 
coup attempt and not included Kemalists in subsequent accusations and arrests following the 
coup.339 
 
Turkish Internationalism at the Turkish Olympics 
Gulenist respondents associated with the audience and the teachers of the Turkish 
Olympics of Egypt felt that Turkey had turned a corner in the use of internationalism at the 
Turkish Olympics. First Gulenists stated that the Turkish Olympics is an international 
competition in which the international world comes to Turkey. At the Turkish Olympics, the 
Turkish audience saw a familiar Turkishness (song, poetry, dance all done in Turkish or from a 
village/rustic region of Turkey) blended with an internationalism where foreign children (i.e. the 
future of humanity) embrace being Turkish. The Turkish Olympics presented Turkish audience 
members with a connected, creative and passionate internationalism. This Turkish Olympics 
sponsored internationalism was opposed to the staid self-justifying Kemalist internationalism of 
the past in which international activity was only supported by the normally isolationist state if (as 
in the case of Turkey’s joining NATO) the Kemalist-led government could point to its own 
success in “westernizing” Turkey. As such, the Turkish Olympics as a festival/spectacle at least 
weakened (or at most destroyed) Kemalist isolationism as a valid component of national identity 
in modern Turkey. The Turkish Olympics as per Mitchell allowed Gulenists to map the world for 
Turkey, fusing neo-liberalism and Islamism. 
Principal Yildirim explains in his interviews that since foreigners were not Turkish and 
could not understand “Turkishness,” Turkish nationalism in Kemalism called on Turks to 
exercise an “othering”/isolating process against anything “foreign.”340 Many citizens of Turkey 
wanted to connect with the outside world and were annoyed by what they perceived as the 
outside world’s relegation of Turkey to a “lesser state” status in the pantheon of nations.341 
Respondents linked Kemalism to isolationist pragmatism which counseled a “peace at home, 
peace abroad” mentality where Turks strove to take care of business in Turkey and counseled 
other nationalities to do the same in their own countries.342 As such the isolationist binary of the 
“other” and the “Turk” was a featured component of Kemalist national identity production. 
According to respondents, this isolationist mentality resulted in a self-imposed cultural 
remoteness in which even second language English learning was a rarity among Turkish 
citizens.343 As Yildirim states: 
For 60 or 70 years before Hizmet (the Gulen status group) Turks were closed to 
the world. We only were happy if we participated in an international sporting 
event or conference; fooling ourselves into believing that we were a great people 
and important on the world scene.344 
 
Kemalist leaders only employed internationalism when internationalism worked to 
reinforce the ideology of the Turkish state and when internationalism helped lessen a threat to 
the Turkish state. To this end Turkey sent twenty-five thousand Turkish troops to fight in the 
Korean War, joined NATO and became a staunch American ally throughout the Cold War. 
Given the growing power of the Soviet Union in the middle of the twentieth century and 
Turkey’s shared eastern border with the Soviet Union, there was a practical reason for Turkey’s 
alliance with the US and other NATO nations. Kemalists proclaimed Turkey’s acceptance into 
NATO as a western acceptance of Kemalist Turkey and thus the successful result of the secular 
Kemalist project to “revolutionize and modernize” the country.345 This version then of 
internationalism in the Kemalist state worked only to remove an existential threat to the state (the 
USSR) and to justify the state sponsored rhetoric that Kemalism had been successful in bringing 
modernity to Turkey. 
The development of Kemalist isolationism or Gulenist/Erdoganist internationalism 
certainly does not happen in a vacuum. From 1923 until Turkey joined NATO in 1952 Ataturk 
and his successors (primarily Ismet Inonu) put Turkey in a neutral position at a time of war and 
imperialism. During the Cold War, leaders in Turkey opted to be American allies.  
However, upon seeing Turkishness and internationalism so intertwined at the Turkish 
Olympics, some Turkish audience members state they dream of the wider world in which 
Turkishness and Turkey is of central importance. Says Meltem Hanimeli: 
Maybe I will be a bit of a racist but to see a (foreign) student performing or 
singing a Turkish song, it is a thing, which fills one with pride. For this to happen 
in English is not important. English has become very widespread. But Turkey is a 
small country and so this is an amazing thing… God-willing we will open lives… 
and make Turkey a more popular nation. And this doesn’t mean that we will go 
out and conquer the world. Instead by using tolerance and reflecting goodness we 
will create a peaceful country.346 
 
It is informative to think on Hanimeli’s last words that the intent of the Gulen status 
group is to “create a peaceful country.” Hanimeli was saying an oft-repeated Gulenist ideal 
common among many at the Turkish Olympics. The ideal is that the efforts of the Gulen 
congregation will serve humanity wherever the status group has schools and that each nation’s 
dialogue with Fethullah Gulen’s teachings will ultimately create “peace” in every country on 
Earth.347 Yet, it seems just as plausible that Hanimeli’s words (or subconscious slip of the 
tongue) hint at a tendency within Gulenism which desires to impose “peace” on Turkey itself. 
It would be quite natural according to Weber that a status group like the Gulenists would 
strive to dominate politics in Turkey. Weber states that all status groups – upon attaining enough 
power – naturally seek to transform the state itself through control of the political and 
bureaucratic system within the nation. That the Gulen status group would be working to impose a 
“peace” on Turkey is not surprising, nor is it surprising that official spokespeople for the Gulen 
status group state that Gulenists have no political aspirations and are only an “innocent” part of 
“civil society in Turkey and around the world.” If the Gulenists were only active in education, 
then these specious statements of supposed Gulenist “innocence” and “civility” might be 
plausible. However, given the congregation’s movement since 2003 into the Turkish police, 
national public prosecutor’s ministry and the national judiciary, it is impossible to say that 
Gulenism is anything but a highly politicized ideology intent on control of the Turkish state. 
Scholars and apologists for the Gulen status group will likely exonerate the Gulen 
congregation’s effort to increase its power in the Turkish state, stating the Gulenists only wanted 
to take part in the inner workings of the Turkish state and not take over the state. If this were the 
case however Gulenists again could be active in many other departments of state besides the 
powerful Turkish police force and the Turkish judicery. That the Gulenists concentrated 
themselves in the power-brokering police and judicery up until 2013 gives credence to Erdogan’s 
claim that Gulenists were seeking to create a parrell state within the state. 
In August 2016, at the time of the defense of this thesis, many Gulenists in Turkey have 
been arrested and await trail in prison cells.348 These Gulenists have been removed from their 
positions in the police, military, state bureaucracy and private sector on the suspicion that they 
were directly involved in the failed July 15, 2016 coup against the Erdogan-led government. 
Following the July 15 coup attempt, Erdogan and fellow AKP leaders in Turkey have begun 
what some observers call a “witch-hunt” against the Gulenists.349 It appears at the time of this 
thesis’ defense that the failed coup was one example of some elements within Gulenism seeking 
to dominate and assert political control over Turkey. 
In the future what further actions will Gulenists take against the Erdogan and AKP-led 
government? Time as ever, will tell. 
 
  
Political Islamism at the Turkish Olympics: Erdogan’s or Gulen’s Olympics? 
The Turkish Olympics represents to many Turkish Gulenist respondents the “democratic 
will” of Anatolians. Principal Yildirim states that the Turkish Olympics is a moment for the 
“beautiful Anatolian people” to shine along with the Gulen status group.350 In this Yildirim 
agrees with Nuri Kuloglu that the Turkish Olympics (and the Gulen congregation) is 
synonymous with the democratic will of the “Anatolian people.”351  
In order to understand connections between politics and Islamism at the Turkish 
Olympics in Turkey, this study features multiple interviews I conducted with Mustafa Ozcan and 
Ozcan’s assistant “Sadik” from 2013 to 2015. Mustafa Ozcan as the reported head of the Gulen 
community in Turkey is a public figure so this ethnography will use Ozcan’s real name. 
Journalist and Gulenist, Cumali Onal of the Gulenist Zaman Newspaper said that, “all the 
work of Hizmet (the Gulen status group) is connected to and has Mustafa Ozcan’s hand in it.”352 
Ozcan traveled around the world attending conferences and speaking on behalf of the Gulen 
status group. Following the 2013 divorce of the Gulen congregation from Turkish Prime 
Minister/President Erdogan, AKP allied media outlets published alarmist news articles which 
featured Mustafa Ozcan (a man in his late 60s) as the nefarious head of the Gulenists in Turkey. 
In interviews Ozcan stated that the alliance between Erdogan’s political machine and the 
Gulen status group had been less of a marriage and more of a partnership.353 According to 
Ozcan, Gulenists never trusted Erdogan or the AK Party leadership.354 From the beginning of the 
Gulenist/AK Party relationship both sides were angling for power over the other and yet both the 
Gulen congregational leadership and the leadership of the AK Party kept up the partnership from 
a mutual fear of a Kemalist military coup d’état.355 
As an example of how Erdogan’s AKP lead government did not fully trust the Gulen 
status group, Ozcan pointed to the Erdogan government putting a special request to the US 
Secretary of State in 2004 to restrict the amount of time Ozcan could stay in the USA.356 This 
“US visa hold” effectively kept Ozcan from relocating to the US to be close to Ozcan’s mentor 
Fethullah Gulen.357 It also kept Ozcan, as the leading Gulenist in Turkey, in a position with close 
ties to the Erdogan government and the economic, media and educational apparatuses of the 
Gulen status group.358  
According to Ozcan, the Erdogan state’s careful restriction, manipulation and control of 
Ozcan’s life and visa travel options made Ozcan’s situation precarious following Erdogan’s and 
the AKP’s electoral victory in March of 2014.359 In a May 2014 interview Ozcan explained that 
he wanted to relocate to the US and conduct his leadership of congregational activities from 
American soil yet, given his visa restriction, he was effectively trapped in Turkey.360 
Ozcan’s assistant Sadik said that Turkish state security forces watched and recorded 
Ozcan’s every step and every meeting.361 During the May 2014 interview at Ozcan’s hill 
mosque/business complex in Istanbul’s Camlica district, Ozcan asked me for help to get out of 
Turkey and go to the US. Ozcan asked if I had pull within the US State Department or the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation or “any other American agency active outside of the USA” so as 
to help Ozcan go the United States with a visa or green card. 362 Though Ozcan did not come out 
directly and say it, I had the distinct impression that Ozcan thought that I was a member of the 
US Central Intelligence Agency. I said to Ozcan that I have no such connections.  
Changes in the production of the Turkish Olympics reflect Ozcan’s narrative of political 
and economic machinations between the Gulen status group and the Erdogan state leading up to 
the seminal year 2013 and the Gezi Park Protest. During the Gezi Protest in June 2013 Fethullah 
Gulen and his leading lieutenants like Ozcan openly denounced Gezi protestors, saying the 
protestors were “looters.”363 The congregation’s media outlets backed Erdogan’s narrative of the 
Gezi protestors being thugs, fifth columnists and radicals.364 The Gulen status group members in 
the Turkish national police force, the national public prosecutors ministry and the many judges 
with ties to the Gulen Congregation were on the front lines, propping up the Erdogan state and 
crushing Gezi Park inspired dissent across Turkey during the 2013 summer of protest. 
On June 14, 2013, the day before Erdogan gave the order for the final crack down on 
Gezi Protestors (on June 15, 2013), Erdogan attended the Closing Ceremony of the Turkish 
Olympics in Istanbul and gave the keynote address. In the keynote speech Erdogan stated that 
Turkey was divided into the “good Turkey” and the “bad Turkey.” Erdogan’s speech to the 
Turkish Olympics faithful roused his political base and left no doubt that they – the audience – 
were among the “good” and the others (Gezi Park Protestors across town) were the “bad.” 
In interviews in 2014 and 2015 many Gulenist respondents accepted that their status 
group’s support of the Erdogan state during the summer of 2013 had been mistaken. Gulenist 
respondents accepted that had the Gulen status group supported the Gezi Park Protestors (or the 
least remained neutral) the Erdogan led state would have collapsed.365 Yet at the time Gulenists 
were valued members of Erdogan’s government bureaucracy. Weber’s ideas on status groups 
and their drive to dominate politics and the state apparatus are informative when looking at the 
Gulenists. From the status group’s inception in the 1970s Gulenists have driven to carve a space 
of political power for themselves in Turkey.366 It was normal then, upon achieving this state 
based power that Gulenists remained loyal to Erdogan in the summer of 2013. 
In 2014 and 2015 the Gulen status group was unable to hold the Turkish Olympics Final 
in Turkey. As discussed earlier in 2014 (and in 2015), the Erdogan led state refused to give 
Gulenists licenses to operate in performance halls and stadiums in Turkey.367 Germany instead of 
Turkey became the new home of the Turkish Olympics Finals in 2014 and 2015. While the 
production of the Turkish Olympics Final in Germany was impressive, the Turkish Olympics 
was much smaller (in terms of numbers of student performers) than in preceding years.  
In times of good relations between the Erdogan government and the Gulen status group, 
millions of Turkish citizens saw the Turkish Olympics live in Turkey or on the televisions in 
their homes as the Olympics was covered by all Turkish media groups. In 2014 and 2015 only 
Gulenist private media showed the Turkish Olympics in Turkey. Due to Erdogan’s personal 
opposition, the Turkish Olympics effectively went from being the biggest show in Turkey to 
being erased from national consciousness.368  
This process of erasing follows Gellner’s ideas of state sponsored media acceptance of a 
nationalist ideology. When the state no longer supports the ideology through its control and ties 
to the media, the ideology (in this case Gulenism) ceases to hold sway over the national populace 
because of opposition from the state and state sponsored and allied media groups. Gellner 
explained that if a widely-held ideology within the country is at loggerheads with the state, the 
government will use its influence in the media to destroy and/or weaken the control the ideology 
has over the nation’s populace. 
By 2015 Ozcan himself was erased from the national discourse in Turkey. Via a phone 
interview in September 2015 Ozcan’s assistant Sadik reported that Ozcan had managed to leave 
Turkey and was now residing “somewhere safe” outside of Turkey.369 
While the Gulen status group is the moving force behind the Turkish Olympics, it is 
important to note that when and which year the Turkish Olympics occurs often determines how 
much the Turkish Olympics has been purely a Gulenist affair or a joint Gulenist/Erdoganist 
project. Clearly, when the Turkish Olympics was a joint Gulenist/Erdogan event it was more 
successful nationally. However, as a solely Gulenist festival in 2014 and 2015 the Turkish 
Olympics gives scholars insights into the ways in which the Gulen status group is growing 
outside of Turkey. 
Whether held in Turkey or outside of Turkey, the Turkish Olympics Final is a window 
for scholars to see how Anatolian Islamists galvanize, politicize and combat one another for 
power and influence in a transforming Turkey. The micro-history of the Turkish Olympics Final 
in Turkey and (as of 2014 and 2015) in Germany, exemplify and reflect the macro-contested 
politics within Turkish Islamism from 2002 onward. Multiethnicism, “black” Turk nationalism 
and the production of education-based capital are all part of this contested political story. That 
some marginalized Gulenist elements in Turkey would reportedly support a coup against the 
Erdogan state is one more example of Islamist contestation in modern-day Turkey. 
 
Multiethnic Sunni Anatolian Audience Members at the Turkish Olympics 
The Turkish Olympics is one example of how the Gulen status group navigated the 
discourse between Kemalist/statist Turkishness and a Turkey of multiple ethnicities. 
Nuri Kuloglu, Multiethnic Turkiyeli Administrator and Organizer 
Nuri Kuloglu head of the Nil Cultural Center in Cairo, Egypt stated during his May 2014 
interview that he was a Kurd from Van province in eastern Turkey along the Iranian border. 
Kuloglu explained that he was active in the Gulen status group at university and upon graduating 
in the mid-1990s worked in a series of congregational schools in Central Asia and in Russia.370 
Kuloglu reports that as early as the 1990s, Gulenist schools in Central Asia were holding Turkish 
language competitions.371 Consequently, from the 1990s onward Turkish language competitions 
were part and parcel to the project of international Gulenist school production and growth.372 
Again the link between language and nationalism à la Gellner shows that Gulenist schools like 
SIS are oftentimes locations of Turkish nationalist deployment in an international context. 
While Kuloglu said that his native language was Kurdish and that he was Kurdish373, he 
used Turkish as a second native language to create a successful pedagogic career. A legend in the 
Gulen status group, Kuloglu was one of the Gulenist educators who pioneered new Turkish 
teaching techniques in Central Asian schools.374 In 2000 Kuloglu and a team of Gulenist 
educators published the Turkish language teaching textbook used years later by Gulenist schools 
(and non-Gulenist schools) across the world.375  
Weber’s ideas on presumed ethnicity, is helpful in understanding how Kuloglu possesses 
multi-ethnic identities. Weber stated that status group members create ethnicities from the 
subjective belief status group members have about their status group. Important to Kuloglu and 
the Gulen status group then is the Weberian idea that ethnic formation is the result of a status 
group’s effort to monopolize and grow their power. As a status group grows so too does its 
assumed and created myth of ethnicity. While the Gulen status group is far from considering 
itself a separate ethnicity in Turkey, Gulenism gathers members from multiple ethnic 
backgrounds and provides a space for social achievement so far as members accept the primacy 
of being Turkish. In the case with Kuloglu, using a status group orientated Gulenist Turkish 
ethnicity was key to his professional advancement and growth within the Gulen congregation. 
And yet, Kuloglu was able to openly discuss his Kurdishness during the ethnography. 
Kuloglu was also one of the founding teachers of the Turkish Olympics.376 Starting in 
2001, Turkish language competition groups from Central Asia – some of whom Kuloglu taught 
and led – were among the first international students to come to Turkey for Turkish language 
competitions.377 From 2001 to 2003 Kuloglu and other Gulenist educators held “proto-Turkish 
Olympics” language competitions in Turkey. In 2003 Gulen congregationalists working with the 
Erdogan state inaugurated the first official Turkish Olympics Final in Turkey, which brought 
international students from around the world to compete together. In 2005 organizers added 
opening and closing ceremonies rich with singing in Turkish and dancing traditional Turkish 
dances to the Turkish Olympics as a way to increase popularity of the Turkish Olympics with the 
Turks.378 Also organizers of the 2005 Turkish Olympics opened the Turkish Olympics to Turkish 
corporate sponsorship.379 As such, the 2005 Turkish Olympics was the first celebration where 
the general population of Turkey began to be aware of the Turkish Olympics.380  
Though Kuloglu did not discuss this matter, it seems likely that as a Kurdish man and one 
of the lead organizers of the Turkish Olympics, Kuloglu knew how to connect with the Kurdish 
community in Turkey. Kuloglu’s story shows that the success of the Turkish Olympics in non-
Turkish areas of Turkey has to be attributed – at least somewhat – to the fact that there were a 
number of leading organizers of the Turkish Olympics who happened to be multiethnic 
Turkiyeliler, that is non-Turkish Anatolians. An openness to multiple Anatolian ethnicities or 
cosmopolitanisms within the Anatolian context seems to have been necessary among the 
organizers of the Turkish Olympics. 
Ali Gunes, Multiethnic Turkiyeli Teacher and Audience Host 
“Ali Gunes,” twenty-seven, a Syrian Arab from Turkey’s Syrian border province of Sanliurfa 
encountered his first Turkish Olympics touring group in Antalya in 2009.381 At the time Gunes 
was in his second year of university, was far from home and was not a Gulen status group 
member. Gunes explains that he went to the touring Turkish Olympics out of curiosity.382 The 
performance occurred in the ancient Roman Amphitheatre of Aspendos. Says Gunes, “The show 
was, well… You know how they say that the first time you tasted a great dish it always stays on 
your palate? (My) first year as an audience member at the Amphitheatre in Aspendos was like 
that.”383 
Awestruck by the show and the Gulen status group’s work around the world, Gunes and 
his friends volunteered to work as security at the Olympics, keeping the audience and students 
away from dangerous parts of the Amphitheatre that had fallen into disuse.384 His work as a 
volunteer at the Turkish Olympics Tour in Anatolia was the impetus for Gunes volunteering for 
continued work with the Gulen congregation over the next year (2009 – 2010). When he 
graduated from university with a teaching degree in Physical Education, Gunes worked for one 
year as a Gulenist dormitory supervisor in Antalya. Then in 2011 Salahaldin International School 
in Cairo offered to employ Gunes as the school physical education teacher. Gunes accepted the 
offer and went to Egypt.  
The fact that Gunes spoke Turkish and Arabic natively made Gunes valuable both to 
Salahaldin and the Gulen status group.385 Besides his work as a teacher, Gunes was active as a 
translator and coordinator at the Turkish Olympics in Egypt.386 
That the Gulen Congregation has developed an environment, which is friendly to both 
Turks and the Sunni non-Turks of Anatolia shows a mastery of manpower organization and 
indoctrination. It is plausible to posit that were it not for Kuloglu’s founding work and Gunes’s 
acceptance of Gulenist Turkishness, the Turkish Olympics in Egypt would have never occurred 
in the version seen in 2014. 
It is important to note that openly speaking about the role of multi-
ethnicism/cosmopolitanism seemed to be somewhat taboo among Gulenists during fieldwork. 
This is unsurprising given that the Gulen status group is a Turkish nationalist organization with 
fundamental ties to the mono-ethnicism of Turanist and Kemalist Turkishness. While Kuloglu, 
Gunes and other non-Turkish Anatolian respondents discussed their 
Arabness/Lazness/Kurdishness etc., this research was only able to touch the surface of non-
Turkish Anatolian audience/organizer multi-ethnicism at the Turkish Olympics in both Turkey 
and Egypt. As such multi-ethnicism in the Gulen status group and at the Turkish Olympics needs 
further investigation. 
 
Egyptian Audience View of the Turkish Olympics in Egypt 
This section discusses how bonds of consent are created between Turkish Gulenists and 
the Egyptian audience vis-à-vis the Turkishness on display at the Turkish Olympics. In response 
to the Turkish nationalism and Turkishness at the Turkish Olympics and SIS, Egyptian parents 
and teachers at the Turkish Olympics in Egypt felt a closeness with Gulenist Turks around three 
concepts: Islamism, Occidentalism and Ottomanism. Each of these concepts have historic 
antecedents in nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and are linked to national identity 
production in Egypt and Turkey. 
Islamism and “Clean” Turks: Egyptian Audience Production at the Turkish Olympics in Egypt  
“Khayal,” forty-three, was the vice principal at the Beni Sweif’s Salahaldin branch 
school. Khayal called himself a committed Gulenist who came into the Gulen status group via 
the teachings of Fethullah Gulen. For Khayal, Gulenism had enlightened his own Islamism. Said 
Khayal, “I think the Turkish people are the best example of modern Muslims. I want all of our 
Muslims (Egyptian Muslims) to be like Turkish people. Turks are very hard working. They are 
nice, organized and clean.”387   
Khayal’s daughter ten-year-old “Mirna” won her competition and was slated to perform 
at the 2014 Turkish Olympics Finals but when the Finals were held in Germany, Salahaldin 
Gulenist educators cancelled the team trip of Egyptian finalists. Still, Khayal was proud of his 
daughter’s work and he supported her education within Gulenist schools, hoping eventually that 
she will go to Turkey to pursue higher education.388 
Khayal’s adoration of everything Turkish (“they are hardworking” etc.) embodies 
petroleum cosmopolitanism. Khayal sees the material wealth of Turkey and the Gulensits and 
wanted to be a part of this wealth production. In our interview Khayal was focused more on the 
wealth to be generated from connections with the Gulenists. 
Occidentalism and “Our Kids”: Egyptian Audience Production at the Turkish Olympics in Egypt  
A self-described “liberal Egyptian woman” and fluent in French and English, Hedayet, 
thirty-nine, was not a likely person to harbor feelings of anti-westernism and Occidentalism. 
Hedayet worked at a French radio channel in Cairo and prided herself on her open-mindedness 
and progressive worldviews.389  
Like many wealthy Egyptians, Hedayet wanted her eleven-year-old son Bahaaeldien to 
be educated in the “western style.”390 So she sent him to the best British and American private 
schools in Cairo. However, in these private schools his classmates picked on Bahaaeldien. 
Explained Hedayet, “The kids at the British and American international schools treated him 
terribly, kicking him on the bus… the administration in the foreign schools didn’t know how to 
deal with ‘our kids.’”391  
By “our kids” Hedayet said she was referring to “Middle Eastern” kids.392 Hedayet 
stressed that she did not want to appear prejudiced but believed that children in the Middle East, 
especially boys, “need to have a hard hand.”393 Stated Hedayet, “If the boys do not respect 
authority in the school they will treat overweight and creative kids like Bahaaeldien badly, like a 
mascot.”394  
When Hedayet sent Bahaaeldien to Salahaldin her biggest concern was that Salahaldin 
would provide discipline at the school and that Bahaaeldien – once in a safe environment – 
would be able to display his own creative skills. Hedayet and Bahaaeldien both attested to the 
high level of education and safe environment Bahaaeldien was a part of at Salahaldin 
International School. Hedayet concluded, “Turks understand us… So they understand our 
children and how to raise our children… Perhaps the Turks can even teach our Egyptian children 
better than our Egyptian schools can.”395 
Bahaaeldien was one of the most active performing students at the Turkish Olympics in 
Egypt. In the fieldwork Turkish Gulenist instructors like Principal Yildirim pointed to 
Bahaaeldien’s artistic and scholarly success at Salahaldin and the Turkish Olympics as signs of 
the good work the Gulenists do in Egypt. 
It is commendable that Hedayet wanted her son treated with respect at his school. Having 
been failed by Egyptians at the best international schools, Hedayet looked for a new kind of 
international elite school for Bahaaeldien. 
This example follows Bourdieu’s theory that the wealthy search for elite schools as a way 
to provide their children with educational capital. In this scholars see that education reproduces 
inequality and classism, not widespread growth and social mobility.   
Ottomanism: Egyptian Audience Production at the Turkish Olympics in Egypt 
Wael, fifty-five, member of the Egyptian government in Alexandria and father of Nabila, 
eleven, stated that Egypt and Turkey are “one heart” and that both countries came from the same 
Ottoman cradle.396 As such Wael believed that Egyptians and Turks should have a natural 
alliance in the world and that the Turkish nationalism displayed at the Turkish Olympics in 
Egypt was not offensive.397 Wael believed that displays of Turkish nationalism were tied to the 
greatness of Egypt itself.398 Weber’s presumed ethnicity and Smith’s cultural critique of 
ethnicity are on display in Wael’s words. Wael presumes the ethnic Egyptian is the same as the 
ethnic Turk and attaches a shared historical understanding of being Turkish and of being 
Egyptian. In understanding ethnicity scholars see the ethno-symbolic approach of Smith and the 
supposed approach of Weber are linked. Ethnicity is both presumed illogically (as per Weber) 
and connected to shared histories, myths and religions (as per Smith). In both thinkers, pre-
modern ethnicity is transformed in modernity to being a national identity. 
To begin to interrogate Khayal’s Islamism, Hedayet’s Occadentalism and Wael’s 
Ottomanism further, more research needs to be done on Egyptian national identity production 
and how that production connects, accepts and rejects aspects of Turkishness. This research 
would likely focus on Egyptian national identity production in relation to Egyptians 
understandings of Ottomanism, Mamlukid/Turkish white slavery and white master relations, 
Islamism and Turkish nationalism. The bedrock of this research would seek to investigate 
questions such as; how does a rebranded “black”/Gulenist Turkishness influenced by Islamism, 
multiculturalism and modernity affect the Egyptian audience at the Turkish Olympics in Egypt? 
How much can Egyptians accept a national ideal from Turkey and how do Egyptians understand 
“being Turkish”?  
 
Conclusion to the Ethnography of Audience Production at the Turkish Olympics 
In this ethnography we have seen that Gulenism is a political movement as much as it is 
an altruistic effort to “serve” humanity. This fact is not surprising. Gulenists are a status group 
with interests in many fields in Turkey. As per Weber, status groups are compelled into politics. 
If the Gulen congregation continues for many more years, it is possible a la Weber that Gulenists 
may even begin to develop their own presumed ethnicity. As such it appears quite natural that 
the Gulen status group would strive to apply their own version of “peace” on the Turkish nation 
and that in his process Gulenists would seek position and power in the private and public spheres 
of Turkey. Perhaps scholars can view the actions of some Gulenists during the July 15, 2016 
coup as an example of Gulenists developing their own presumed ethnicity. 
Academics of Turkey and the Gulen congregation can view the Turkish Olympics as a 
space to further Gulenism and Gulenist understandings of Turkishness to a Turkified audience. 
That the Erdogan state would ally with the Gulenists in the production of the Turkish Olympics 
(primarily from 2005 until 2013) can be understood as an alliance of Islamist “black” Turks and 
a resulting reinvention of Turkishness for Turks and multiethnic Turkiyeli.  
Reinvented Turkishness at the Turkish Olympics strives to answer the fundamental 
questions and conflicts of Turkey. In convincing audience members to accept a new version of 
Turkishness, Gulenist thinkers and organizers of the Turkish Olympics present an 
internationalized Turkishness which responds to the Kurdish/multiethnic/Turkiyeli question, the 








Concluding the Study of the Gulen Status Group’s Turkish Olympics in Egypt 
 
 Cihan Korkmaz, age twenty-five, was a Gulenist dance instructor sent from Turkey to 
educate performing students at the Turkish Olympics in Egypt. Korkmaz taught two teams from 
Salahaldin High School (SIS), the boy’s and the girl’s dance teams. Korkmaz could not speak 
Arabic (or any other language besides Turkish) and could only communicate with his Egyptian 
dance team members via SIS physical education teacher and Syrian/Turkish Arab, Ali Gunes. 
During practices Korkmaz – a lithe authoritarian instructor – would often shout at Egyptian and 
Turkish dance team members. The Egyptians did not understand Korkmaz’s berating, looking 
helplessly at fellow Turkish dance team members or Gunes for translations of what Korkmaz 
was yelling. 
During one break between dance practices I witnessed Korkmaz, Sevinc and Meltem 
Hanimeli – all Gulenists and in their mid-twenties – discussing the role of the Gulen status 
group’s educational network and the Turkish Olympics in the Arab world. Since 2013, besides 
coming to Egypt once a year to train the dancers for the Turkish Olympics at SIS, Korkmaz had 
also gone to Yemen to teach Turkish Olympics dance teams there.399 
 In the break Korkmaz said to Sevinc, Meltem Hanimeli and myself that the Arabs and 
their mosques were, “filthy” and need, “us (Turks) to progress… they are trapped in 
ignorance.”400 Korkmaz went on to state that Fethullah Gulen had told his congregation that the 
Arabs – because of their hard-headedness and ignorance – would be the last to comprehend and 
accept what the Gulen status group were doing in the world.401 Korkmaz went on to say that 
Allah had revealed Islam to Arabs first because the Arabs were the race most in need of 
enlightenment and that this state of affairs (the ignorance of Arabs) was the same today as it had 
been in the times of the Prophet.402 
During this conversation with Korkmaz, Sevinc and Meltem Hanimeli approved of and 
supported Korkmaz’s opinions. Meltem Hanimeli even gave examples of the backwardness of 
Yemenis as she had been stationed in Yemen before she got the assignment to come to Cairo. 
Hanimeli described gunfire in the city she had been stationed in Yemen but “Hamd olsun (God 
be praised) we were kept safe, doing the good work for the ‘service movement’ (Gulen status 
group).”403 
That Gulenist Turks would view themselves in their employment of Gulenist Islamism 
and Turkish nationalism as culturally superior to Arabs is in no way surprising. Precedents for 
Anatolian Turkish belief in their own cultural superiority over Arabs likely date back to Sultan 
Selim I’s invasion and conquest of much of the Arab world in 1517. This Anatolian Turkish 
feeling of superiority over Arabs likely intensified into hatred during TE Lawrence’s and Arab 
leaders’ insurrection against the Ottoman State four hundred years later. 
 Yet, the fact that cultural imperialism as expressed by Korkmaz and seconded by 
Hanimeli would continue to inform how Gulen status group members in their twenties view the 
Arab (Egyptian and Yemeni) school children with whom they worked, is emblematic of a unique 
cultural imperialism existent within the Turkish Olympics and the Gulen congregation. This 
Gulenist imperialism cloaks itself in the guise of iyi niyetler that is the “good intentions” of an 
Islamist group’s “service to humanity” all the while applying an Islamist and Turkish nationalist 
ideology based externally on neo-liberalism. 
This study has employed frameworks developed by Timothy Mitchell and Edward Said 
and focused on a global southern audience who have processed modernity and are now applying 
their brand of modernity to the greater world. As Turkey was one of the few nations outside of 
Europe which successfully resisted European colonial domination, Turks possess the credentials 
in the global south of being fellow “inferiors”/“easterners”/others but without the colonial 
historical “baggage” which goes along with such “credentials.” Initially as Ottomans and then as 
Turks, Anatolians instead have a history of forced modernization from the Kemalist Republican 
Turkish state. In a way, Turks colonized themselves from within via the actions of the 
isolationist Kemalist state. 
Gulenist Turks position themselves then as both outside and inside the colonial process. 
Organizations like the Gulen status group and events like the Turkish Olympics work to 
reinforce Turkishness and a Turkish approach to modernity both within Turkey and outside of 
Turkey. Outside of Turkey, Gulenist institutions and the Turkish Olympics can be understood as 
a version of neo-colonial south-on-south cultural imperialism. Meanwhile, Gulenists themselves 
discuss how they work to “moderate” the rest of the “poor world” into a new age of “peace 
among all humanity.”404 
Perhaps the most important aspect of this thesis work has been to begin a discourse in 
which this study of neo-imperialism/Ottomanism can deepen the academy’s understanding of 
twenty-first century power structures and economic relations between formally oppressed global 
southerners. 
 
Traveling Turkish Gulenist Children in the Turkish Olympics in Egypt 
For an imperialist/nationalist project to succeed, imperialists feel a need to create spaces 
where their children can proclaim nationalism for “the home country” and not “go native.” 
National spectacles such as the Turkish Olympics in Egypt provide self-proclamation and 
national proclamation spaces in which imperial milieus seek to reproduce nationalist sentiment in 
faraway lands. In the ethnography, many Turkish parents – some of whom were Gulenists and 
some of whom were not Gulenists – saw the Gulenist school network and the Turkish Olympics 
as an arena to inculcate their children in Turkishness.  
Similar to how international branches of the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts of America 
inculcate expatriate American children in being American, the Turkish Olympics provide a way 
to socialize expatriate Turkish children in Turkish nationalism. Yet a primary question remains: 
why would Gulenist parents who live in Turkey ship their children to a Gulenist school abroad? 
One reason is practical; the schooling for a child from a family part of the Gulen status group is 
free or highly subsidized by the congregation. Yet there are many Gulenist schools that Turkish 
Gulenist children can attend in Turkey.  
In Turkey, as abroad in Egypt, the Gulenist schools are for-profit institutions open to 
wealthy children irrespective of membership in the Gulen status group. Yet, Gulenist parents in 
Turkey may be incentivized to send their children to far away Gulenist schools in order to 
reproduce and strengthen the Gulen congregation abroad and to indoctrinate their children in 
Gulenism. Much like the Church of Latter Day Saints (LDS Church) requiring its young 
members to go on a mission away from the United States, the sending of young people transfers 
the energy of youthful rebellion into the energy of the Gulenist “service community” and 
indoctrinates young Gulenists into the religiosity of the Gulen status group.  
Further research would seek to answer how children from Gulenist families are selected 
to go to which country. Is the selection process akin to a religious lottery in which Fethullah 
Gulen or one of the leading “big brothers” of the Gulen congregation prays and then selects a 
slip of paper with a child’s name and another slip of paper with a country? Or do Gulenist 
parents have more control over where they send their children? Obviously these questions are 
mostly conjecture at this point and need more research. However, the issue of how Turkish 
children from Gulenist families come alone from their homes in Turkey to a distant land like 
Egypt and then participate in a nationalist/internationalist festival like the Turkish Olympics is 
fundamental to understanding the Gulen status group as a whole. 
Another question that needs further research is to what extent the now anti-Gulenist 
Erdogan led Turkish state has clamped down on Gulenist (and other dissenters’) schools and 
universities in Turkey especially following the failed July 15, 2016 coup. Since late 2013 
Erdogan and his allies have attacked a number of Gulenist institutions and even managed to 
close the largest Gulenist newspaper, Zaman. Further research into this topic would study how 
much the Gulen status group has been able to maintain its extensive educational, economic and 
media network in Turkey. Along with this study of private Gulenist institutions would also be 
research into Gulen congregationalists and their maintaining government positions within the 
public sphere in Turkey such as in the Turkish police, Turkish public prosecutor’s office and 
Turkish judicial networks. Following the mass arrests of supposed coup planners and 
sympathizers, this study would ask how successful the Erdogan-led state has been in ending 
Gulenist influence in this many sectors in Turkey. 
 
Gulenism and Neo-Liberalism; An Islamist Status Group Twist 
The ethnography on child performers at the Turkish Olympics in Egypt showed that the 
Gulen status group is involved in the privatization of education in Egypt at their elite school 
Salahaldin International School (SIS). The majority of students at SIS came from Egyptian 
families of means and pay tuition. However, the existence of subsidized education and room and 
board for students from Gulenist families and some Egyptian students from poor or middle class 
backgrounds shows how the Gulenist educational system is not purely neo-liberal in its interior 
functioning. Instead, we see a second and third aspect of the Gulenist educational network. The 
Turkish Olympics and the Gulen educational system at SIS worked to reinforce congregational 
belief among students/performers from Gulenist families and worked to indoctrinate into 
Gulenism students/performers from poor or middle class Egyptian families. 
A private elitist educational model while applied to one group of wealthy 
student/performers at SIS and the Turkish Olympics, did not apply to the other two groups of 
student/performers. The second group – children from Gulenist parents – was expected to take 
part in the Turkish Olympics as a way to reinforce their belief in Islamism and Turkish 
nationalism as understood by the Gulen status group. The third group – talented children from 
non-Gulenist families – was part of a meritocracy of indoctrination. If the third group accepted 
Gulenism and Gulenist understandings of Turkish nationalism displayed at the Turkish Olympics 
then they became part of the Gulen congregation and as such will presumably have many of the 
benefits provided to other co-congregationalists, regardless if they are native “Turks” or not. 
While the Gulenists adhere to a laissez-faire business model in the organization of SIS 
and their greater congregational network, the existence of a meritocracy (i.e. free education for 
students from non-Gulenist parents) within this neo-liberalizing Islamist status group presents 
scholars with new fields of research. Beyond the meritocracy of the Gulenist status group, once 
new members of the group join the group, how does the congregation protect employment 
opportunities for all members?  
In my work at the Gulenist TV channel, I have personally seen that Gulenists do not fire 
each other. If a person does not do well at his or her job; a new job is created or an easier job is 
given to the unsuccessful worker. One tradeoff I observed of full employment within the status 
group is that wages at status group controlled organizations are significantly lower than industry 
standards. However, with lower wages came the protection that the congregation provides. Free 
or subsidized education, full employment, health care and other benefits all belong to Gulen 
status group members.  
At this point the issue of class must be analyzed in any further investigation into the 
Gulen status group. While all members have access to education, health care and other benefits, 
do wealthy Gulenists have more access than rank and file Gulenists? Are non-Turkish Gulenists 
receive the same level of education, health care and other benefits that “Turkish” members of the 
status group receive? Also, how much does Fethullah Gulen’s interpretation of Islamism 
influence the economic production of the Gulen status group and in what ways is economic 
production influenced by ideological beliefs of the Gulen status group? These questions and 
others like them would likely inform scholars’ further work on the Gulen congregation and the 
Turkish Olympics. 
 
Gulenism and Gulen 
Abdelrahman reported that the other boys in the dormitory (boys of Turkish, Kazakh and 
Azerbaijani origin) hated the Gulen status group leaders in Egypt because the boys believed that 
the discipline standards for them at SIS and in the dormitory were harsh and not in line with what 
Imam Fethullah Gulen preached. Clearly Abdelrahman did not like aspects of the Gulen status 
group. His views, while important, must be interpreted remembering that he was kicked out of 
SIS and the affiliated Gulenist dormitory. Yet Abdelrahman’s statements on how other boys in 
the dormitory felt about the Gulen Congregation deserve investigation by scholars. 
In studying this example, scholars must be careful in delineating the difference between 
the man, Gulen and the ideology Gulenism which informs the sociological functioning of the 
Gulen status group.  
Given the power Gulen himself exerts over the Gulenist status group405, Gulen the man 
and Gulenism the ideology appear to be more or less linked. As such, it seems likely that the 
boys at the Gulenist dormitory in Cairo were wrong in thinking that Fethullah Gulen did not give 
his underlings direct instruction about how they should run Gulenist dormitories around the 
world. However, Gulenism and Gulen at times may be different (akin to Fordism and Ford, 
Leninism and Lenin, etc.). That the thinker’s intended meaning and the sociological power of the 
thinker’s writing when implemented would be different than what she had intended is not 
surprising. One need only look at Nietzsche and Nazism’s appropriation of Nietzschian thought 
to see a transformational knowledge producer’s ideas writ low into the filth of rightest fascism.  
While it is unlikely that the Nietzsche/Nazism example is apropos to this study, there is 
still a need for scholars to temper their critique of Gulen and the Gulenist status group especially 
when that critique is based wholly on direct quotes from Gulen’s writing. Scholarship based on 
quotes from Gulen that are not married to anthropological evidence in how the ideology is 
practiced on the ground is shallow scholarship indeed. 
 
Gulenist “Service to Humanity” and Islamist Capitalism 
Sema’s attendance at SIS and in the Turkish Olympics in Egypt is similar to the case of 
Yunis and Cengis (the two “boys of the future”) in that it shows how the Gulen status group 
proselytizes children into believing their status group works to serve humanity. Regardless of 
being Turkish or non-Turkish, once inside (or semi-inside) the Gulen congregation, members or 
potential members are indoctrinated through status group activities and attendance at Gulenist 
educational institutions. While the ethnographic evidence shows that the goal to proselytize is 
not overt, once inside the Gulen status group the inner layer proselytism begins to pull, like 
gravity, at a student/performer.  
Non-Turkish student performers at the Turkish Olympics (i.e. Ahmed and Abdelrahman) 
experienced this proselytizing pull upon becoming outsider internationalists. Even Turks who are 
not a part of the status group but are associated with the Gulen congregation feel a pull toward 
becoming a full member.406 Gulenists do not force potential members to join but there is a 
consistent process of “entreatment” on the potential member. Oftentimes potential members 
know what the Gulen status group wants of them.407 
Gulenist internationals are within the congregation and as such are separate and protected 
from the neo-liberalism the Gulen status group displays externally. Perhaps this deployment of 
internal protective-ism and external neo-liberalism could be called in modern parlance “Islamist 
capitalism.” The employment then of Islamist capitalism inside the Gulen congregation appears 
to reproduce community-friendly internal politics and oppose overt individualism. While wages 
are low, the ethnography shows that the Gulen status group provides social assistance to group 
members. 
One final note is that it is important to stress Gulenism is not at odds with the neo-liberal 
education/business model. I feel it necessary to state again that it is logical, and perhaps even 
necessary that without a protective state apparatus to defend them, people will naturally join 
status groups. Status groups like the Gulenists provide protection in the face of a retreating state 
from the effects of hyper-capitalism. 
 
Gender, the Nationalized “Turkish Woman” and Family in the Gulen Status Group 
 In the ethnography, the “ideal” Gulenist woman appeared to be both a believer in the 
Gulenist version of Sunni Islam and the mother of the Turkish nation. Even women who were 
not technically “Turkish” such as Sema said she possessed Turkishness as an extension of being 
part of the Gulen status group.  
Further research into the issues of femininity and nationalism needs to be done which 
feature Gulenist women’s perspectives on these issues. Researchers also have yet to study in 
depth how Gulenists marry and produce notions of masculinity and femininity within their status 
group and within their separate family units. 
A greater study then on families in the Gulen congregation would likely start by seeking 
to learn how Gulenists send their children to Gulenist schools around the world. A second study 
on gender and family in the Gulen status group would focus on the phenomenon of Gulenists 
inviting groups of non-Turkish parents and other congregational friends from various nations to 
Turkey for Gulen status group organized trips. Both of these studies (Gulenists families sending 
their children abroad and Gulenist families hosting traveling non-Turkish families and guests 
into Turkey) would likely discuss how Gulenists market themselves to parents as dependable 
educators of children. These studies would also give insights into Gulenist familial practices in 
the production of gender and family norms within a Turkish nationalized milieu. A third study 
which features non-Turkish Gulenists’ marriage practices would likely be the place to complete 
the unpacking the issues of family norms and gender production in Gulenism. 
 
  
Private Business Married to Privatized Education: The Gulen Status Group Model 
What is clear from this research of the Turkish Olympics in Egypt is that the spread of 
Turkish business in Egypt is linked to the Gulen status group school network.408 Salahaldin 
International School in Cairo (and other Gulenist language schools and high schools in Egypt) 
act as loci where Turkish business groups such as the Gulenist Business organization TUSKON 
(Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists) can network and do business with 
Egyptians.409 Given Salahaldin’s status as the leading Gulenist institution in the largest Arab 
nation, the school has regular visits from affiliated Gulenist media and business groups as well as 
Gulenist politicians from Turkey.410 Access to foreign and local investment as well as direct 
connections between first the Morsi and then the El Sisi governments means that the Gulenist 
enterprise in Egypt (though limited by the El Sisi led state) continues to flourish in a time of 
political turmoil between Egypt and Turkey.411  
Importantly, the Gulen status group education/economic network is not relegated only to 
Egypt. Respondents report that the Gulen status group seeks to replicate its 
economic/educational network throughout its worldwide system of schools. This means that the 
Gulenist education/economic loci system in Salahaldin and Egypt is the norm across the 
international Gulen network, not the exception.412 
Turkey’s foreign economic and political growth since the end of the Cold War may be 
the reasons for the growth of the Gulen status group. This Turkish economic growth might 
ultimately be the driving force behind the spread of Turkey-based economic and political power 
in the Muslim majority world. During the recent years of unilateral American dominance, 
Turkey has successfully carved for itself more military and economic regional autonomy.413 
Internally Erdogan’s capitalist Islamist “black” Turk roots made him both a populist politician 
and a transformative leader with access to foreign investment.  
Though no solid evidence has come to light as of yet, it appears plausible that the Gulen 
status group procured for Erdogan’s domestic allies some of the foreign investment that came 
into Turkey from 2002 until the 2013 break between the Gulenists and Erdogan’s AK Party. 
How and from which source this supposed foreign investment came into Turkey over Erdogan’s 
political career needs more research by scholars and investigative journalists. 
 
Financial Transparency in the Gulen Status Group 
Gulenists in the ethnography were quite open about sharing with me many aspects of 
their educational network and the production of the Turkish Olympics. However, even after my 
multiple requests for direct financial records and interviews with donors of the Turkish 
Olympics, Gulenist administrators such as Ozcan, Yildirim and Gokhan refused to give me 
access to accounting numbers and donors. Leading Gulenists would only say when questioned 
that Turkish donors and local Egyptian leaders who believed in the vision of Fethullah Gulen 
funded Salahaldin International School and the Turkish Olympics in Egypt. 
This lack of transparency as to how the Turkish Olympics or the Gulen status group are 
funded gives plausibility to a theory posited by some Turkish and foreign observers of the Gulen 
status group/congregation. Given Fethullah Gulen’s own exile in the US and the subsequent 
Gulenist connections to powerful Americans from Gulenist dialogue centers across the US and 
the Gulen status group’s championing of privatization and anti-regulation, this theory posits that 
the United States government seeks to support the growth of the worldwide Gulen status group.  
Critics of the Gulen status group in Turkey such as media and political allies of the AKP 
and President Erdogan, purport that this US government support is given secretively to the 
Gulenists by the CIA and other covert American organizations. Adherants to this theory state 
that the reason for this supposed American support of the Gulenist congregation is that the 
Gulenist educational network – wherever it goes and whatever it does – oftentimes furthers a 
version of moderated Islam amendable to neo-liberalism in Muslim majority nations. 
Any further study then on the Gulen status group and/or the Turkish Olympics will need 
to discuss this theory and investigate further the finances which make the Gulen status 
group/congregation’s educational network and the Turkish Olympics possible. Gulenists should 
look at further investigations into their finances not as dangerous or threatening invasions, but 
instead as a chance to verify once and for all to the world that the funding of their international 
network is transparent and connected with their altruistic goal of “serving humanity.” 
 
Final Conclusions on Child Indoctrination at the Turkish Olympics 
 From the fieldwork I have personally developed three indoctrination steps which non-
Turkish children undergo into the Gulen status group via the Turkish Olympics. The first I have 
called “comradery internationalism.” The second is “outsider internationalism” and the third 
stage and full acceptance into the Gulen congregation is called “international Gulenism.” 
Certainly Turkish or non-Turkish Anatolian students are a part of these indoctrination steps but 
their direct access into the Gulen status group is made easier than international non-Turkish 
students. Turkish students gain easier direct access into Gulenism because they and their families 
are inherently a part of Turkish nationalism which is the preeminent nationalism active in the 
Gulen congregation. 
Gulenist leaders in Egypt chose which Egyptian children to support with scholarships and 
dormitory residency.414 Occasionally Gulenist leaders placed student subjects into the dual roles 
of outsider internationalist and comradery internationalist. This was the case with Ahmed and 
Abdelrahman. However, usually Egyptian student performers only stayed at the level of 
comradery internationalist and did not become outsider internationalists. This likely happened 
because the Gulenists build their schools, dormitories, hospitals and universities to make 
money.415 As such, indoctrinating all Egyptian performing students at the Turkish Olympics into 
Gulenism is possible in a superficial manner as expressed in comradery internationalism. 
However, for the Gulen status group to go deeper and subjugate hearts and minds of 
performing students using the carrots of fully or partially subsidized scholarships and free living 
space would have been financially detrimental to the Gulenist for-profit business model. As such 
opening student access to the second stage of indoctrination had to be limited to children of 
talent that the Gulen status group could tie to its congregation vis-à-vis scholarships and the 
carrot of free educational capital. Once Egyptian students became members in the Gulenist 
meritocracy of indoctrination they became outsider internationalists and eventually Gulenist 
internationalists. 
The ethnography shows that the meritocracy of indoctrination that is connected to 
outsider internationalism is part of a larger existential component in Gulenist status group 
organization. Many of the officials of the Gulen status group in Egypt and in Turkey state that 
they themselves came from poor families and were only able to reach a higher economic and 
educational level by membership in the Gulen congregation. That these same individuals would 
organize a meritocracy of indoctrination in Egypt connected to SIS and the Turkish Olympics is 
not surprising. Also given the international standardization across the Gulen status group, the 
field work shows that in every nation Gulenism is active, a version of outsider internationalism 
connected with a meritocracy of indoctrination exists. Scholars can see from this research that 
new generations of Turkish and non-Turkish international students enter into the Gulen status 
group as outsider internationalists connected to the Gulenist meritocracy of indoctrination. One 
country of possible research on this topic would be the United States where as of 2010 Gulenists 
ran the second largest affiliated Charter School network in the country. Given the illegality of 
mixing religion and education with public Charter School funds how do Gulenist dormitories and 
the meritocracy of indoctrination function in Gulenism in the US? 
The ethnographic evidence shows that deep indoctrination into the status group begins 
with the Gulen congregation’s dormitory system.416 The removal of Abdelrahman was an 
important example. Once in the dormitory system Abdelrahman could either accept the Gulen 
status group or not. In Abdelrahman’s case the heaviness of Gulenist Islamism became 
intolerable for him and he reacted with forbidden love and dangerous late night romantic 
meetings. The fact that Abdelrahman could not function in the dormitory system was a test. 
Upon failing the test, Gulenist leadership removed Abdelrahman from the status group. In the 
Gulenist system the dormitory then is the threshold of full indoctrination into the 
congregation.417 
Further research into the internal politics of the male and female Gulenist Dormitory 
system in Egypt is fundamental to understanding how the Gulen status group creates 
indoctrination among children. During this research process the role of the Gulenist “big brother” 
agabey (one agabey runs each male dormitory) or “big sister” abla (one abla runs each female 
dormitory) will be important in understanding how students and performers structure their lives 
and learn about the world. Scholars will need to study performance in the Turkish Olympics as a 
component of the students’/dormitory residents’ structuring and learning processes. Researchers 
ought to study how Gulenist “big brothers” and “big sisters” become coaches, teachers, 
administrators and dormitory leaders in the Gulen educational network and at the Turkish 
Olympics. 
Despite the Erdogan government’s arrests and closures of status group organizations, 
Turkey continues to be the center and home of the Gulen status group. However, as the status 
group spreads internationally, denizens from countries with extensive Gulenist educational 
institutions are important in understanding how the Gulen congregation employs its third version 
of internationalism. Gulenist internationalism and it is the final step in the three step process of 
non-Turkish child subjugation into the Gulen status group vis-à-vis the Turkish Olympics. 
It is important to note the role of the family over a student’s indoctrination into the Gulen 
congregation. Were Salma’s or Mariam’s or Nada’s or Laila’s families not acquiescent and 
supportive of Turkey and their children’s Turkish School in Cairo, it is unlikely these four 
Egyptian girls would be dancing Turkish dances or singing Turkish songs at the Turkish 
Olympics. For this reason, Gulenist schools are supportive of parents visiting Turkey on trips 
organized by the Gulen status group. 
 
Final Conclusions on Audience Production at the Turkish Olympics 
From 2003 to 2013, the Turkish Olympics called on Turkish citizens to host thousands of 
visiting international school children traveling across Turkey.418 Consequently, during the 
Turkish Olympics in Turkey an Amedi Kurd, a Sanliurfan Arab or a Trabzonian Laz became 
normalized as “Turkish hosts” by the presence of touring international child performers in their 
provinces. This acceptance of an internationalized “Turkish host” by audience members was 
based on a new national Turkish identity. The Turkish Olympics then is a space/festival where 
“black” Turks and non-Turkish Sunni Anatolians appropriate the Kemalist exclusive claims on 
Turkishness and spread a new inclusive Turkish identity. As such some audience members from 
Turkey believe they become empowered citizens by watching the Turkish Olympics.419 And 
perhaps in some ways audience members do in fact become more empowered. 
In the fieldwork many Gulenist respondents believed that the Turkish Olympics in both 
Egypt and Turkey was a natural social osmosis; a project of enlightenment created from the 
collective subconscious of the Turkish people and then given to the world as a gift. “Black” 
Turks that is indigenous Anatolian Turks and non-Turks of Anatolian origin (Laz, Circassian, 
Arab, Hemsirin and Kurds) were marginalized groups in Kemalist Turkey. The growing power 
of the Erdogan state and the Gulen status group gave these multi-ethnicities and “black” Turks 
more political and economic power in Turkey. This new Turkey – that is the Turkey of the 
Turkish Olympics – is linked to the successes of the Erdogan state and the Gulen status group. 
At different times both the Gulen congregation and the Erdogan state used the Turkish Olympics 
as a place of national reinvention and indoctrination into “black” Turkishness.  
Islamism and multi-ethnicism both have a place in this new Turkishness of the Turkish 
Olympics. Sunni Islamist “hosts” accept the new Turkishness identity as a precursor to active 
work within the Gulen status group and the Turkish Olympics. The Turkish Olympics then 
becomes an engine to introduce employment and deployment into the international Gulen 
congregational network. 
It is at this point that more research needs to be done on the exact status group structures 
by which an educator or other worker within the status group (such as Emre Buyukgoz, the chef 
of SIS and father of Su Buyukgoz) gains employment to work in the vast Gulenist network. 
Possibly there is a computer database of names and abilities or some other way of organizing the 
resources of the Gulen status group to help congregational leaders select work applicants to fill 
job positions. 
Leading Gulenist representative in Egypt, Ibrahim Gokhan (Gokhan was a Laz from 
Trabzon) explained that the Turkish Olympics was a way for the world to understand “who the 
Turks are today.”420 Said Gokhan: “From the past there was an image of the Turk. It was 
connected to the Ottoman Empire first and then as the (Republican) ‘Turk’ afterward. Now there 
is a different image because of the Turkish Olympics.”421 Gokhan’s words reflect the “black” 
Turks’ and non-Turkish Sunni Anatolians’ changing views of being “Turkish” at the Turkish 
Olympics. 
The concepts of a multiethnic Turkiyeli (a citizen of Turkey) and Sunni Islamism 
exemplify historical continuity with earlier Republican and Ottoman understandings of self. 
Gokhan’s mentioning of an Ottoman heritage connected to the Turkish Olympics harkens back 
to the Tanzimat and the Ottoman state’s drive for a multi-ethnicism called “Ottomanism” within 
the Ottoman State. As such Ottomanism of the past connects with Turkiyelilik (multi-ethnicism) 
of the present among the Turkish audience at the Turkish Olympics. Sunni Islamism was an 
ideology of social change and unity in the late Ottoman State. Similarly, Islamism continues to 
transform and influence identity production in Turkey today in that it presents audiences with an 
ideology of social unity opposed to the laicism of Kemalism. 
This research has shown how a reinvented Turkishness animates “Turkish” audiences at 
the Turkish Olympics. Besides more studies into the Egyptian audience at the Turkish Olympics, 
studies into “black” Turkish multiculturalism would help scholars better understand a 
transforming Turkey. Overall, this research has called into question the naturalness of 
Turkishness, the Turkish Olympics and the “enlightened” modernity of Kemalism and Gulenism. 
 
Gulenist Belief and Meaning: the Raison D'Etre of the Turkish Olympics 
Gulenists believe they are a part of a worldwide service-to-humanity movement. To this 
end, Gulenists have built schools, universities, hospitals and dormitories across the globe. They 
have done this work in the span of twenty-five years. Rank and file Gulenists in the fieldwork 
made little money and many of them withstood challenging living conditions in order to raise 
their families in lands far from home. 
Gulenists have belief. And their congregational leaders have an ability to hold and wield 
educational and economic capital. Presently the Gulen status group is hurting in Turkey. The 
most recent reports I have received from Gulenists are that Gulenist activities in Turkey have 
gone underground. Yet my contacts are adamant that Gulenism is not finished in Turkey. They 
state that theirs is an international “service movement” built to last.  
The Turkish Olympics is the driving engine of indoctrination for audience members and 
performing children into this congregation. As long as there is a Gulen status group, the festival 
known as the Turkish Olympics will continue. This is because the production of the Turkish 
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